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Abstract 
The EU has made the area of democracy, human rights, rule of law and 
good governance a priority cooperation area under the framework of the EU 
Strategy towards Central Asia. The inclusion of strong normative elements 
into the Strategy was both due to the EU’s commitment to democratic 
principles and the lack of democratisation progress in Central Asia.  
This thesis examines two interrelated questions: To what extent has EU 
democracy promotion in Central Asia been successful, and why? Focusing 
on the implementation of EU democracy promotion instruments the thesis 
has made three original contributions. First, it adds to the existing research 
on democracy promotion mechanisms and provides a comprehensive 
analytical framework for evaluation of democracy promotion, inclusive of 
factors which may facilitate or impede democracy promotion in Central Asia. 
Second, this thesis demonstrates the validity of a holistic approach to 
analysing factors impeding democracy promotion. It acknowledges that a 
variety of diverse factors affect external democracy promotion and their 
impact can vary as international, regional and domestic conditions change.  
Third, two original case studies were presented and analysed with taking 
into consideration relevant contextual conditions, which might affect the 
design, implementation and outcomes of EU democracy promotion. Case 
study approach offers a highly contextual solution to examining external 
democracy promotion. It allows for a depth of analysis and adds to the 
existing body of literature, which usually either focuses on individual 
democracy promotion projects or provides a shallow overview of EU 
activities in Central Asia. The thesis focused on the stable and wealthy 
authoritarian Kazakhstan and poorer Kyrgyzstan, which is prone to political 
instability but also to democratic openings. The case studies represented the 
country with more strategic importance for the EU (Kazakhstan) and the 
country with less strategic importance for the EU (Kyrgyzstan) in order to 
see how non normative interests interfere with normative interests 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
In 1991, on the eve of the Gulf War, Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens 
gave an unflattering characteristic to the European Communities: "an 
economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm” (as cited in Whitney 
1991, no pagination). His words became a declaration of a problem and, 
though unintentionally, were followed by more than two decades of intense 
activities aimed to harmonise the interests and policies of the EU member-
states and to establish functional mechanisms to articulate, consolidate and 
pursue the EU interests worldwide. 
In the course of more than 20 years the European Communities transformed 
into the European Union (EU), a unique international actor which consists of 
28 member states and is characterised with a complex multi-dimensional 
governance system. The EU now has the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), an authorised official to speak on the behalf of the EU - High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR for FASP), and a 
foreign policy body - the European External Action Service (EEAS 2015a, no 
pagination). While the EU’s external foreign policy might still lack effective 
implementation mechanisms and unity in decision making, one should admit 
that the EU is no longer a “political dwarf”, but a regional power with a global 
ambition and a normative agenda. The EU’s ability to assert political 
influence has proven itself in the ambitious enlargement rounds, but its 
capacity to impact the countries beyond its immediate borders remains 
limited. In this regard, EU efforts to promote democratic principles in Central 
Asia deserve particular attention as they take place in an unfamiliar and 
largely authoritarian region, which does not have any accession prospects. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the five Central Asian republics, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan faced the 
daunting challenge of nation-building, state-building, drastic political and 
socio-economic reforming, and finding their niche in the international system. 
The Central Asian countries have gone different pathways in their pursuit of 
new statehood. Some of them chose a quick transition to market economy 
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and underwent the “shock therapy” reforms (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), 
while others preferred gradual and partial transition from command economy 
to market economy (Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) (Blackmon 2011, pp.15-
28). Kyrgyzstan sought to integrate into the international community as much 
as possible and joined a variety of international organisations. Turkmenistan, 
on the other hand, declared “positive neutrality” and virtually abstained from 
participation in any globalisation processes or regional integration efforts 
(Kavalski 2010, pp.184-185).  
Most of Central Asian countries declared their commitment to building 
democracy and incorporated such key democratic principles and institutions 
as separation of powers and regular elections into their constitutions. 
However, none of them can be considered free or democratic at the time of 
writing this thesis. The democratisation efforts vary from dynamic in 
Kyrgyzstan, scant in Uzbekistan, and non-existent in Turkmenistan.  
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan regularly find themselves at the bottom of 
international democratic ratings (Bertelsmann Transition Index 2015b; 
Freedom House 2015); Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are in a slightly better 
position, but still rated not free (Bertelsmann Transition Index 2015b; 
Freedom House 2015). Kyrgyzstan seems to display more willingness and 
effort to democratise but has not yet been able to build a sustainable or 
stable democratic system.  
These processes were accompanied with an increasing involvement of 
external powers, who in one form or another attempted to get acquainted 
with the region, explore possibilities for cooperation, or even assist political 
change by promoting principles of Western liberal democracy. The EU has 
become one of the most visible external normative actors in the region.  
 
1.1 EU Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: A Challenging Task in an 
Unfamiliar Region 
In 2007, under the German Presidency, the Council of the EU issued a 
strategy towards Central Asia, which outlined seven priority areas of the 
EU’s bilateral and regional cooperation with Central Asia: human rights, rule 
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of law, good governance and democratisation, youth and education, 
economic development, trade and investment, energy and transport links, 
environmental sustainability and water, common threats and challenges, 
and, intercultural dialogue (Council of the EU 2007, no pagination). While 
Central Asian governments and the EU share an interest in some of these 
cooperation areas, democracy-related activities are often considered 
sensitive and challenging.  
Due to historical and political circumstances democracy promotion has 
become an integral and almost obligatory component of EU foreign policy or, 
as it is often called, external action. The EU’s creation and development 
have been closely interrelated with a set of values lying at the core of its 
identification. The values of human rights, freedom, democracy, equality and 
the rule of law are attributed to the all-encompassing inheritance of Europe 
and serve as the normative foundation of the EU’s existence (Treaty on the 
European Union 2012, Preamble, Art.2). In compliance with the Treaty on 
the European Union, the Union’s external action should be guided by 
democratic principles (article 21, European Union 2012b). Democracy is 
seen as both an objective and a condition of meaningful cooperation with 
third countries (European Council 1991).  
In Central Asia, EU efforts to promote democracy are conditioned with a 
variety of contributing motives. Firstly, the EU is driven by the general motive 
to foster liberal democracy in the world (Kotzian et al 2011, pp.995-996) and 
extend its normative power beyond its borders (Manners 2008, pp.570-571). 
As mentioned earlier, democracy lies at the core of the EU identification and 
promotion of this identity abroad is a natural progression of domestic 
democracy consolidation policy. Secondly, the European Security Strategy 
identifies the spread of democracy as a strategic foreign policy objective: 
“The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic 
states” (European Council 2003, p.10). Thirdly, democracy is 
instrumentalised in development policy thanks to the wide-spread, yet 
contested, assumption that democracy facilitates development of a peaceful 
and prosperous international system. In this regard, the EU mainstreams 
democracy into its development policy (Schraeder 2002, pp.15-55). Finally, 
the EU’s involvement in the region might also owe to non-normative 
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interests. Rich energy supplies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan play a 
substantial role in the EU’s motivation to engage in the region (Denison 
2009, pp.5-7).  
Democracy promotion in Central Asia has become a litmus test for the EU’s 
capacity to assert influence beyond the immediate European 
neighbourhood. The EU has developed a range of instruments to promote 
democratic principles in third countries (Kotzian et al. 2011, p.997-1003), but 
the most effective ones are related to the prospects of membership in the 
EU. Since the EU cannot offer membership to the Central Asian states it has 
to rely on other instruments: positive conditionality instruments (e.g. 
development aid, closer cooperation, trade privileges); negative 
conditionality instruments (sanctions, critical statements); and, normative 
suasion through dialogue and persuasion (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 
2008; Warktosch 2008; Axyonova 2011; Axyonova 2014). EU democracy 
promotion in Central Asia is spread across various budget lines (the 
Development Cooperation Instrument - DCI; European Institute for 
Democracy and Human Rights - EIDHR), and is implemented by a variety of 
actors, including Brussels-based officials at the DCI and European External 
Action Service (EEAS), the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, and 
the EU Delegations to respective Central Asian states (Urdze 2011). 
Despite the fact that the EU had invested certain efforts in supporting 
democracy in Central Asia, the EU’s democracy promotion record remains 
uneven. There are two diverging views on the effectiveness and success of 
EU democracy promotion efforts in Central Asia and the line of 
disagreement lies between the policy makers and academic communities. 
On one hand, the European Commission’ and Council’s joint progress 
reports (2008, 2010, 2012) continuously emphasise positive advances in 
democracy promotion area. On the other hand, the majority of the existing 
research on the EU-Central Asian relations indicates that the EU democracy 
promotion progress has been uneven and weak (Matveeva 2006; Warkotsch 
2011; Hoffman 2010; Axyonova 2011 and 2014). Monitoring data provided 
by third parties, international organisations such as the International Crisis 
Group and the Human Rights Watch, report a steady record of human rights 
violations, abuse of power, distorted justice, inequality and all-penetrative 
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corruption, demonstrate rather flawed democratic development in all five 
Central Asian republics (International Crisis Group 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 
2013, and 2015; Freedom House 2015; Human Rights Watch 2015a and 
2015b; Bertelsmann Transition Index 2015). While each Central Asian 
republic displays a unique political setting, varying degrees of freedom and 
openness, different extent of the observation of human rights, they share 
one important feature – none of them are democratic. The entire region is 
among the most authoritarian areas in the world (Boonstra 2015, no 
pagination). Under these circumstances, EU democracy promotion presents 
a curious case, which might provide certain insights into the broader field of 
democratisation studies, Central Asian studies and EU studies. 
 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
This thesis analyses EU democracy promotion efforts in Central Asia under 
the framework of the EU’s Strategy towards Central Asia 2007-2013 and in 
relation to its implementation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. At that, it aims 
to reveal a holistic picture of the state of affairs on the ground taking into 
account the EU, local Kazakh, Kyrgyz and wider regional contexts. An 
analysis such as this makes an up-to-date empirical contribution linking the 
well-researched EU studies with the under-developed area of Central Asian 
studies through the lenses of democratisation and external democracy 
promotion studies. Based upon original interview data collected during a 
series of fieldwork research trips to Belgium, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
and a wide range of secondary sources, the thesis addresses the underlying 
reasons behind the EU’s involvement in Central Asia; discusses and 
evaluates EU democracy promotion policy and its implementation; examines 
local conditions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; and, identifies EU, domestic 
Kyrgyz and Kazakh, and wider regional factors which might impede a 
successful implementation of EU democracy promotion activities in a highly 
authoritarian setting like that of Central Asia.  
In order to address the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion policy in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and the factors which might have impeded its 
implementation, I endeavour to find an answer to the following primary 
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research question: To what extent has EU democracy promotion in 
Central Asia been successful, and why? This research question helped 
establish the research design (discussed further in this chapter) and define 
the methods of data collection and analysis. The question was intentionally 
left open-ended to ensure a sufficiently large research frame for what is a 
genuinely big picture on the ground. However, in order to structure the 
research and narrow down the focus I have used a set of secondary 
questions: 
What local contextual factors in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan might 
affect external democracy promotion? 
How does the EU promote democratic principles in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan? 
To what extent have EU democracy promotion mechanisms and 
instruments been used in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? 
How does broader regional environment affect EU democracy 
promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? 
 
The thesis finds that EU democracy promotion has not been successful in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan due to three sets of factors. The first set of 
factors is the EU-related factors. As a democracy promotion agent, the EU 
often lacks political will, leverage and consistency in the implementation of 
democracy-related programming. In addition, the divergence and different 
prioritisation of normative and non-normative interests by various EU 
stakeholders makes the democracy promotion in Central Asia challenging. 
The second set of factors impeding EU democracy promotion in Central Asia 
is due to the political idiosyncrasies, the stability of the Kazakh 
authoritarianism and the general political instability in Kyrgyzstan, and other 
local factors. The last set of factors refers to the larger regional framework 
and the ongoing opposition of key regional powers – China and Russia, who 
are less than happy with what they consider a Western ideological 
intervention into their legitimate backyard.  
The thesis has three main original contributions. First, it provides a thorough 
and tailored analytical framework for evaluation of democracy promotion and 
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factors which might impede democracy promotion in Central Asia. Second, 
two original case studies are presented and analysed with taking into 
consideration relevant contextual conditions which might affect the design, 
implementation and outcomes of EU democracy promotion. Third, this thesis 
demonstrates the validity of a holistic approach to analysing factors 
impeding democracy promotion. The existing research on EU democracy 
promotion in Central Asia often focuses only on one set of factors, usually 
either on the EU or on the local context, prioritising it over others. This 
research acknowledges that a variety of diverse factors affect external 
democracy promotion and their impact can vary as international, regional 
and domestic conditions change.  
 
1.3 Research Design 
In order to ensure a comprehensive answer to the stated research 
questions, I apply an iterative or circular research design. Two pre-
conditions informed the choice of the iterative research design. Firstly, the 
complexity and multi-dimensional nature of the research topic required a 
holistic and reasonably flexible approach, which gives sufficient space to 
reflect upon discovered empirical data gathered during the data collection 
stage. Secondly, this design helps to address the lack of established 
research frameworks in this field of studies.  
An iterative research approach does not seek to test a single theory. 
Instead, it allows for a thorough and open-minded exploration of various 
explanations of why the EU has or has not been successful in promoting 
democratic principles in Central Asia, and facilitates taking into account a 
broad range of factors which might impede democracy promotion in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
For the purposes of this research project I apply exclusively qualitative 
research. Semi-structured elite interviews, key treaties, policy documents 
and declarations are the core primary sources for analysis. In addition, this 
thesis builds its argument upon the existing research on EU as a democracy 
promotion agent, general Central Asian studies research, and 
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democratisation and external democracy promotion literature. EU 
democracy promotion in Central Asia is a recent political development, 
which has not yet been examined to its full potential. Nevertheless, there is 
an emerging body of literature, which focuses on various aspects of EU 
actions or inaction as a democracy promotion agent in Central Asia. Notable 
researchers include Vera Axyonova, Fabienne Bossuyt, and Alexander 
Warkotsch. In addition, the EU-Central Asia Monitoring Project (EUCAM) 
provided a broad range of empirically rich material and well-informed 
analysis.  
In an attempt to strike a balance between depth of analysis and breadth of 
utilised data, the research uses a dual case study design focusing on EU 
democracy promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan between 2007 and 
2013. The period under examination corresponds with the timeframe of the 
ambitious EU’s Strategy for Central Asia, which set the support to 
democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance as one of the 
priority cooperation areas and provided the impetus to EU democracy 
promotion activities in the region (Council 2007). External democracy 
promotion involves a variety of actors and is informed by a multitude of 
factors. At the most basic level, an external democracy promotion case 
should involve at least two parties: a democracy promotion agent and a 
target country. In this research, the EU is analysed in its capacity of a 
democracy promotion agent in the two target countries – Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan.  
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are two of the five post-Soviet Central Asian 
republics, which have emerged as sovereign actors in the international 
system in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse. For more 
than 70 years, these countries were tightly integrated with Russia, and have 
virtually no historical record of interaction with external powers in the 20th 
century. In the 21st century, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan face an opportunity 
and a challenge to interact with numerous powers, some of which aim to get 
involved in their political and economic development, and assert influence 
over the region of Central Asia (Edwards 2003; Rumer et al 2007).  
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The governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrate varying 
degrees of, at least, formal declarative acceptance of the concepts of human 
rights, rule of law, good governance and democratisation. Generally, their 
declarations and legal acts indicate that they might share European values 
(see Kazakhstan’s strategy paper “Path to Europe 2009-2011” issued in 
2008, and the Constitutions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). However, the 
situation with democracy, human rights, and rule of law has not changed 
significantly since the Soviet time despite the adoption of liberal laws, 
democratic declarations and general openness to the “outer” world. Instead, 
the region remains largely authoritarian with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, 
where a degree of democracy does exist when compared to its immediate 
neighbours, though not as consolidated and liberal as compared to Europe. 
So, may one speak of a successful democracy promotion, promoted by such 
external actors as the EU, in Central Asia, and why has it been successful or 
unsuccessful? This research will attempt to provide possible answers and 
explanations. Upon completion, the research will represent an accessible 
account of explicit and hidden impediments to external democracy promotion 
projects in Central Asia, and as such, contribute to the general 
understanding of democracy promotion processes in post-authoritarian 
societies and hybrid regimes, and have practical value for those involved in 
democracy promotion efforts.  
These two Central Asian countries were chosen as the case studies for the 
research project for several reasons. Kyrgyzstan represents a good case to 
demonstrate the EU’s role and strategy in the light of the interplay between 
the normative mission and security interests. It is a poor country with 
security problems that might indirectly affect the EU: political instability, 
illegal migration, drug and human trafficking, porous borders, and proximity 
to centres of extremist activity. Therefore, democracy here is considered not 
only as an aim in itself, but also as a mean to facilitate domestic security and 
stability, and to contribute to regional and global security. Kazakhstan is the 
largest and richest Central Asian country and the principal hydrocarbon 
exporter from Central Asia with developed gas fields and substantial 
reserves of oil (Denison 2009, p.4). As such, Kazakhstan serves as a good 
case to demonstrate how prioritisation of non-political issues might affect 
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democracy promotion. Secondly, the overall context of the two countries is 
significantly different from each other and as such may contribute to a more 
holistic understanding of the region. Both countries are often labelled as 
hybrid regimes, political systems that combine elements of autocracy and 
democracy. However, if one imagines a scale of hybrid regimes stretching 
from authoritarianism to democracy, Kazakhstan is located closer to the 
authoritarian extreme, while Kyrgyzstan tends to fluctuate towards the 
democratic end of the scale. Kazakhstan is an authoritarian state with a 
stable economic and social situation thanks to the Caspian petro-wealth and 
gas, whereas Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest Central Asian countries with 
an unstable political situation and prospects for further social unrest, but 
strong democratic tendencies (International Crisis Group 2010a). Third, 
despite significant differences in the economic and political setting, both 
countries share similar experiences of post-Soviet state-building and 
democracy-building. In addition, they share a common foreign policy feature: 
they are relatively open to cooperation with global and regional powers. 
Kazakhstan has once claimed its commitment to the European path of 
development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, 2008), but in reality 
it adhered to a multi-vector foreign policy which refers to a pragmatic, 
interest-based policy aimed to maintain good relations with as many 
international actors as possible without any explicit prioritisation of strategic 
partnerships (Ipek 2007, p.1183). For the poorer Kyrgyzstan the multi-vector 
foreign policy is a matter of necessity. As a small low income landlocked 
country, Kyrgyzstan has to take the need to rely on external resources into 
consideration in its foreign policy decision making (Foreign Policy Concept of 
Kyrgyzstan 2007, no pagination). Given the considerable experience of 
cooperating with Europe, including joint efforts to consolidate democracy, 
there is a sufficient bulk of information for the analysis of the EU’s 
democracy-related activities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Despite covering various aspects of EU democracy promotion in Central 
Asia, official EU reports and research publications do not fully illustrate the 
complexity of pursuing ambitious goals in a challenging environment with 
limited resources and leverage in the democracy promoter’s hands. Dry 
institutional narratives fail to reflect the intricate reality of continuous 
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challenges, competing perspectives of the involved institutional and 
individual actors, and hidden implications of EU activities on the ground. In 
addition, the relevant reports are often limited by the institutional constraints: 
they have to cover certain aspects and possibly ignore others. Academic 
publications, on the other hand, do not always have enough space to fully 
uncover the complicated topic. For this reason, the narratives of the officials 
and experts, who are directly or indirectly involved in EU democracy 
promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan or in monitoring these activities, 
represent an invaluable source of information and complement the official 
narratives and research. In this regard, elite interviews offer useful means 
into getting a more sophisticated picture through various perspectives of the 
institutions and actors in question. In interviewing elites in relevant policy 
making, executive and expert circles, I opted for semi-structured interviews 
with flexible questions tailored to each group of interviewees. Semi-
structured interviews are often used in elite interviewing and are instrumental 
for providing detail, depth, and insider’s perspective at the same time 
allowing hypothesis testing (Leech 2002, p.665). As the next section 
demonstrates, the choice of semi-structured elite interviews proved to be 
useful for the research. 
 
1.4 Data Collection 
The data collection period began in July 2012 and was completed by June 
2013. In total, 42 interviews were conducted during five fieldwork trips to 
three locations: two trips to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; a trip to Astana, 
Kazakhstan; and, two trips to Brussels, Belgium. Interviewees can be 
divided into three key groups. The first, the largest and the most open group 
includes EU-related participants: Brussels-based staffers at the European 
External Action Service, the European Commission, and the European 
Parliament, as well as the EU officials working in Bishkek and Astana, at the 
EU Delegations and EU-funded projects. This group also includes several 
diplomats and clerks, who work in national representations of the EU 
members states in Brussels, in Central Asian units in the EU member states’ 
foreign affairs ministries, and European diplomats in Central Asia. The 
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second, the smallest and the least open group includes relevant officials 
from Kyrgyz and Kazakh ministries, state agencies and other state bodies, 
as well as representatives of local political parties and civil society 
organisations. Finally, international European and local Central Asian 
experts and think tanks provided their invaluable contribution by sharing their 
professional opinions on various subjects related to EU democracy 
promotion in Central Asia. 
The following criteria guided the selection of potential interviewees. Firstly, 
they needed to be directly or indirectly involved in EU democracy promotion 
activities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (first group). Secondly, they had the 
capacity to comment on the national policies and interests on the ground 
and on the overall democratisation process in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
(second group). Finally, to ensure an effective information cross-check and a 
variety of opinions, I included third parties – experts and think tanks, to the 
list of potential interviewees.  
After a preliminary list of potential interviewees was completed, they were 
contacted through formal and informal channels. The mechanism of 
establishing a contact with each interviewee was informed by the 
accessibility considerations. The first group (EU-related participants) were 
contacted through formal channels, i.e. publicly available work phone 
numbers and emails. In the course of the research fieldwork trips to Astana, 
Bishkek and Brussels in 2012-2013 I interviewed a variety of officials 
working for the European Commission and its general directorates, namely 
the Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development and 
the Directorate General for Trade, the European External Action Service and 
its delegations to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the European 
Parliament. I sought to learn their views and opinions on the effectiveness of 
the EU democracy promotion efforts in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and hear 
their story of why the EU democracy promotion has or has not been 
successful, and why. Prior to conducting interviews in 2013, I expected to 
see some differences in the opinions of the EU officials in Brussels and the 
EU Delegations in Astana and Bishkek. My expectations were based on an 
assumption that the officials dealing with democracy-related projects on the 
ground come into direct contact with the local context and see what policies 
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and mechanisms do or do not work in the local setting. However, both 
Brussels-based and Central Asian-based EU officials were equally aware of 
the situation on the ground and expressed the views and opinions on the 
success of the EU democracy promotion initiatives in the region that fit into 
the official discourse expressed in joint progress reports. The difference was 
in some minor details: EU Delegations officials could comment more on the 
responsiveness of local partners or on technical peculiarities of delivering 
projects, while Brussels-based EU officials were more defensive when asked 
about cooperation and dialogue with authoritarian regimes.  
The second group of interviewees - Central Asian officials, political and civil 
society activists were contacted through mixed means. In some cases, 
formal channels were sufficient to arrange a meeting, but proved to be time-
consuming and less effective. I repeated the European Court of Auditors’ 
selection of sources for interviews (ECA Report 2013), in order to carry out 
their review of the EU’s development assistance to Central Asia. The 
auditors interviewed EU delegation staff, representatives of national 
authorities, Member States’ embassies, technical experts, civil society 
organisations, other donors and stakeholders (ECA Report 2013, p.13). 
However, my capacity to access this selection of interviewees was limited 
with financial, time and bureaucratic constraints. In addition, the auditors 
examined 21 support programmes, both country specific and regional, and I 
examined 29 projects (17 in Kazakhstan and 12 in Kyrgyzstan) listed under 
the category of governance, democracy, human rights and support for 
economic and institutional reforms. Again, my access to the information on 
the projects was not as broad as the ECA’s; I mostly used publicly available 
information on the projects and secondary sources. 
 
1.5 Research Issues 
I have not encountered any major problems that could have undermined the 
research stage, during the data collection period in Brussels, Bishkek and 
Astana. Thanks to careful preparatory arrangements the logistical aspects of 
the research trips went reasonably smooth in all three capitals. However, the 
data collection process encountered some issues in Central Asia. Most of 
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these issues were related to the sensitive nature of the research subject and 
individual anonymity and security concerns of interviewees from among civil 
servants.  
In compliance with the University of Leeds Research Ethics Policy, 
interviewees were informed about the research aims and objectives and 
asked to sign consent forms before interviews could take place (see a 
sample consent form in Appendix A). The requirement to sign consent form 
has been slightly problematic for several participants. Civil servants felt 
uncomfortable signing a paper despite being provided with all related 
information and assurances that their participation was confidential and 
anonymous. The hesitant interviewees attributed their uneasy attitude to the 
consent form to a range of reasons. There was the fear of the unknown as 
civil servants in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are rarely approached by 
foreign researchers, who ask them to sign consent form, and the local 
researchers do not usually ask for any signatures. Secondly, they worried 
that a signature might give away their identity. Despite my best efforts to 
assure the potential participants that the signed consent forms will be stored 
in a secure place in Leeds, they emphasised that there might be factors or 
events out of my control, which might potentially make their signatures on 
the consent form exposed to the public. In order to address these fears and 
concerns, I informed my interviewees about the University Ethics Policy, 
assured them that the consent forms were needed to protect them, and 
explained the principles of confidentiality and anonymity. The fact that all 
interviewees, who agreed to meet, eventually did sign the consent forms and 
contributed to the research data collection, indicated that they were satisfied 
with my assurances. Nevertheless, there are legitimate reasons to believe 
that some interviewees were not entirely open and they had the right to do 
so given the less than safe political environment in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. I acknowledge their reluctance to speak openly and would like 
to ensure that this research does not undermine their personal safety or 
professional career. In order to ensure this I have anonymised all 
participants leaving only indications of their occupation and location (see the 
list of interviews in Appendix B).  
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Several civil servants and civil society representatives found it difficult to 
believe that I was a researcher and suspected that I was a journalist or a 
foreign agent seeking to promote a certain agenda. Woliver (2002, p.677) 
explains how she has experienced a certain bias from a group of her 
interviewees due to her affiliation with academia and a specific programme. I 
experienced a range of similar preconceptions from the part of my 
interviewees in civil service; after having learned that I come from a Western 
university and study democracy promotion they assumed my research is 
part of a Western ideological agenda. In most cases, I managed to convince 
the interviewees that my research is agenda-free and I am not paid by any 
interest groups. However, some of the prejudices regarding my affiliation 
were strong to the extent that some of the interviewees were not convinced I 
was a researcher. 
Another issue was related to an unequal availability of sources. Due to the 
different levels of openness and access to the information in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, I was able to collect more data from Kyrgyzstan than from 
Kazakhstan. Despite my assurances of anonymity and confidentiality, I 
found it difficult to interview state officials in Kazakhstan as they felt insecure 
when asked democracy-related questions and could not fully trust me 
suspecting me to be an undercover journalist, who tried to expose them. 
Meanwhile, in Kyrgyzstan, state officials and civil society representatives 
were less suspicious and more willing to talk under the condition of 
anonymity. In addition, thanks to being a Kyrgyz citizen and having some 
personal and professional connections I managed to gain more trust and, as 
a result, more information from a wider variety of local civil servants and 
expert community. Having worked for judicial and parliamentary 
strengthening projects prior to starting this research project has enhanced 
the range of my professional contacts in Kyrgyzstan, who vouched for me 
and assisted with getting access to the interviewees. This slight imbalance in 
the availability of primary data in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was tackled 
through using the method of triangulation, which also helped ensuring the 
validity of data and mitigating potential bias on the part of interviewed 
participants. I have cross-checked information through various sources and 
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filled in potential gaps in primary sources from Kazakhstan by using a wide 
range of relevant secondary sources. 
Finally, there was an issue of less than explicit answers. While the majority 
of interviews were largely informative and the interviewees were quite 
generous about sharing their knowledge and opinions, sometimes they were 
reluctant to comment explicitly on sensitive issues such as the state of 
democracy in Kazakhstan or potential implications of conducting political 
dialogue with undemocratic regimes. The EU officials often repeated the 
official institutional narratives without adding too much to what I have already 
discovered during the preparation stage. Nevertheless, this reluctance to 
discuss these sensitive issues and their reaction to specific questions can be 
interpreted as an evidence.  
In all cases, I invested a significant amount of effort and time to establish a 
good professional rapport. This was achieved through a variety of measures 
such as being particularly open and honest about the research purposes and 
my funding; being humble about my limited prior knowledge of the subject; 
showing appreciation of the time the interviewees agreed to spend to speak 
to me; and, ensuring confidence and comfort of interviewees (Leech 2002, 
p.665). The outcome of this investment was rewarding. In the course of the 
fieldwork trips, I had a unique opportunity to get acquainted with the opinions 
of various local stakeholders and observers, who had varying degrees of 
knowledge of and involvement in the EU democracy promotion activities on 
the ground. The richness of fieldwork materials helped successfully 
implement the iterative research cycle and explain a holistic picture of the 
existing situation on the ground. 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure and Final Remarks 
EU democracy promotion beyond its immediate neighbourhood is a fertile 
ground for research as it presents a relatively recent and underexplored area 
with rich empirical material. The implementation of EU democracy promotion 
in Central Asia can be analysed through a variety of approaches and tools. 
This thesis concentrates on the success of the EU democracy promotion 
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policy under the framework of the EU’s Strategy towards Central Asia 2007-
2013 and seeks to understand what factors might have impeded its 
successful implementation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In other words, 
the thesis investigates to what extent the EU democracy promotion has been 
successful, and why. In order to address this question, this thesis identifies 
and analyses the key stakeholders in the process: the EU as a democracy 
promotion agent; Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as target countries; and, wider 
regional environment, where EU democracy promotion takes place. It 
discusses and evaluates EU democracy promotion policy and its 
implementation and examines the factors, which might have impeded, 
distorted or undermined the EU efforts to promote democracy in Central 
Asia. In order to do so, the thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter two reviews the literature on democratisation, external democracy 
promotion, the EU and Central Asia. There is a shared view within the 
limited circle of academics, who has researched EU-Central Asian relations 
(e.g. Vera Axyonova and Alexander Warkotsch), that EU democracy 
promotion efforts have been unsuccessful, and the fault is often placed 
either on the EU as a half-hearted democracy promotion agent, or Central 
Asia as an unwelcoming for democracy soil. However, there is an important 
gap, which this thesis attempts to fill in. EU democracy promotion is a multi-
faceted process with a variety of explicit and hidden actors and shaping 
factors, which intersect, collide, converge, and change on a regular basis. In 
order to identify and explain these actors and factors, it is necessary to 
employ a variety of tools. The democratisation and democracy promotion 
literature offers a variety of approaches and analytical tools, which could be 
instrumental in addressing the issue of EU democracy promotion in Central 
Asia. The EU as a democracy promotion agent has been under the spotlight 
of the democratisation studies research over the last decade. However, the 
researchers in this field mostly focused on EU democracy promotion in its 
immediate neighbourhood, where accession mechanisms could be applied. 
The EU’s engagement in Central Asia, a former Soviet region experiencing 
an authoritarianism renaissance, is a recent academic interest, which 
emerged in the course of the implementation of the EU’s Strategy towards 
Central Asia.  
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Chapter three serves to explain the local context, existing socio-political and 
economic conditions in the two case study countries, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Understanding the local contextual background and its 
differences in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is crucial for understanding what 
external democracy promotion agents such as the EU face when striving to 
promote democracy abroad.  
Chapter four examines EU efforts to promote democratic principles and 
norms under the framework of the EU Strategy towards Central Asia. In this 
chapter, I investigate the EU’s actors and their objectives in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan; map the EU legal and normative framework in relation to its 
external democracy promotion policies; and, focus on specific projects and 
activities aimed to promote democracy in Kazakhstan in Kyrgyzstan.  
Chapter five presents an analytical part of the thesis, which aims to answer 
the first part of the primary research question: To what extent has the EU 
democracy promotion been successful? For this purpose, I analyse the 
existing evaluation of EU democracy promotion policies and test it against 
the primary and secondary data I collected. In addition, I develop a set of 
evaluation criteria to see whether the democracy promotion objectives as set 
by the EU-CA Strategy have actually been met. 
Chapter six makes the use of the existing literature, original interview data 
and other sources to identify and explore the range of factors impeding EU 
democracy promotion. It employs a three-dimensional structure to analyse 
how local contextual conditions, EU-related factors and broader regional 
setting affect EU democracy promotion efforts in the target countries. In 
doing so, the chapter addresses the second part of the primary research 
question: Why EU democracy promotion has (or has not) been successful.  
Chapter seven summarises the key findings and arguments of the research 
and discusses venues for future research and policy implications based 
upon the implementation outcomes of EU democracy promotion activities in 
2007-2013. 
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Chapter 2 External Democracy Promotion: Promoters and Targets 
 
2.1 Introduction 
There are several researchers in the English-speaking academia, who 
directly addressed the topic of EU democracy promotion in Central Asia. 
One of them is Vera Axyonova, whose most recent book examines EU 
democracy promotion in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan at its micro level 
(Axyonova 2014). Publications by Warkotsch (2011, 2008), Hoffmann 
(2010), Crawford (2008), Fabienne Bossuyt and Paul Kubicek (Bossuyt and 
Kubicek 2011, 2015), and few others provide certain insights and helpful 
directions for further research. The Europe-Central Asia Monitoring 
Programme, a joint project by Fundación para las Relaciones 
Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE; Madrid) and the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS; Brussels), presents another valuable 
source of relevant discussion and analysis on the topic, but from a slightly 
different policy-relevant angle (EUCAM 2015). However, the overwhelming 
majority of relevant publications are limited in scope and are able to only 
partially cover such a complex and multidimensional issue as EU democracy 
promotion in Central Asia.  
In order to support the scarce research on EU democracy promotion in 
Central Asia, this thesis aggregates the existing fragmented publications on 
EU democracy promotion in Central Asia, and makes use of the original 
primary data collected for this research project in 2012-2013. This thesis 
provides an in-depth detailed analysis of EU democracy promotion through 
the examination of three key dimensions - EU dimension, local contextual 
dimension, and the broader regional setting. Before embarking upon this 
task, it is important to explore the existing research in the field. 
Due to the limited amount of publications on the topic, this chapter identifies 
and maps three broader areas of research, which serve as the foundation of 
this thesis, namely Democratisation Studies, EU Studies, and Central Asian 
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Studies. Bearing in mind the research question, the basics in the three areas 
will be discussed with the primary focus on the selected issues and debates. 
This will help unravel the case of EU democracy promotion in Central Asia 
and make sense of the primary data in subsequent analytical and empirical 
chapters. Therefore this chapter is structured into three sections, each 
addressing a relevant area of research. The first section is devoted to the 
largest of all three areas, Democratisation Studies. Prolific authors and 
heated intellectual debates are abundant in Democratisation Studies. For 
this reason it is particularly difficult to navigate through this theoretically and 
empirically rich body of research. Nevertheless, using the thesis objectives 
and research questions as guides, key concepts, issues and debates will be 
discussed including definitions of democracy, the interplay between 
democracy, stability and development, democratisation processes, the 
external dimension of democratisation, external democracy promotion, and, 
democratisation and democracy promotion in post-communist countries. The 
second section explores the EU in its capacity of a global democracy 
promoter. The focus will therefore be upon examining the EU concept of 
democracy, its developmental approach to democracy promotion, and the 
normative vs. realist debate with regard to the EU’s motivation to promote 
democracy abroad. In addition, the most relevant publications on EU 
democracy promotion in Central Asia seek to examine the Central Asian 
political landscape and identify local contextual factors, which might be 
useful for understanding the two case study countries – Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. The Central Asian Studies currently recovers after a major 
disruption in the academic research during the Soviet era. While there is a 
plethora of publications on Central Asia, only a section of them fits into the 
scope of this thesis. For this reason, I concentrate on the existing research 
publications that are capable of explaining the local political landscape in 
Central Asia. In particular, I focus the research on historical legacy, socio-
economic and political context, as well as academic publications on regime 
stability and security. 
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2.2 Democratisation Studies  
Democracy is the world's new universal religion. 
Paul Corcoran (1983, p.15) 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
formal acceptance of democratic principles in post-communist countries 
fuelled a triumphant mood among Western academic and policy making 
circles as liberal democracy was deemed “one competitor standing in the 
ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity” (Fukuyama 2006, p.42). 
As the third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991) seemingly 
overwhelmed the vast landmass of formerly Soviet Eurasia, an increasing 
number of state, non-state and transnational democracy promotion agents 
flooded the democracy promotion area having created a formidable field 
within the development aid sector (Carothers 2007). Major donors, including 
developed countries and the United Nations (UN), sought to mainstream 
democracy and the related principles of good governance, rule of law and 
human rights into their development assistance agendas. Although, the 
short-term record of these endeavours is uneven as the externally supported 
democratisation processes evolved into different forms in different countries. 
This wealth of empirical data provided an impetus to the already thriving field 
of research on the external democracy promotion. This section focuses on 
the relevant concepts and issues, which are instrumental for understanding 
EU democracy promotion in Central Asia. Initially, it outlines the concept of 
procedural democracy, which is a popular concept amongst policy making 
circles involved in external democracy promotion. Afterwards, I explore 
relevant academic debates on the interplays between democracy and 
development, development and stability, values and interests of democracy 
promoters, and touch upon the opposite trend to democracy promotion – 
autocracy promotion. 
While external democracy promotion is a relatively recent phenomenon 
democracy is probably one of the most contested concepts in the history of 
social sciences, which has been examined “from every conceivable angle for 
over twenty-five centuries” (Whitehead 2002). Before proceeding to an 
overview of external democracy promotion drivers, mechanisms and 
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possible outcomes, it is important to establish some key features of 
democracy and its intrinsic value for external democracy promotion.  
 
Procedural democracy  
Procedural democracy refers to the type of democracy favoured by most by 
practitioners as it is more straightforward and benchmark-able. Procedural 
democracy traces its roots back to Joseph Schumpeter’s classical theory, 
which defines democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1942, p.269). 
Robert Dahl (1973, pp.2-3) suggested a very similar definition of democracy 
or “polyarchy” to describe Western political systems as continuous 
processes characterised by dimensions of rights and freedoms that ensure 
citizens’ participation in political decision making. Samuel Huntington was 
also a strong advocate of procedural-institutional democracy. He suggested 
that having consolidated procedures and institutions was crucial to channel 
the shifts in values and expectations generated by modernisation, an 
inevitable companion of development (Huntington 1968, p.32).  
Adherents of procedural democracy usually offer a minimal set of achievable 
standards to classify a political system as a democracy because “fuzzy 
norms do not yield useful analysis” (Huntington 1991, p.9). Such pragmatic 
approach to defining democracy remains quite appealing to democracy 
promotion agents as the key elements of procedural democracy – elections, 
separation of powers, participation in political life, pluralism, and citizen 
rights and freedoms are easier to convert into policy objectives. It is 
important to acknowledge that the conception of democracy is a highly 
debated topic and there are as many definitions of democracy as there are 
writers on democracy. For the purposes of this thesis, it is reasonable to 
accept that the conventional democracy promotion implies the promotion of 
procedural liberal democracy.  
 
Democracy, Development and Stability Debate 
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The inter-relationship between democracy, development and stability is 
another interesting contested issue within the Democratisation Studies field. 
It is possible to mark out four academic opinions in this debate (Carothers 
and de Gramont 2013, p.3). The democracy-first opinion views democratic 
governance as a vital condition for socio-economic development. The 
advocates of this opinion base their argument on the positive economic 
performance of democracies as compared to non-democracies and argue 
that a well-functioning political system facilitates economic development 
(Siegle et al. 2004). The development-first opinion suggests that a transition 
to and consolidation of democracy requires a set of socio-economic 
conditions in place. A most notable representative of the development-first 
camp is Seymour Lipset, who argued that socio-economic development 
facilitates democracy through factors such as urbanisation, literacy, mass 
media, and industrialisation, which produce a social structure conducive to 
democratisation (Lipset 1959, p.82). Lipset insisted that a democratic 
political system requires a certain level of modernisation. More recent 
studies discovered that the democracy-first approach can be detrimental to 
economic development as premature democracies slow economic grows 
and affect stability (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990, p.129).  
The third opinion on the interplay of democracy and development finds itself 
somewhere in between emphasising both political and socio-economic 
aspects of development. Thus, Linz and Stepan (1996, pp.7-12) list various 
factors, which are vital for successful democratic transitions, including 
macro-level statehood, prior regime type, actors (especially, the leadership, 
who manages a transition), and contextual (political economy, legal context, 
and international influences). Finally, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs using 
the examples of China and Russia indicated that the link between 
democracy and economic development is very weak. In their opinion, 
economic growth does not necessarily lead to democracy. Much to the 
opposite, the gains of economic growth are likely to be used to oppress 
political opposition, deter democratic change and sustain existing 
authoritarian regime (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2005, p.78). In addition 
to this the democratic transition might actually threaten political stability as it 
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requires a drastic transformation of pre-existing order. Drastic transformation 
contains latent threats to societal stability.  
 
Interests vs. Norms in Democracy Promotion 
While the interrelations between democracy, development and stability focus 
mostly on the recipient end of democracy promotion, the debate on 
normative and interest-based drivers behind external democracy promotion 
addresses the motivation of democracy promotion agents. Here, the debate 
involves two opinions, which are reasonably clear and visibly different in 
theory, but much less so in practical terms. The rationalist approaches 
emphasise the instrumental nature of external democracy promotion and its 
importance for the pursuit of security and business interests of donors. 
Normative approaches highlight democracy as a universal value and 
suggest that democracy promotion is a normative duty of established 
democracies.  
Rationalist approaches to democracy promotion view the latter as a foreign 
policy instrument designed to pursue national interests of developed 
democratic states. During the Cold War, democracy promotion often implied 
regime change in pro-Communist countries. It was seen as a geopolitical 
tool for the ideological containment policy. As an outcome, the United States 
have developed a conviction that the nature of political regimes in third 
countries have direct effects on United States security. Democracy 
promotion has become an important tool of political engagement with 
friendly governments in third countries. Democracy and development were 
valuable as a way to bolster political goals and prevent the spread of 
Communism in the world (Carothers 2009, p.16). 
Nowadays, this motivation pattern is less popular against the background of 
the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, which have undermined the image of 
the US democracy promotion (Carothers 2007, p.114). The democratic 
peace logic has a more lasting effect on the motivation dynamics for 
democracy promoters. According to this logic, democracy promotion agents 
engage in democracy promotion abroad as the ruling elites believe in the 
utilitarian nature of democracy promotion, i.e. that in the long-term, 
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promoting liberal democratic principles abroad will facilitate more peace and 
cooperation thus creating a secure international environment with less 
structural pressures on the state. However, democracy comes second to 
immediate security considerations. Democracy can be promoted only if it 
does not have negative effects on national security. If more urgent security 
issues arise, democracy promotion assumes secondary importance (Peceny 
1999, Schweller 2000).  
Alternatively, liberal theorists view democracy promotion as instrumental to 
maximise welfare gains and ensuring economic benefits for private actors 
(Moravcsik 1997, pp.528-530). Economic cost-benefit analysis determines 
foreign policy choices and requires the liberal democratic state to support its 
sub-state commercial actors abroad by creating favourable conditions for 
their business in third countries. For this reason, the utilitarian importance of 
external democracy promotion varies from country to country and depends 
on a variety of structural factors (Ikenberry 1999). If a democracy promoting 
state does not have any substantial interests in a third country, it is unlikely 
to put a significant amount of effort and resources to promote democracy in 
this country.  
Normative approach to democracy promotion argues that democracy 
represents a universal positive value for humanity, and serves the interests 
of the majority in a society (Dahl 1998, pp.44-61). This assumption grounds 
itself on normative and institutional logic. The normative logic implies that 
political elites internalise liberal democratic values and act on their basis 
whenever possible. Accordingly, democratic leaders prefer non-violent 
resolution of conflicts and seek cooperation with other democratic leaders 
(Doyle 1997, pp.4-7; Maoz and Russet 1993, p.31). The institutional logic 
relies on the social groups, who would oppose war and pressure their leader 
into non-violent conflict resolution through democratically elected and 
accountable institutions (Lake 1992, p.25; Owen 1997, p.42). Dahl uses 
empirical evidence of the post-World War II reality to prove that democracies 
do not fight each other. In particular, he states that ‘of thirty-four international 
wars between 1945 and 1989 none occurred among democratic countries’ 
(Dahl 1998, p.57).  
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Utilitarian explanations bring analysis to the level of individual citizens, who 
are uninterested in wars because wars endanger their lives and welfare. 
Under democratic governance, individual citizens are empowered in policy 
and decision making, and theoretically, they are more likely to push their 
governments to seek peace in potential conflict situations (Rummel, 1983). A 
broader view of democracy presupposes that democratic development of 
countries entails closer economic cooperation among them. Close economic 
cooperation has spill-over effects on political cooperation, and make wars 
unlikely as they may affect both political and economic cooperation among 
states (Mansfield, 2002; Russet and Oneal 2001). As the normative 
approaches to democracy promotion evolved, a new argument developed in 
the field. This argument goes beyond seeing democracy as an international 
norm and extends this logic to external democracy promotion. In this regard, 
developed democracies have a moral obligation to support democratisation 
processes in other countries (McFaul 2005).  
The normative vs interest-based motivation debate has significantly affected 
the research trends in EU studies as well. As further discussion in this 
chapter will demonstrate the EU studies have an on-going debate between 
normative theorists and structural realists.  
 
Political and Developmental Approaches to Democracy Promotion  
Having discussed the reasons behind external democracy promotion it 
would be reasonable to focus on implementation of democracy-related 
projects. It is possible to distinguish between two approaches to democracy 
promotion: political and developmental (Carothers 2009). The key difference 
between these two approaches is how they view the value of democracy in 
providing democracy assistance.  
The political approach views democracy as “a positive value in itself” 
(Carothers 2009, p.7), and employs the Dahlian concept of democracy. The 
essence of democracy assistance for adherents of the political approach is 
promoting fair elections, ensuring civil and political rights, and, sometimes, 
supporting the establishment and consolidation of such institutional features 
as a diverse parliament or an independent judiciary. The political approach 
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might adopt confrontational forms if the government of the host country is 
both oppressive and non-cooperative. However, democracy promoters might 
be less assertive if an oppressive regime shows support to their interests 
(Carothers 2009, p.7). The developmental approach attributes a secondary 
role to democracy and sees the value of democracy in its capacity to 
facilitate favourable conditions for social and economic development.  
The developmental approach views democratisation as a slow and gradual 
process that requires a set of socio-economic prerequisites. The 
developmental approach aims to introduce democratic principles and 
practices through mainstreaming them into the general development 
assistance agenda in target countries. It applies indirect methods of 
democracy promotion and rarely involves any sort of confrontation with the 
host government (Carothers 2009, pp.8-9). In most cases, democracy 
promotion that follows the development-first logic is implemented through 
indirect technical assistance projects. 
While the complexity of the real world does not allow for the existence of 
these approaches in their pure forms, Carothers notes that the US 
democracy promotion represents a politically-driven top-down approach and 
is capable of challenging the host government by supporting opposition or 
encouraging free mass media and civil society organisations (Carothers 
2009, p.14). The EU approach is mostly developmental with the focus on 
promoting social and economic development with inclusion of democratic 
norms and processes (Del Biondo 2011). 
 
Mechanisms of Democracy Promotion  
Moving from the policy-level to the implementation level, it is important to 
discuss the research on mechanisms of external democracy promotion. 
Here, the literature is diverse and more empirically grounded, which can be 
particularly useful for this research on EU democracy promotion. From the 
evidence provided by democracy promotion mechanisms it is possible to 
identify several key mechanisms. 
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Diffusion of democratic norms through certain channels (transmission of 
democratic principles across borders in a geographic neighbourhood) is an 
unintended mechanism, which consequently requires little effort and 
investment (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Rogers 2003, p.5). Here specific 
mechanisms diverge slightly. Pevehouse argues that membership in 
regional organisations with an established democratic tradition increases the 
chances of a democratic regime change in participating countries 
(Pevehouse 2002). Starr and Lindborg highlight global, regional and 
neighbourhood effects of democratisation. The location in a largely 
democratic neighbourhood has a capacity to contribute to non-democratic 
countries to pursue democratic change (Starr and Lindborg 2003). Brinks 
and Coppedge (2006) trace the neighbour emulation within the US and its 
effects on neighbouring countries, which tend to follow the direction in which 
the majority of other countries in the region. The latter finding is important for 
this research as it might explain the different patterns of democratisation 
dynamics in the immediate EU neighbourhood and the Central Asian 
neighbourhood.  
If diffusion does not require any deliberate effort to induce democratic 
changes, democracy promotion by force not only requires a significant 
amount of effort, but also political will, resources and sufficient legitimisation. 
Based upon the principles of liberal interventionism this mechanism often 
takes the form of military intervention that aims to forcibly remove an 
oppressive regime and create initial conditions for democratisation process. 
While policy makers may use it as a last resort in democracy promotion, it is 
generally assumed that it is not particularly effective (Pickering and Peceny 
2006, pp.555-556) because it involves both domestic and international 
controversy. 
Other mechanisms of democracy promotion such as democracy support, 
strategic calculation, and normative suasion lie in between the unintended 
diffusion and the military intervention. Democracy support or democracy 
assistance refers to projects on human rights, civic education, electoral 
assistance, legal reforms, and support to independent mass media and civil 
society organisations. The democracy assistance mechanism aims to create 
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the socio-political conditions conducive to democratic transition (Carothers 
2007; Levitsky and Way 2010, p.39).  
Strategic calculation presents a non-violent mechanism based upon the 
costs and benefits analysis logic employed by the recipient. Strategic 
calculation usually refers to positive and negative conditionality. Positive 
conditionality involves linking incentives to the recipient’s acceptance of 
democratic standards and principles. Negative conditionality penalises non-
compliance with the democratic standards and principles promoted by 
democracy promoter through sanctions (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008, 
pp.188-196; Schimmelfennig 2005, pp.827-860). Despite the popularity of 
conditionality as a democracy promotion mechanism, there are concerns 
that recipients or target countries do not fully engage in cost and benefit 
analysis or are not sufficiently interested in “carrots and sticks”.  
Checkel and Warkotsch argue in favour of normative suasion as a more 
sustainable and lasting democracy promotion mechanism. Normative 
suasion involves a continuous process of argumentation, otherwise known 
as international socialisation, between the socialiser (democracy promotion 
agent; donor) and the target country, where the former attempts convincing 
the latter that democratic change is a right thing to do (Checkel 2005; 
Warkotsch 2008). Proponents of normative suasion insist that the transfer of 
norms and values through international socialisation is more reliable as the 
norms and values are actively discussed and contested, learnt and 
internalised, i.e. genuinely adopted by the recipient (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 
pp.6-11). To what extent this is possible remains questionable and will be 
tested through the case of EU democracy promotion in Central Asia. 
 
Autocracy Promotion  
Autocracy promotion is not a primary focus of this thesis, but it presents an 
alternative process, which might explains the peculiarities of the 
democratisation process in Central Asia. 
After two decades of proliferation of democracy promotion agents, policies 
and activities, researchers in the field noted an actual decline in liberal 
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democracy around the world. This “backlash against democracy” was 
characterised with the spreading view of democracy promotion as Western 
interventionism amongst recipient countries, the closure or limitation of the 
activities of democracy promotion agents, and the re-assertion of 
authoritarian regimes (Carothers 2006, pp.59-62; Burnell and Schlumberger 
2010). Autocracy promotion literature builds upon a complex empirical 
evidence of the recent decades. However, unlike democracy promotion 
literature, autocracy promotion literature is rather immature and offers 
counter-intuitive (Borzel 2015, p.519) findings, which, nevertheless, may 
explain both the backlash against democracy and the uneven record of 
external democracy promotion in the former Soviet Union.  
While this is an area under-researched, there are academic efforts to identify 
key concepts, issues and ideas. In particular, researchers attempt to identify 
autocracy promotion agents, who can be divided into two groups. The state 
promoters of autocracy include China and Russia as “main suspects”, and 
Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela under President Chavez as a “supporting cast” 
(Burnell 2010, pp.1-2). Given the small number of states and organisation, 
who occasionally oppose Western democracy promotion, it is difficult to 
speak of a concerted action against democracy promotion.  
In addition, researchers attempt to analyse the motivation behind autocracy 
promotion. The motives can be normative: autocracies need to multiply the 
specific political regime in order to increase their legitimacy (Börzel and 
Risse 2012). Alternatively there are structural explanations, within the 
political economic perspective, which explains the autocracy promotion 
dynamics with a shared economic culture that facilitates economic 
cooperation between autocracies. However, these conclusions are 
presented with caution: the issue of stability is important and established 
autocracies would endorse other autocracies in their region only if this does 
not affect their stability, security or economic interests (Bader et al 2010).  
Similarly to democracy promotion, researchers identify and describe the 
mechanisms of autocracy promotion, which can take both unintentional and 
deliberate forms. Unintentional form usually implies transmission of norms 
through diffusion or contagion, through the power of example (Burnell 2010, 
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pp.7-8). Jackson outlines the economic links and soft power mechanisms as 
an indirect method to divert Western ties and reduce the European 
incentives offered to local leaders, trade cooperation, and broadening 
access to the European market, norms and values, education etc. In addition 
to these mechanisms, authoritarian agents of influence can offer autocratic 
socialisation through multilateral and bilateral channels. 
However, the most solid research in this sub-field seems to focus upon 
typology and analysis of authoritarian regimes. Levitsky and Way offer an 
insightful analysis on competitive authoritarianism and its resilience against 
democracy promotion. Given the fact that the prior regime types in Central 
Asia were authoritarian, it makes sense to take their findings and apply them 
to the Central Asian setting. Competitive authoritarianism is a regime, which 
combines authoritarian practices with democratic institutions, and is based 
upon the ruling party strength, state’s coercive capacity, and state control 
over wealth (Way 2010).  
Democracy Promotion vs. Autocracy Promotion? 
Most importantly, one needs to take into account the fact that democracy 
promotion and autocracy promotion do not occur in an isolated space. More 
often than not, they are parallel or confront each other. These areas of 
confrontation are diverse and are often located where democracy promoters 
and autocracy promoters have overlapping areas of influence. In this regard, 
Bliesemann de Guevara’s (2008, pp.365-368) research on contested sites 
for nodes of governance might offer powerful insights. Contested sites 
theory suggests the regions, where different nodes of governance and 
different sets of norms compete to win the hearts and minds of transition 
regimes. Global powers of the USA, Russia, China and the EU bring their 
vision of development and governance or offer their respective sets of norms 
to be accepted and internalised by recipients (Lewis 2010). 
Similar logic can be traced in Deyermond’s theory of Matrioshka hegemony. 
Deyermond offers a flexible analytical framework to comprehend the variety 
of actors and their strategies in a contested site. Deyermond argues that 
different international actors and their strategies can be accommodated 
together and co-exist creating a multi-level regional hegemony (Deyermond 
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2009). In that case, none of the democracy and autocracy promoters 
possess an undisputed and permanent dominant position in any area of the 
world beyond their borders. Instead, they engage in a variety of great and 
small games, where the rules and players transform and change as the 
games progress. 
Finally, an important aspect when addressing the democracy promotion and 
autocracy promotion interplay is that the reality of democracy promotion and 
autocracy promotion dynamics are far from being clear-cut, black-and-white, 
good-vs-bad patterns. To the opposite, Borzel discovered that Western 
democracies do not consistently commit themselves to democracy 
promotion; just like authoritarian regimes, their primary concerns are stability 
and security, and exportation of norms comes second. Alternatively the 
authoritarian regimes do not always pursue autocracy promotion. They 
rather pick and choose the specific cases, where they feel the need to 
counter Western democracy promotion efforts in order to protect their 
political and economic interests. Democratisation and democracy promotion 
studies, alongside the emerging field of autocracy promotion studies, tend to 
overestimate external dimensions of democratisation. The local actorness 
and ownership of democratisation or consolidation of authoritarianism still 
play a decisive role (Borzel 2015, pp.521-525). 
Democratisation studies offer a rich pool of old and new research, which 
would be important within this research. However, due to scope limitations, it 
is only possible to address a select number of issues, debates and ideas, 
which will be instrumental in addressing the research question: To what 
extent has EU democracy promotion been successful and why? The 
literature reviewed in this section was more general, and the specific nature 
of the democracy promoter in this thesis (the EU) and the target countries 
(Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia) requires a more tailored review 
of the existing research. For this reason, the next two sections will address 
the EU as a democracy promotion agent, and Central Asia as one of the 
areas of the world where democracy is being promoted.  
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2.3 European Union Studies 
The European Union has evolved from a narrow cooperation project, the 
European Coal and Steel Community to a complex organisation with a broad 
range of common policy areas and growing governance system. The 
integration processes within the EU have reached the point where the Union 
actively pursues Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and has a 
spokesperson for the united external action. The EU’s international role and 
identity attracts particular attention of researchers, and forms a “growth area” 
in the EU studies field (Rogers 2009, p.832). Studies on the EU’s 
international role and identity provides insights into its democracy promotion 
policy because the role and identity may inform the EU’s motivation to 
promote democracy abroad, and shape what and how the EU projects 
abroad as its values.  
It is possible to distinguish between two broad theoretical approaches that 
attempt to explain the EU’s international role, identity and motivation to 
promote democracy abroad: liberal democratic idealism, and realism. Liberal 
democratic idealism refers to several debates and issues, which 
characterise the EU as a distinct civilian and/or normative power and 
singular international actor pursuing the mission of promoting democratic 
peace and prosperity in the world through non-violent means (Duchene 
1972, 1973; Manners 2002, 2006; Youngs 2001). Realism in its different 
variations is represented by authors who argue that EU politics still revolves 
around states and interests, primarily survival interest, and its reliance on 
non-military means is conditioned by the mere lack of military capacities 
(Bull 1982, 1983; Hyde -Price 2006).  
 
Duchene vs. Bull Debate 
In the 1970s, Francois Duchene introduced his vision of the European 
Community (European Union) as a distinct civilian power and an alternative 
to the military superpowers of the time, the USA and the USSR. Duchene 
emphasised the unique nature of the European Community, “a new animal 
among the larger beasts” (1973, p.7). He argued that Europe was the first 
contemporary international actor to exert influence by the means of 
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economic and political power rather than by military means (Duchene 1972, 
p.19). Duchene suggested the unity of the European Community and pooling 
efforts and resources of its member states was crucial for the consolidation 
of the Europe’s role in international affairs. He was convinced that thanks to 
Europe’s population, economic performance and joint capital “the 
Community’s potential is an impressive even by super-power standards” 
(Duchene 1973, p.2).  
Civilian power includes three key features: economic power as the primary 
mean to achieve national goals, the primacy of diplomacy in settling 
international disputes, and, reliance on legally-binding supranational 
institutions (Twitchett and Maull in Manners 2002, p.237). Civilian concept is 
both descriptive, as it characterises the EU’s specific foreign policy and 
prescriptive, as it provides recommendations and a vision of a desirable 
policy. Civilian power is about values and process and has a two-fold 
fundament: the EU’s being, political essence, and the EU’s doing, external 
action (Nicolaidis and Howse 2002, pp.770-771). The “civilian power 
Europe” argument has served to deflate the supremacy of military power and 
state-centric approach in international system, i.e. the current dominant 
realist approach to international relations theory. However, champions of 
realism have never given up their stand in this battle of ideas.  
In the 1980s, Hedley Bull contested the concept of progressive civilian 
power. Bull argued that the European civilian power relied upon and strongly 
depended on the military power of European states and its strategic ally, the 
USA (Bull 1983). Under the framework of the Cold War and the Soviet 
threat, Europe had two options to survive: ally with the US, or rely on its own 
resources, and the latter was hardly possible with the “civilian” power (Bull 
1983, p.877). Bull noted that the European foreign policy’s reliance on 
“civilian” power and lack of purely European military instrumentalities “will 
make only a limited impression on the rest of the world, and leave the 
European allies still with no alternative to following in the wake of the United 
States, where matters involving peace and war are concerned” (Bull 1983, 
p.880).  
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Duchene’s and Bull’s debate developed under the overarching conditions of 
the Cold war. The military vs. civilian power debate was strongly informed by 
such phenomena of the time as bloc logic, hard-headed realism and the 
state-centred practice of international relations. With the collapse of the 
USSR and the end of the Cold war the international system had undergone 
significant transformations that included the elimination of bloc logic, the 
short-term triumph of liberalism, and hopes for democratic peace (Fukuyama 
1989), alongside the diversification of global actors with non-state entities. 
Academia reflected this transformation in a burst of new and revival of old 
debates on power, sovereignty and international roles played by different 
actors.  
 
Manners vs. Hyde-Price Debate 
With the significant post-Cold war changes of the EU’s structure and 
operation, the debate between liberal democratic idealist and realists visions 
of Europe has gained new impetus. In 2002, Ian Manners presented his 
vision of the European Union “as a promoter of norms which displace the 
state as the centre of concern” (2002, p.236). He suggested shifting the 
focus of the academic discourse from state-like features of the EU to its 
normative power of ideational nature. Manners identified the hierarchy of 
norms that constitute the fundamental basis of the EU laws and policies. The 
top five core norms included peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Minor norms included 
social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good 
governance (Manners 2002, p.242). These norms penetrate the legal 
framework of the Union, and can be traced in official publications, 
statements, and speeches of the EU officials.  
Manners marked out several ways by which the EU norms are diffused 
among other political actors. Contagion implies an unintended diffusion of 
ideas, while informational diffusion results from the deliberate strategic 
communication. Procedural diffusion transfers the EU’s norms through 
institutionalised relationships between the EU and a third party. 
Transference of norms takes place when the EU exchanges material goods 
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or assistance/aid with third parties. A notable example of such diffusion of 
norms is conditional assistance to developing countries: a beneficiary 
country receives assistance only if it makes a feasible effort to adjust its 
domestic policy or legislation to the norms of the donor. Overt diffusion 
stems from the presence of the EU in third states, Commission delegations 
and the EU member-states’ embassies. The last, factor of norm diffusion is a 
cultural filter, which affects the formation and diffusion of international norms 
(Manners 2002, pp.244-245).  
The normative power Europe concept has been criticised on several 
grounds. Thomas Diez (2005) criticised it for the lack of originality, and 
referred to a very similar concept of civilian power proposed by Francois 
Duchene in 1970s. Helene Sjursen (2006) criticised the normative power of 
European theory for a lack of an unequivocal method of analysis. 
However, the most substantive criticism of the normative power Europe 
concept came from the realist school. The structural realist approach argued 
that the EU was not a unique international actor in its own right. Instead, it 
represented “a vehicle for the collective interests of its member states” 
(Hyde-Price 2006, p.220). Hyde-Price stressed that the EU was established 
in the heyday of the Cold war, and was a form of states’ adaptation to the 
structural pressures of the time. The development of the common foreign 
and security policy, which is often considered to prove the liberal democratic 
aspirations for increased cooperation, viewed from the realist perspective is 
nothing but the adaptation to the present international system and reaction 
to post-Cold war structural pressures (Hyde-Price 2006, p.223).  
The end of the Cold war resulted in three consequences, which presented 
certain challenges to the European security. Firstly, Europe needed to 
integrate a united Germany. A closer union based upon the Maastricht 
Treaty facilitated this purpose. Secondly, the EU needed to complete the 
economic agenda of the 1980s to compete with the US and Japan. Once 
again closer union was necessary to achieve this objective. Thirdly, with the 
collapse of the socialist camp Europe faced the challenge of the 
neighbouring area to its east that was rather chaotic and unstable. This 
endowed Europe with a new role as a guarantor of peace and stability in 
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Central and Eastern Europe. While individual European states were unable 
to tackle such tasks the EU was more capable of addressing economic, 
social and political aspects of transition than its Eastern neighbour countries 
(Hyde-Price 2006, p.226). The EU is used by states to tackle these tasks as 
“an instrument of collective hegemony”, and it relies on a range of available 
means (ibid, p.227). There is still some space for normative consideration as 
member states allow the EU to act as the repository for shared ethical 
concerns. However, ethnical concerns and norms are on the real agenda as 
long as they do not conflict with core national interests of member states 
(Hyde-Price 2006, p.222).  
A larger unresolved dichotomy lies at the core of these debates and it refers 
to the core question: What do democracy promoters promote: norms or 
interests? In the EU context, the liberal democratic (normative) camp views 
democracy as a universal value, which needs to be promoted (Manners 
2008, p.563). On the other hand, the structural realist perspective tends to 
view the EU as an intergovernmental instrument of adaptation to structural 
pressures of the contemporary international system (Hyde-Price 2006, 
p.225), and puts member states and their interests at the core of EU policies 
(Hyde-Price 2006, p.227). In this regard, democracy promotion is secondary 
to other interests, and is pursued to the full extent only it does not clash with 
more important security or economic interests. While the issue of the EU 
nature and motivation is crucial for understanding the complexity of its 
engagement in democracy promotion in such regions as Central Asia, at the 
practical level, it is also important to understand how the EU defines the very 
notion of democracy.  
 
EU Conception of Democracy 
A “floating but anchored” conception of democracy (Whitehead 2002, p.6) 
fuels the long-standing theoretical debate on the substance of democracy. 
However, more tangible and measurable definition is required for the 
purpose of this thesis. The EU does not appear to have a clearly codified 
concept of democracy, which could be used to measure its progress in 
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external democracy promotion. Therefore, it is important identify key 
components of democracy as they are defined by relevant EU documents. 
In this regard, two documents might prove useful. The Copenhagen Criteria, 
identifies the requirements for potential candidates to the EU membership. 
As the criteria are applied to all future EU member-states, it is reasonable to 
conclude that these define the minimal democratic standard in the eyes of 
EU institutions. Copenhagen Criteria identify three key components: 1) 
stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, and human 
rights; 2) functioning market economy; 3) adherence to the EU laws, the 
acquis communitaire. The predominant and relevant criteria is democracy 
promotion, and it clearly indicates the strong preferences for procedural-
institutional type of democracy.  
Another important document is the Council Regulation of 1999, which 
stipulates the requirements of mainstream democracy, the rule of law and 
respect of human rights and freedoms into the implementation of 
development cooperation. This Regulation identifies the necessary 
components of development cooperation: the rule of law, political pluralism, 
good governance, the participation of the people in the decision making 
process, electoral processes, and separation of civilian and military functions 
(Council 1999). These components offer a broader vision of democracy but 
do not clarify how these standards can be achieved at practical level. 
However, these two documents are not treated as sources to define 
democracy. Surprisingly enough, the search for the EU definition of 
democracy still continues as various EU institutions continue to issue 
different documents, which indicate new dimensions of democracy. Thus, in 
2009, the European parliament adopted a resolution on democracy building 
and urged to use of the UN General Assembly’s 2005 definition of 
democracy as a reference point for its democracy promotion policies abroad 
(in Wetzel 2015, p.1). The lack of a shared definition of democracy accepted 
by all key EU institutions and enforced through development policies 
indicates the weak conceptual foundation in EU democracy promotion. Kurki 
(2015) describes this lack of solid foundation as “fuzzy liberalism” and 
argues that it is not an accidental feature of EU democracy promotion. In 
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fact, the “fuzziness” of EU conception of democracy reflects upon the EU’s 
politico-economic model of democracy and developmental approach to 
democracy promotion abroad. Framing democracy into a blurred discourse 
gives the EU an opportunity to stay flexible and incorporate social and 
economic factors of democratisation into the democracy promotion process 
(Kurki 2015, p.41). Such framing results in an unclear EU definition of 
democracy, which requires a case-specific consideration.  
 
EU Motives to Promote Democracy: Manners vs. Hyde-Price Debate in 
Action 
The EU is often regarded as a unique international actor characterised by 
ideational power and normative drivers (Manners 2008, p.580). Liberal 
democratic explanations of the EU’s democracy promotion policy are 
somewhat mainstream approach in the relevant literature. The EU’s 
rationale to promote democracy in third countries falls within the lines of 
democratic peace theory’s assumption that democracy facilitates the 
development of a peaceful and prosperous international system (Schraeder 
2002, pp.15-55). Such an assumption is explicitly declared in the European 
Security Strategy, which considers democracy instrumental to ensuring 
secure neighbourhood (EU 2003). According to its own understanding, the 
EU is driven by the universal motive to foster liberal democracy in the world 
(Kotzian et al 2011).  
As some researchers note, the EU is driven by its self-perception as a 
normative power, which needs “to spread its fundamental ideas and norms 
throughout the world” (Hoffmann 2010, p.93), and “to foster the western 
model of liberal democracy” (Kotzian et al 2011, p.996). Such a mission is 
not exclusively outward; to the opposite, one may apply the externalisation 
hypothesis to explain the interplay between the EU’s external policy and 
domestic affairs. When declaring its commitment to promote democracy 
worldwide, the EU institutions and the EU member-states’ governments 
have to tighten democratic procedures at home to avoid being accused of 
double standards (Youngs 2001, p.46).  
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Nikolaidis and Howse (2002) also consider the EU’s normative mission as 
vital for its preservation. They identify normative projection as the EU’s 
mechanism of norm diffusion to other international actors. The EU seeks to 
expand its normative framework to the world and “to reproduce itself by 
encouraging regional integration around the world” (Nikolaidis and Howse 
2002, p.768). At that, the EU uses narratives of projection to export its norms 
to other countries. The export of norms requires several intermediary factors 
and involves economic and political means. Thus, trade facilitates 
democratisation, which, in its turn, facilitates the export of the liberal vision of 
peace. At that, the EU has a long history of normative projection and 
expansion. For centuries, Europe has perceived itself as “a vanguard that 
may have something to teach the rest of the world” (Nikolaidis and Howse 
2002, p.769). It asserted its influence on all six continents by the means of 
brute military force combined with cultural intrusion (Christian missions, 
export of European lifestyle, European law, colonial governance, science, 
technology and entertainment). The projection of Europe’s model of 
statehood, economy, justice and lifestyle took different shapes and labels: 
enlightenment, colonialism, imperialism, or recently civilian/normative power 
(Nikolaidis and Howse, p.765).  
Other authors are more careful in stating the purely normative character of 
the EU’s policies abroad. A group of researchers conducted eight case 
studies of the EU’s foreign policy and identified characteristics of the EU 
foreign policy in each particular case (Tocci 2008a, 2008b). They have set 
three basic criteria to evaluate the EU policy in target countries: normative 
goals, normatively deployed instruments and discernible normative impact, a 
visible result. On the basis of these case studies, they concluded that the 
European Union might have normative legislation, but often pursues 
Realpolitik goals, apply mixed normative-realist means, and its policy in each 
particular case might result in both normative and non-normative outcomes. 
In other words, the EU represents a multi-faceted actor, whose activities 
combine both normative and realist objectives and vary from country to 
country. 
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EU democracy promotion mechanisms  
The EU uses positive and negative mechanisms of promoting democratic 
values, or linkage (Freyburg 2009; Levistky and Way 2010) and leverage 
(Lavenex and Schimmelfenig 2011). Positive mechanisms, or linkages, 
include democracy assistance through agreements, technical assistance, 
training, information exchange, education, and support for civil society 
(Youngs 2001, pp.31-34). Positive mechanisms work on the basis of social 
and communication ties of the recipient country to the EU (Freyburg 2009). 
Such ties are expected to diffuse democratic norms among important 
domestic stakeholders and inform attitudes by a prolonged exposure to 
norms (Freyburg 2009, pp.1-4). Negative or coercive mechanisms refer to 
the suspension of contractual relations and sanctions that are used in 
relation to the regimes, which abuse democratic principles (Youngs 2001, 
pp.34-37). In addition to conventional democracy promotion mechanisms, 
the EU has certain leverage on the countries in its immediate 
neighbourhood, which are willing to join the EU (Lavenex and Schimmelfenig 
2011). In the latter case, the EU can externalise its domestic democratic 
practices by requesting potential candidates to adopt them as a condition to 
join the Union.  
 
EU democracy promotion in Central Asia  
The EU and Central Asia: strategy for a new partnership, the document 
adopted by the Council in 2007 under the German Presidency, sets forth the 
EU’s key objectives in CA, outlines areas of cooperation, and identifies 
general policy of the EU’s involvement in CA. The strategy indicates the rule 
of law, human rights, democratisation, education and training as “key areas 
where the EU is willing to share experience and expertise” (EU 2007, p.5). 
From 1991 to 2007, EU assistance was provided under the framework of the 
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). 
In 2007, due to the re-structuring and unification of the EU development 
assistance instruments, TACIS programmes were replaced with the 
Development Cooperation Instrument (Axyonova 2011). The EU earmarked 
an assistance budget for Central Asia under the DCI for 2007-2013 that 
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amounted to 719 million Euros (Regional Strategy Paper 2006). Its 
assistance to Kyrgyzstan amounted to 17 million Euros for 2011-2013, and 
this sum was expected to be split among three priority areas – education, 
poverty reduction, and good governance (EU Delegation to the Kyrgyz 
Republic brochure 2010).  
However, despite the intentions to assist development and democratisation 
in Central Asia, the projects and activities in these priority areas were 
implemented with mixed results. This rather uneven record of the EU’s 
democracy promotion in Central Asia raises questions regarding the 
underlying reasons, which might impede democracy promotion in Central 
Asia. Some authors put the responsibility for the lack of progress on the 
democracy promoter, the EU (Warkotsch 2008; Axyonova 2011), while 
others extend this responsibility to local conditions and the responsiveness 
(or lack thereof) of local governments (Matveeva 2006; Hoffmann 2010). 
Researchers note the gap between the declared EU policies of democracy 
promotion and the actual significance attributed by the EU officials to the 
task of promoting democracy in non-EU countries. Warkotsch (2008; 2011) 
highlights this gap with regard to the bilateral Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements negotiated between the EU and individual Central Asian states. 
The EU strives to commit third countries to democracy through political 
dialogue. The PCAs, which represent core document shaping formal EU 
relations with the Central Asian countries, contain only a brief and vague 
section on the political dialogue with the rest of the document dealing in 
detail with functional aspects of economic cooperation (Warkotsch 2008, 
p.243). In the fields of human rights, rule of law, good governance and 
democracy, reflection is needed on how to support positive trends and 
tangible results through the human rights dialogues and bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation.  
This gap might be explained by the prioritisation of non-political objectives in 
the region. The most exemplary case is the EU policy towards Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan is a semi-authoritarian state ruled by the same leader, Nursultan 
Nazarbayev for more than 20 years. Nazarbayev’s regime might seem more 
democratic in comparison with other notorious Central Asian dictators 
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(Cummings 2005), but fraudulent elections, limited freedoms and regular 
human rights abuse brought Kazakhstan a characteristic description – petro-
authoritarianism (Walker and Goehring 2008). In the light of the European 
quest for diversification of energy supply sources, Kazakhstani abundant oil 
and gas fields are of great interest for the EU. The Kazakh gas has been a 
strategic commodity for the EU before the gas crisis of 2006. Europe’s main 
gas supplier, Russian Gazprom, heavily relied on purchasing the Kazakh 
gas and reselling it to Europe (Matveeva 2006, pp.72-75). Currently, the EU 
is conducting wide-ranging energy dialogues with Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, and considers the gas supplies of these countries for the 
Southern Corridor with a trans-Caspian link (Emerson and Boonstra 2010). 
Energy needs are increasingly distorting relationships between democracies 
that consume hydrocarbons and the authoritarian states that produce those 
(Walker and Goehring 2008, p.25).  
Other authors include local conditions to the list of factors, which might 
impede democracy promotion in the region. Hoffmann (2010) focuses on 
good governance as an element of the EU’s democracy promotion agenda, 
and argues that the implementation of good governance-related initiatives is 
rather weak due to several reasons. Firstly, the prospects for external good 
governance promotion in such stable authoritarian environment as Central 
Asia are limited. Secondly, the local governments have to agree on good 
governance promotion, which they are often reluctant to do. explains such 
reluctance with an assumption that transparency, participatory politics, and 
strengthening of formal institutions might undermine the basis for rule and 
power maintenance (Hoffmann 2010, p.89-90). Thirdly, the EU is reluctant to 
push harder in its pursuit of democracy, thus creating opportunities for local 
governments to limit their concessions and feign reforms. Matveeva is also 
critical of democracy promotion saying that approaches to democracy 
promotion often disregard local contexts, overestimate existing human 
capacity and ignore the real needs of people on the ground (Matveeva 2006, 
p.77). 
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2.4 Central Asian Studies 
[In Central Asia] The position of affairs changes not every hour, but every 
minute. Therefore, I say vigilance, vigilance, vigilance. 
General Mikhail Skobelev (as cited in Bellairs 1900, p.164) 
Central Asian studies as a social science sub-field is rooted in the 19th 
century British-Russian geopolitical competition - the Great Game. The 
Great Game provided impetus to the scrupulous examination of the broader 
Central Asian region by the military and civilian explorers. British travellers, 
scholars, soldiers and spies, such as Alexander Burnes, Ralph Cobbold and 
George Curzon to name a few, shared their stories about encounters with 
the local peoples, cultures and politics in numerous travel notes and other 
publications. The Russian exploration of the region was more intensive 
thanks to the geographic proximity and the vested interest in keeping the 
Russian Empire’s southern belly free of conflicts and from the British. 
Russian researchers and military officers Skobelev, Bartold, Radlov, 
Przhevalsky and Aristov (again, to name a few) produced a bulk of versatile, 
first-hand observations of this terra incognita, which was referred to as 
Middle Asia or West Turkestan in Russia (as opposed to East Turkestan – 
Chinese Central Asia; Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya 2011, p.9). Throughout the 
19th and early 20th centuries, the British Royal Geographic Society and the 
Russian Royal Geographic Society were the leading research hubs in the 
nascent Central Asian studies field (Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya 2011; 
Hopkirk 1992). Geopolitics and colonial considerations heavily influenced the 
agenda of Central Asian studies during this period and the research primarily 
focused on the geostrategic importance of the Eurasian Heartland 
(Mackinder 1904; Hopkirk 1992). 
With the end of the Russian Empire in 1917 and the subsequent 
incorporation of West Turkestan into the Union of the Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) in 1922, the research on Central Asia de jure had 
become a part of the broader Sovietology field (Artemov 1982). However, de 
facto Central Asian studies dissolved because Sovietology both inside and 
outside the USSR focused primarily on the West of Urals and ethnic 
Russians (see Motyl 1989 for a critical analysis of conceptual flaws inherent 
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to the mainstream Sovietology). With few rare exceptions (e.g. Dunn and 
Dunn’s 1967 research on Soviet regime and native cultures), Sovietology 
largely ignored Central Asia. 
Only with the collapse of the USSR and after a decade of initial 
familiarisation with the region (Malik 1994; Ehteshami 1994; Atabaki 1998; 
Banuazizi 1994), Central Asian studies experienced a renaissance with the 
growing research on political idiosyncrasies in Central Asia (Collins 2004; 
Cummings 2012; Radnitz 2010; Hale 2015), geopolitics (publications by 
Blank, Olcott, McFaul, Trenin and Menon), international political economy 
(Spechler and Spechler 2010; Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013), and other 
issues occurring in and around the Central Asian region. From among the 
variety of the contemporary research on Central Asia, transitology studies as 
applied to the post-Soviet Central Asia context offer most relevant insights 
for this thesis. Democracy promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
presents an integral part of larger democratisation efforts, which, in their 
turn, are a component of the political and economic transition in the post-
Soviet period.  
 
Nations in Transit?  
The collapse of the USSR raised hopes among Western policy making 
circles that Central Asia would join the “triumphant” liberal democratic West 
(and share Fukuyama’s enthusiasm of the early 1990s) and transition from 
command economy to market economy and from the Soviet-era 
authoritarianism to democracy. These hopes were fuelled with the early 
declared commitments to support the transition of some Central Asian 
leaders. Kazakh and Kyrgyz leaderships were among the first ones in the 
regions to adhere themselves to the rejection of old Communist way and the 
adoption of international standards (Gleason 2001, p.168). As the reality has 
demonstrated, both economic (market liberalisation) and political transition 
(democratisation) went unintended routes and resulted in the fusion of old 
and new economic and political elements and the formation of a unique 
Central Asian hybridity. 
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The independence era started with several major economic shocks in all five 
Central Asian republics: the cessation of Moscow subsidies; the 
disintegration of the Soviet production, trade and distribution networks and 
the subsequent closure of large state-owned enterprises; and, the botched 
privatisation that gave the rise to the few ‘new rich’ and the fall into poverty 
of numerous ‘new poor’. Two of the five Central Asia republics, Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan adopted the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) and World 
Bank’s (WB) suggestion of drastic economic reforms aimed to liberalise 
prices, reduce government regulation of economy, and encourage 
competition and foreign trade. These reforms were dubbed “shock therapy” 
(Gleason 2004, p.51; Blackmon 2010). Due to these economic shocks, the 
most population in the region found themselves in a dire economic situation 
with rocketing unemployment rates, significant reduction of the public social 
welfare, hyperinflation, a sharp decline in income levels, and growing 
poverty (Radnitz 2010, p.42; Pomfret 2006).  
The similarities of economic transition between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
end with the initial economic shocks related to the collapse of the Soviet 
economy and the adoption of the shock therapy. Kazakhstan, thanks to its 
enormous deposits of oil, gas, uranium and metals and successful attraction 
of foreign investment, was able to mitigate the socio-economic 
consequences of the Soviet disintegration and the post-Soviet shock therapy 
(Walker 2008). The purpose of the economic transition has soon become 
obsolete: by the new millennium, it was evident that the Soviet-era command 
economy disappeared, but, instead of a free market economy, Kazakhstan 
developed a state-controlled capitalism – petro-authoritarianism (Walker 
2008) strongly imbedded into neopatrimonial political system and turned into 
a rentier state (Pomfret 2006, pp.10-11; Franke et al 2009; Kaluyzhnova 
2008). Its smaller neighbour Kyrgyzstan has not yet recovered after the 
1990s double shock and become a heavily indebted country relying on 
external budget support (Pomfret 2006, p.11). Kyrgyzstan’s poor economic 
performance, reliance of externally generated funds, such as donor aid, 
foreign loans, labour migrant remittances and partial dependence on sole 
gold mine made the country a semi-rentier economy (see detailed analysis 
in Chapter 3).  
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External involvement in reforms is likely to cause domestic reaction, which 
might distort the reform objectives. Rigid prescriptions and requirements of 
external actors make the reluctant domestic forces to develop informal 
coping and circumvention strategies (Bliesemann de Guevara 2008, p.363). 
In the case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the shock therapy imposed by 
the international financial institutions with the permission of national leaders 
unintentionally created conditions for a flourishing informal economy. Initially 
a survival tool for ordinary citizens, the Central Asian grey market grew in 
scope and scale and turned into a transnational phenomenon spread across 
the wider Central Eurasian region, where the informal small-scale trade in 
daily essentials can be found side by side illegal trade in people, weapons 
and drugs (see more about the informal economy in former Soviet Union in 
Polese and Morris 2014; in Tajikistan - Gleason 2001, p.174; in Uzbekistan - 
Rasanayagam 2011). The rise of the informal economy has had lasting 
effects on democratisation processes because it has undermined the state’s 
capacity to control commercial flows (less so in Kazakhstan, more in 
Kyrgyzstan), has deflated the very concept of the rule of law, and, has given 
a rise to undemocratic actors such as organised criminal groups (Kupatadze 
2012) and practices such as corruption (Engvall 2012, Kupatadze 2012).  
Despite disastrous socio-economic consequences, the economic transition 
was sanctioned and supported by the ruling regimes across Central Asia as 
they saw the need to meet the international standards and join globalisation 
processes (Gleason 2004; Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013). Political transition 
to democracy, on the other hand, attracted much less attention and political 
will from the part of local elites. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan almost 
immediately put presidential political system in place, but their paths of 
political consolidation diverged greatly (Hale 2012, p.73). President 
Nazarbayev was able to maintain a firm grip on power from the 
Independence Day in 1991 up until now. First President Akayev was less 
capable of maintaining his power and after having flirted with democratic 
rhetoric for about 15 years, he lost it in the course of the 2005 Tulip 
Revolution. While some authors debate whether Kyrgyzstan is a democracy, 
there are clear signs that the Central Asian region presents a stable 
authoritarian environment with a strong democratic deficit, presidential 
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regimes, and unfair elections (Kubicek 2010, p.38; Hoffmann 2010). What 
seems to attract more research attention is the question why “the once 
seemingly monolithic Soviet bloc generated such complex patterns of 
democracy, quasi democracy, and autocracy” (Hanson 2003, p.143). 
Responding to the need to re-evaluate the transition period, researchers 
engaged in an analysis of the factors, which might have impeded and 
distorted the political transition process. Structural factors impeding the 
transition included Soviet structural legacy and economic factors, most of 
which lie either in the disintegration of the Soviet economy or in the 
immediate post-Soviet context. Lack of national unity (Kubicek 2010, pp.41-
43) caused by multi-ethnic composition of former Soviet state-nations (as 
opposed to Western nation-states, which evolved from ethnic nation to civic 
nations; Glenn 1999), and, sub-ethnic identities and loyalties – such as clan 
and tribal belonging (Collins 2006) were seen as detrimental to the initial 
state consolidation and democracy building.  
Due to the harsh post-Soviet socio-economic conditions the political systems 
of Central Asia acquired some unique undemocratic features. Radnitz 
explains how the survival needs of both elites and masses led to the 
consolidation of subversive clientelism, where the traditional reliance on the 
state is replaced by interest-based obligations to independent elites, who act 
as a surrogate state providing social support and employment opportunities 
to local communities (Radnitz 2010). Under these circumstances, there was 
no space left for the development of and consolidation of state institutions 
and democratic practices. The uneven and troubled economic development 
in the early independence years was related to the survival discourses: the 
economic situation in the beginning of the transition was simply unfavourable 
for a successful political transition (Luong 2005, p.258). 
On the other hand, some researchers highlighted actor-oriented factors. 
Ruling elites and major political figures faced uncertainty in the transition 
period and opted for non-democratic politics to stabilise their respective 
countries (see Isaacs 2010; Nourzhanov 2010 on Nazarbayev; Anderson 
1999 on Akayev, first Kyrgyz President). The role of Central Asian leaders 
cannot be overestimated given “the highly personalistic context of Central 
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Asian politics” (Gleason 2001, p.169), which remains a major impediment to 
successful democratisation in the region. Personalities of the Central Asian 
leaders and their reluctance “to give up their power and actually abide by 
‘rule of law’ principles” are often seen as key challenges to a successful 
democratisation process (Kangas 2004, p.82). Below them, non-ruling 
business elites are not interested in democracy as it does not serve their 
immediate survival strategies. They are either interested in protection from 
the state (Radnitz 2010), or in investment in the state to rip benefits through 
corruption or administrative power (Engvall 2012). The role of masses is 
ambiguous in this regard. Western mass media and some political observers 
saw the people as the key drivers of democratic change during the Kyrgyz 
revolutions in 2005 and 2010 (Kuzio 2008; McFaul 2015). In reality, only few 
Western academics dug into the Kyrgyz political soil deep enough to 
differentiate between a genuine democratic mobilisation and an elite-led 
mobilisation, where the people act as “the weapons of the wealthy” (Hale 
2015; Radnitz 2010, p.15-27).  
Conceptualisation of the gap between the transition expectations and the 
outcomes gave rise to a bulk of research devoted to the hybrid Central Asian 
regimes. Authors attempted to explain the peculiarities of the Central Asian 
political regimes and produced a variety of labels such as benevolent 
authoritarianism (Anderson 1999, p.55), Central Asian hybrids (Matveeva 
1999, p.31), patrimonial regimes (Collins 2009), imitation democracies 
(Furman 2008), patronal political regimes (Hale 2015), and imagined 
democracies (Beachain and Kevlihan 2015). While, these characterisations 
share some conceptual similarities, Henry Hale’s patronal politics theory 
(and partly Isaacs 2010 and Peyrouse 2013 on neopatrimonial regimes) 
satisfies the research requirements of this thesis. Hale re-evaluates 
conventional patron-client networks in the Central Asian context and 
provides a wider analytical framework for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the domestic context in the target countries. More 
importantly, Hale’s work signifies the departure of Central Asian studies from 
Western-bound or Soviet-bound ideals into a more autonomous area of 
studies, which requires stepping away from the “theory of ideal” and 
accepting that Central Asia interprets and applies the Western ideas of 
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parliamentary politics, participation, parties, and so on, in its own way. In 
addition, Hale insists on accepting the dynamism of Central Asian politics 
(something Russian General Skobelev warned of more than a century ago – 
see epigraph), and staying open to what a new day in Central Asia brings. 
Furman’s imitation democracy concept and Beachain and Kevlihan’s 
imagined democracy narrative will be instrumental for explaining the ability 
of Kazakh and Kyrgyz political regimes to mimic democratic institutions and 
practices without actually applying them. Other aspects of research on 
domestic politics, political landscape and economies in Central Asia will be 
useful for creating a comprehensive picture of the target countries. As 
mentioned before, this thesis builds its argument from a wide variety of 
sources and follows the principles of congruence and research flexibility. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the relevant literature within three fields of study: 
Democratisation studies, the EU studies, and Central Asian studies. It 
brought publications on different aspects of external democracy promotion, 
EU external identity and foreign policy, and Central Asian politics together in 
order to identify the core issues and questions, and to lay out the analytical 
and conceptual fundament for my research project on the topic of the EU’s 
democracy promotion in Central Asia.  
Research on democracy promotion reflects the rise and fall of the post-Cold 
War enthusiasm about the end of the ideological rivalry and an expected 
global conversion to democracy. Acceptance and commitment to democracy 
of the formerly authoritarian states of Eastern and Central Europe, former 
Soviet Union, and parts of Asia and Africa provided certain ground for 
optimism about future democratic development of these countries. 
Publications of the 1990s reflected these expectations; authors discussed 
third wave of democratisation (Huntington 1991), and triumph of liberal 
democracy (Fukuyama 1992), and considered democracy to be a universal 
value (Dahl 1998). The quality of democracy and a certain extent of 
democratic principles’ distortion in local societies caused less optimistic and 
more pragmatic views on the fate of democracy and democracy promotion 
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strategies. Nowadays, researchers on external democracy promotion 
(Richard Youngs, Thomas Carothers, Gordon Crawford, Peter Burnell) 
acknowledge the necessity of collective effort from both democracy 
promotion agents and recipients of democracy assistance, the role of 
tailored democracy promotion policies, and the responsiveness of local 
actors.  
The overview of the existing research in this field helped identify core 
questions and issues, which should be taken into account for an analysis of 
the EU’s democracy promotion policy case in Central Asia further in this 
thesis. It is possible to mark out four key questions, which arise from recent 
publications on external democracy promotion: who and why promotes 
democracy; how they promote democracy; and, how local actors perceive 
and react to external involvement in the domestic process of political 
reforming; and, what outcomes of external democracy promotion are. These 
basic questions will be asked with relation to the EU’s policy in Central Asia, 
and answered in next chapters of this thesis. Researchers in the field of 
democracy promotion problematise the motivation of democracy promoters, 
mechanisms and instruments of democracy promotion, the issue of agency, 
implementation and compatibility of democracy promotion policies with local 
conditions, technical issues related to implementation of democracy 
assistance projects, and, outcomes of democracy promotion projects. 
The EU studies section focused on the debates on the EU’s external identity, 
projection of its identity onto its foreign policy, including external democracy 
promotion policy, and the EU’s activities in Central Asia. From this field of 
research, it is possible to identify a duality in the mainstream approaches to 
viewing the EU’s identity and foreign policy. Thus, Ian Manners views the EU 
as a normative power, whose mission on the international scene involves 
spreading democratic values and norms. Adrian Hyde-Price argues against 
this assumption from the structural realist point of view; in his opinion, the 
EU’s foreign policy revolves around its member states’ interests, the most 
important of which is survival in the post-Cold War world. European states 
pursued integration and creation of common foreign policy as a way to 
adjust to structural pressures of the contemporary international system. The 
normative vs. realist dichotomy sets an analytical framework to examine the 
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EU’s democracy promotion in Central Asia. The EU’s legal framework does 
contain references to democratic values and norms, which are stated as 
guiding principles in its foreign policy, so in this regard the EU might be 
considered as an actor with strong normative agenda. The actual 
implementation of the EU’s foreign policy and objectives pursued in different 
parts of the world shows that the EU might be a multi-faceted actor, which 
pursues both self-interest goals and normative goals (e.g. see eight studies 
edited by Tocci, 2008). Acknowledging such duality in the EU’s policy 
overseas is useful for this research as it helps providing more 
comprehensive understanding of the EU as an international actor and a 
democracy promotion agent.  
Central Asian politics is relatively recent research field because the Central 
Asian countries entered the international scene as independent actors only 
20 years ago. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are no exception with their on-
going political reforms. Both countries have declared their commitment to 
democratic values in their constitutions. Nevertheless, researchers highlight 
local authoritarian tendencies and non-democratic practices.  
While the review of the research findings on relevant topics serves to help 
building the analytical and conceptual framework for this research project, 
certain gaps in the literature should be noted. Firstly, the research on Central 
Asia is diverse, but fragmented. This research project will attempt bringing 
these fragmented research publications together to create a patchwork of 
the Central Asian political landscape. Secondly, the problematisation of 
issues does not always provide comprehensive explanation of factors, which 
might inform and shape democracy promotion policies and implementation. 
The existing research publications often place more emphasis on one side of 
democracy promotion initiative, either on “promoter”, or “recipient”. In the 
rest of this research work, I will attempt to explore factors shaping 
democracy promotion policy and implementation on both sides with taking 
into consideration secondary factors and hidden stakeholders. Thirdly, the 
research on the EU’s democracy promotion shows certain geographic 
preferences as it predominantly focuses on the European neighbourhood 
(Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008; Hyde-Price 2006), Middle East and 
Africa (Lynch and Crawford 2008; Del Biondo 2011; Youngs 2001). In this 
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regard, Central Asia as the EU’s democracy assistance recipient is rather 
unusual research topic. This research project will fill in this gap in regional 
coverage of the EU’s democracy promotion studies and focus on the EU’s 
involvement in democratisation process in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
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Chapter 3 Local Context in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
 
3.1 Introduction  
External democracy promotion presents an inter-active, multi-dimensional, 
dynamic process that involves a broad variety of domestic and external 
actors each having an agenda of their own. From among these actors, two 
play a direct role in this process: a democracy promotion agent (donor) and 
a target country (recipient). Under the framework of this thesis the EU is a 
democracy promotion agent, and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are target 
countries. This chapter aims to explore the domestic context of the two 
target countries – Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The need to address relevant 
contextual factors stems from the fact that the conditions in the target 
countries have a potential to affect the responsiveness of local governments 
and societies, increase or limit the external agent’s leverage, enhance or 
distort the implementation of democracy promotion activities, and eventually 
shape the outcomes of donor projects and programmes.  
There is an important limitation to bear in mind when addressing the local 
context in target countries. Democracy promotion can be affected by such a 
vast variety of factors that it is impossible to take into account all relevant 
aspects. In order to strike a fine balance between the wealth of information 
and the focus of the research project I will concentrate on few most 
important domestic factors - the state of democracy, regime stability, and the 
level of economic development of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Using the 
existing research and other data I identify key socio-political and economic 
contextual factors, which might be important for external democracy 
promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. An overview of these factors will 
help produce a concise and comprehensive understanding of the local 
context in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The section that follows this 
introduction offers a general overview of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These 
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two countries have only recently emerged on the political map of the world 
and have not gained much international attention throughout these years. 
For this reason it is necessary to introduce Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to 
the reader and highlight some aspects of their geography, demographic 
composition and history that might helpful to understanding the local context. 
The next substantial sections are devoted to the state of democracy, regime 
stability and economic development. The section on economic development 
highlights the difference in economic performance between Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. The wealthiest nation in Central Asia, Kazakhstan has more 
freedom in both domestic and external politics. On the other hand, the poor 
donor-dependent Kyrgyzstan has to take into account the interests of 
numerous donors when conducting domestic and external politics. 
 
3.2 General Overview  
The study of democratic transitions will take the political scientist deeper into 
history than he has commonly been willing to go. 
Dankwart Rustow (1970, p.347) 
While there is a risk of making this section overly descriptive, there is also a 
need to introduce Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to the reader because these 
two countries rarely appear in global mass media headlines or attract any 
other international attention. In doing so I briefly go through the usual 
geographic, demographic and societal facts and figures, and proceed to 
some key socio-historical developments that could explain the trajectories of 
the post-Soviet transition including democratic transition (or, lack of thereof) 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are landlocked countries located in the heart of 
the Eurasian continent. Both share borders with China, Uzbekistan, and 
each other. Kazakhstan also shares borders with Russia, Turkmenistan and 
Iran through the Caspian Sea, and Kyrgyzstan neighbours Tajikistan in the 
south (see map of Central Asia in appendix C). As one might see, none of 
these neighbour countries are democratic. The majority of Kazakhstan’s and 
Kyrgyzstan’s neighbours regularly find themselves at the bottom of 
- 56 - 
l 
international democracy rankings and are regularly criticised by international 
human rights watchdogs (Freedom House, Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International to name a few). 
With the territory spanning across 2,724,900 square kilometres, Kazakhstan 
is the largest country in the region and the ninth largest country in the world. 
Kyrgyzstan occupies modest 199,951 square kilometres (CIA 2014, no 
pagination). Despite their size differences both countries experience 
difficulties with the special management, domestic transport infrastructure 
and communications. In Kazakhstan, the existing roads and communications 
are insufficient to cover the vast territory, which primarily consists of semi-
arid steppe. Mountains occupy 94% of the Kyrgyz territory and separate the 
country into two parts, north and south. Only one road connects north and 
south, and in winter the connection between two parts of the country is 
limited due to the risks of avalanches and landslides (Laruelle and Peyrouse 
2013, pp.242-254).  
The population of Kyrgyzstan is 5.834 million people. Kazakhstan is three 
times bigger with 17.29 million people. Both are unitary states with regions – 
oblast’ as the largest administrative territorial unit (7 in Kyrgyzstan and 14 in 
Kazakhstan). Both countries have two capitals, a formal and an informal 
ones. The cities of Bishkek, the official capital, and Osh, also known as the 
southern capital, enjoy the status of cities of national significance in 
Kyrgyzstan. Kazakh cities of Almaty, the former capital, and Astana, the 
current capital, are cities of national significance and are considered 
southern and northern capital respectively (World Bank 2015a and 2015b).  
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are multi-ethnic societies. More than 130 ethnic 
groups live in Kazakhstan and about 90 live in Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, 
the ethnic Kyrgyz constitute 72.2% of the total population. The next two 
largest ethnic groups are Uzbeks - 14.3% and Russians - 6.9% (National 
Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan 2015). In Kazakhstan, the ethic Kazakhs 
are the majority - 63.1%. The next two largest ethnic groups are Russians 
(23.7%) and Uzbeks (2.9%; CIA 2014). In both countries there are small 
numbers (less than 1%) of Chinese Turkic Muslims - Uyghurs, who have 
been migrating to Central Asian countries throughout the twentieth century 
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up until now. The presence of Uyghurs in Central Asia, especially in the 
bordering Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, is allegedly a matter of concern for 
the Chinese Government, whose policies aim to reduce Uyghur separatism 
in the Western province of Xinjiang (Starr 2004). However, the scale and 
reality of such concern is unclear.  
Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are bilingual. The language of the majority 
ethnic group, so-called “titular nation” Kazakh and Kyrgyz respectively has 
the status of the state language. The Russian language as the lingua franca 
in majority former Soviet republics is a legacy of the Soviet past. In the last 
decade the language has become a topic of heated debate in both countries. 
Due to the growing ethno-nationalist sentiments in both societies a part of 
the local population in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan insist on reducing 
the use of Russian language in public and private life. The political 
leadership in both countries does not seem to share these sentiments and 
attempts to contain them, possibly due to the concerns that a real or 
perceived threat to the Russian language or to the Russian diaspora can 
affect Kazakh and Kyrgyz relations with Russia.  
The majority population in both countries are Sunni Muslim (70-75%; CIA 
2014). Thanks to large groups of Slavic population Orthodox Christianity is 
the second largest religious denomination in both Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Other religious beliefs enjoy a degree of freedom, but this 
freedom regularly shrinks due to an increasingly restrictive legislation on 
religion (Human Rights Watch 2008: Freedom House 2011). In the light of 
the recent global developments the participation of Central Asians, including 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz citizens in the Islamic State’s (IS) activities in Syria is a 
matter of growing concern. The exact number of Kazakh and Kyrgyz IS 
recruits is unknown but recent reports on the local nationals joining or 
recruiting for IS indicate that the concerns are justified (RFE/RL 2015). 
As this brief introductory overview demonstrates despite some differences 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan face similar social and security issues. The 
similarities between two countries stem from two factors: the geographic 
proximity and a shared past. In the following discussion I identify key 
historical developments, which shaped the current political and socio-
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economic context in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Two periods informed the 
formation of the contemporary Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies: the period of 
Turkestan under Tsarist rule (roughly nineteenth century - 1917), and the 
Soviet period (1917-1991). The year 1991 can be considered the beginning 
of new period for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – the period of independence 
and transition.  
 
Pre-Soviet Societal Structures  
Prior to the Russian colonisation in the nineteenth century the population of 
Central Asia consisted of kinship-based traditional communities, whose 
areas of living were not defined by strict borders. The natural environment 
shaped the lifestyles of numerous Central Asian communities. Since 
agricultural lands were located mostly in the southern Central Asian area of 
fertile river valleys local Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik populations adopted 
sedentary lifestyle. Northern parts of the area were either mountainous 
territory or semi-arid steppe. The Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribes, who inhabited 
these areas, practiced either semi-nomadic pastoralism in mountainous 
regions or nomadic pastoralism in the vast steppe. Different production 
cycles in sedentary and nomadic communities resulted in distinct socio-
political systems. The sedentary south was home to state formations - 
khanates, centralised states with developed political structures. The nomadic 
tribes of the north had highly stratified pastoral society with extended familial 
household as the basic social unit: “an exogamous group of families related 
in the male line, which occupied common winter quarters” (Dunn and Dunn 
1967, p.148). These basic social units formed federations: several familial 
households formed uru, a clan. Several clans constituted a tribe. A 
confederation of tribes, if large enough, could elect a khan (Dunn and Dunn 
1967, p.148). The electoral monarchy was a feature of the so called 
“nomadic democracy”, but the elected khan had a very weak authority and 
the communities were largely ruled by local leaders (Furman 2008, p.33; 
Abramzon 1971). While Kyrgyz communities were relatively small, Kazakhs 
managed to build three larger socio-geographic units - zhuz (horde), which 
included dozens of tribes (Furman 2008, p.34).  
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The pre-Soviet socio-political organisation of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz 
societies is important due to several reasons. Firstly, the kinship-based 
structure had survived the Russian rule and was revived in the 
independence period. Kazakh division into three hordes can be traced at the 
highest political levels as the current political elites in Kazakhstan know their 
horde allegiance and, to a certain extent, use it in everyday politics (Skokov 
2014). In both countries, kinship-based networks are a subject of public and 
academic attention. Clan politics is an attractive narrative, which is often 
used to explain the peculiarities of local political dynamics (Collins 2006 and 
Schatz 2006). Secondly, the volatility and instability of larger socio-political 
structures and domination of smaller community structures have survived 
the test of time as well. In the pre-Soviet period when geographic and 
weather conditions were appropriate the larger structures would easily fall 
apart into a number of smaller groups or even individual familial households 
drifting apart in search of better pastures (Cummings 2005, p.17). In 
contemporary Kazakhstan and especially Kyrgyzstan, political allegiances 
are almost as fragile as the pre-Soviet ones. Political elites find it difficult to 
form and maintain stable alliances, i.e. larger structures (Radnitz 2010b; 
Hale 2015). For this reason, the nation-building proves to be quite 
challenging as multiple loyalties do not seem to facilitate national unity, a 
much-needed pre-requisite for statehood consolidation and democratic 
transition (Rustow 1970, p.350). 
 
Russian Colonisation and the Soviet Union  
The Russian settlers started migrating to the region as early as in the 17th 
century. The Tsarist government, especially under Petr Stolypin’s 
administration (1906-1911), encouraged Russians to settle in the region in 
order to ensure the control over the vast territory of Central Asia. By the mid-
nineteenth century the Tsarist Russia took the control over the most of 
Central Asia through armed conquest, negotiations, and voluntary 
accession, but in 1917 the Tsarist rule was overthrown by the Soviet power 
(Morozova 2005, p.67-69). The short-lived rule of the Russian Empire 
introduced few important socio-economic features, which were later 
- 60 - 
l 
consolidated by the Soviet Union. Firstly, the industrialisation diversified the 
previously agricultural economy of the region having speeded up the 
modernisation process. Secondly, the semi-forced sedentarisation of 
traditionally nomadic communities reshaped the existing kinship-based 
social structures by including the neighbourhood factor to the old blood-line 
factor of personal and social identification (De Young et al 2013). Finally, the 
Tsarist Russia set the conditions for making Russian the lingua franca in 
Central Asia.  
The Soviet regime inherited the colonial possessions of the overthrown 
Russian Imperial power. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan became a part of the 
Soviet Union in 1920 first as one autonomous republic. In 1936 they became 
two separate union-level republics (Artemov 1982). Under the Soviet rule the 
processes of industrialisation, sedentarisation and russification reached their 
peaks having made the traditional Kazakh and Kyrgyz communities fully 
sedentary and Russian-speaking.  
The ethnic composition of Kazakh and Kyrgyz Soviet Republics got further 
diversified with a significant influx of Russian migrants, who moved to 
emerging cities to support the booming military industrial complex (Dunn and 
Dunn, 1967, p.149). More ethnic groups arrived. Some, including Germans, 
Koreans, Poles, and North Caucasian ethnic groups were forcefully deported 
to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during Stalin’s regime. Others were recruited 
during the Virgin Lands campaign in Kazakhstan aimed to turn the vast 
Kazakh steppe into agricultural land in 1954-1956. In addition, there were 
individual migrants, who settled in the region in search of a better life 
(Cummings 2005, p.16).  
Soviet social engineering and co-existence of numerous ethnic groups within 
the Soviet state resulted in the creation of a large Soviet community where 
numerous ethnic, tribal, residential, cultural, professional and linguistic 
affiliations created a unique multi-layered identity, which depended on each 
individual’s life story (Glenn 1999, pp.48-49). At the same time the Soviet 
authorities pursued “national in form, Socialist in content” policy and 
acknowledged certain rights of ethnic groups in the multi-ethnic Soviet 
Union. It is important to note that the USSR applied dialectical approach to 
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the issue of nationalism based on the premises that assimilation and nation-
building are not mutually exclusive processes. The Soviet Union introduced 
and implemented top-down nation-building in Central Asia. Nevertheless the 
Soviet rule actually reinforced the sense of national affiliation through the 
establishment of the Soviet Republics, when large ethnic groups were given 
politically and geographically defined territory that bore their name (Collins 
2006, p.21).  
However, as this brief historical overview demonstrates the Kyrgyz and 
Kazakh statehood and nationhood were blueprinted and introduced in the 
top-down manner by external actors – decision makers in Moscow. Neither 
Kazakhstan nor Kyrgyzstan have had any substantial experience of 
autonomous state- and nation-building. Similar to other former colonies they 
did not develop their statehood. They received ready national structures and 
institutions from their colonial power. At that both countries also lacked any 
democracy experience as the colonial powers preceding the independence 
were largely undemocratic and left a strong authoritarian legacy that shaped 
both the societal and state structures. As a result of these historical 
developments Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were “hardly prepared for an 
unexpected adventure in state building” (Lewis 2008a, p.123). 
 
3.3 Transition and Democracy  
The adventure in state building started in December 1991, when the 
collapse of the Soviet Union was legally fixed and the now-former Soviet 
republics were granted independence. The immediate post-Soviet period 
was full of significant changes, which took place with little preparation time or 
sufficient resources. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had to quickly write and 
approve constitutions, create national currencies, design and adopt state 
symbols (flags, hymn and state emblem), and join the United Nations (MFA 
Kazakhstan 2015, MFA Kyrgyzstan 2015). By 1994 all elements of the 
external façade of statehood were in place. Political and economic 
transformation proved to be much more challenging objectives.  
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Transitional Period 
The initial transitional period was characterised with multiple economic 
shocks and crises. The collapse of the Soviet Union was accompanied with 
the disintegration of the Soviet production, trade and distribution system and 
closure of large state enterprises, which provided employment for a large 
part of the population (Pomfret 2006, p.5). The subsequent unemployment 
and deterioration of the quality of life was further worsened by the swift 
economic reforms in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan were the two countries in Central Asia that accepted the fast 
track economic reforms suggested by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (Gleason 2004, p.45). Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
preferred gradual, state-controlled transition from command economy 
towards market economy (Blackmon 2009). Turkmenistan’s decision to 
abstain from externally suggested reforms ensued from President Niyazov’s 
decision to enforce the concept of “positive neutrality”, which implied 
effective disengagement and distancing from international affairs and 
organisations (Kavalski 2010, pp.184-185).  
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan proceeded with suggested reforms and 
launched the process of liberalisation of prices, privatisation of state 
property, reduction of government regulation of economy, facilitation of 
competition and foreign trade through legislative adjustments, and 
withdrawal of state subsidies (Gleason 2004, p.51). The immediate socio-
economic effects of the shock therapy were catastrophic for the majority 
population. The liberalisation of prices resulted in hyperinflation with the 
prices on basic goods and services rocketing 14 times in Kazakhstan and 8 
times in Kyrgyzstan at the inflation peak years (see Table 1 below). 
Table 1: Inflation rates as percentage from GDP 1991-1998  
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Kazakhstan 96.4 1,472 1,243 1,546 161 39 16 5.7 
Kyrgyzstan 134 830 754 181 42 35 19 9 
Source: World Bank Data 2015a and 2015b 
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The privatisation of state property took place against the background of this 
hyperinflation and resulted in an unequal distribution of privatisation 
opportunities. The citizens in both countries received vouchers that could be 
exchanged for shares in state-owned companies. Due to the desperate 
economic situation the majority population had to exchange those vouchers 
for immediate cash in order to survive this period. As a result the 
privatisation profited the new rich while the majority population have become 
even poorer. Lucrative privatisation facilitated the emergence of a 
plutocracy, deepened the gap between the new poor and the new rich, and 
contributed to the growing perception of inequality (Matveeva 1999, p.40; 
Morris and Polese 2013). The Soviet welfare state disappeared along with 
the Soviet Union and the newly independent Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
had no means to support the impoverished population (Radnitz 2010b) 
In addition to these socio-economic hardships the transitional period 
facilitated the development of informal economic practices in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan. The quickly changing circumstances forced people to 
respond with alternative jobs in informal, unregulated by the state sectors to 
avoid unemployment and poverty (Morris and Polese 2013 offer an excellent 
account of the informal economic development in the post-Soviet space). 
Informal economic activities required the services and activities, such as 
security provision or taxation, which are normally provided by the state. For 
example, organised criminal groups offered basic security and protection as 
well as resolution of disputes between informal economic entities. The 
growing demand in the informal sector resulted in the consolidation of 
organised criminal groups. While in Kazakhstan the formal state structures 
did manage to restrict and contain these groups, the weaker and less stable 
Kyrgyzstan saw the rise of criminal groups, who took advantage of instability 
and chaos in the early independence years. As the time passed former 
racketeers and criminals legalised themselves through private security 
companies and developed relations with the formal economic and political 
elites, who had to take into account the new power brokers (Morris and 
Polese 2013; Kupatadze 2008). This gave rise to the political-economic-
criminal nexus, where the lines between political elites, business community 
and criminal underworld got blurred, and illegal activities got intertwined with 
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legal ones. Under such circumstances, the enforcement of the rule of law 
principle has become somewhat challenging. 
The challenging economic transition had few important implications. First, 
the externally promoted economic reforms and the associated hardships left 
a long-lasting distrust in the benevolent external actors and in reforms in 
general. The one lesson learnt by the local population was that any change 
will make their situation worse. Second, the rise of the informal sector and 
the development of organised criminal groups changed the power landscape 
in Kyrgyzstan. Underworld kings accumulated enough financial power and 
human capital to build relations with the local political and economic elites. 
Finally, the survival needs of political elites and the general population 
revived the traditional networks of support – kinship and neighbourhood-
based patron-client groups. The well-off patrons acted as a surrogate state 
and provided the means to survival and services that the weakened states 
could not provide (Radnitz 2010b).  
These socio-economic circumstances made political transition very difficult. 
The unfavourable economic conditions made political elites opt for non-
democratic policies to stabilise the countries. In Kazakhstan, President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev prioritised stability and economic recovery over 
democratic transition and embarked upon building a strong presidential 
regime in 1991 and successfully carried on the regime consolidation for the 
next 24 years (Nourzhanov 2010, pp.107-132). Kyrgyzstan opted for political 
reforms, but could not successful complete, consolidate and enforce the 
democratic transition due to the regular authoritarian setbacks and 
continuous political instability. In the first 15 independence years Kyrgyzstan 
was ruled by President Askar Akayev, who first acted as a liberal reformer, 
but gradually turned into an autocratic after having significantly limited the 
powers of the parliament, government and the judiciary. President Akayev’s 
increasing pressure on local political leaders, deteriorating economic 
situation and the public frustrations on inflation, reduction of social benefits 
and growing unemployment culminated in the 2005 regime change, one of 
colour revolutions in the post-Soviet space. The 2005 regime change, also 
called Tulip revolution, brought President Kurmanbek Bakiev in power 
(Lewis 2010, pp.45-61).  
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The Current State of Democracy in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan  
The last decade (2005-2015) was characterised with further consolidation of 
President Nazarbayev’s regime in Kazakhstan and increased political 
instability in Kyrgyzstan. Thanks to series of constitutional amendments the 
current political system is strongly presidential. Kazakh President enjoys a 
wide range of powers and encounters no opposition from the side of the 
executive, legislative and judiciary branches. President Nazarbayev 
personally has the right to run for re-elections until he dies or decides to stop 
as the constitutional amendments in 2007 gave him the status of the First 
President with the right of unlimited terms. In Kyrgyzstan, in the course of 
the revolutions, presidential powers were cut back and the current political 
system is parliamentary-presidential.  
In 2007-2014, Freedom House has reported a solid evidence of stagnation 
with occasional regression (downward trends) in the democratisation 
process in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. According to the Freedom 
House’s Freedom in the World annual reports in 2007-2014, Kazakhstan has 
not been free even once, and Kyrgyzstan has continuously been “partly free” 
except for 2010, when the increasingly autocratic regime of President 
Kurmanbek Bakiev was overthrown by public protests. 
Table 2: Freedom in the World scores for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 
2007-2014 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Kazakhstan  5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Kyrgyzstan 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Scores read: 1.0 to 2.5 (free), 3.0 to 5.0 (partly free), and 5.5 to 7.0 (not free); 
Based on the Freedom in the World reports 2007-2014, Freedom House 2015 
The seemingly stagnating Kazakh democratisation record has actually been 
characterised with regular downward trends due to a long-standing abuse of 
human rights and political freedoms and continuously shrinking space for 
civil society and free mass media. In the course of the seven reported years, 
Freedom House repeatedly highlighted trends, which significantly hindered 
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democratisation in Kazakhstan: the consolidation of President Nazarbayev’s 
rule through electoral politics; political violence and oppression; and, 
suppression of independent mass media and civil society. Mass media 
continued facing harassment throughout the period with regular legislative 
restrictions and crackdowns on mass media in the form of suits and 
prosecutions against critical mass media outlets, new legislation on internet, 
and blocking attempts to open new media outlets (Freedom House 
Kazakhstan Reports 2013-2014; Isaacs 2010a, pp.198-203).  
Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a different democratisation pattern thanks to a 
democratisation impetus provided by the 2005 Tulip revolution that 
overthrew President Akayev’s regime. However, the hopes for consolidation 
of the Tulip revolutions’ small victories in the area of mass freedom and 
competitiveness of political parties proved to be vane as the newly elected 
President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s regime quickly showed signs of the notorious 
Central Asian authoritarianism. From 2007 to 2010, Kyrgyzstan has 
repeatedly received downward trend ranking due to the consolidation of 
President Bakiev’s regime through constitutional amendments, fraud 
elections, oppression and intimidation of free mass media, civil society and 
political opposition. The deterioration of freedoms and rights in the country 
resulted in another revolution in April 2010. The uprising launched a chain of 
events in the country, some of which were positive such as the adoption of a 
new constitution balancing presidential and parliamentary powers and 
competitive parliamentary elections in October 2010. This significantly 
improved Kyrgyzstan’s score and moved it back to the partly free category 
(Freedom House 2011). In the following four years (2011-2015), Kyrgyzstan 
has maintained its partly free status and had its ups and downs in the 
democratisation process. Ups included a competitive presidential election in 
October 2011, which resulted in the first peaceful and legitimate transfer of 
power (Freedom House 2012) and the establishment of a new anticorruption 
body. Downs revolved around an unfair treatment of ethnic minorities in the 
post-conflict period, issues with judicial independence, and regular 
dismissals and appointments of the government (Freedom House 2012, 
2013 and 2014).  
- 67 - 
l 
Electoral politics played an important role in consolidating the Kazakh 
authoritarianism and fuelling the Kyrgyz unstable democracy. In 24 years, 
there were 4 presidential and 7 parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan, and 5 
presidential and 6 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan (Beachain and 
Kevlihan 2015, p.501). Nursultan Nazarbayev won each presidential 
elections in Kazakhstan and called for at least three early parliamentary 
elections, when the parliaments were too independent. In Kyrgyzstan, both 
parliamentary and presidential elections were accompanied with the fear of 
instability as both ruling and competing political elites mobilised their support 
groups and often relied on illegal mechanisms to ensure victory (see 
Beachain and Kevlihan 2015 for electoral politics and Radntiz 2010b on 
electoral mobilisation of masses). In both countries, elections were usually 
critiqued by international observers and endorsed by regional observers. 
Such international electoral watchdog as OSCE observation missions 
regularly noted a variety of electoral fraud tactics committed by the ruling 
authorities in both countries, as well as an overall atmosphere of 
intimidation, mass media bias, low representation of opposition parties on 
election commissions, procedural violations, and flawed handling of post-
electoral complaints (ODIHR 2006). Regional observation mission from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS Portal 2015) and the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO Portal 2015) regularly supported elections 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and noted a high democratic standard of the 
elections’ conduct.  
In addition to electoral politics, political violence and oppression facilitated 
the authoritarian consolidation in Kazakhstan and instability in Kyrgyzstan. 
International human rights watchdogs repeatedly raised the issue of 
increasing violence and oppression directed against opposition leaders, 
human rights advocates and trade unionists. Two opposition leaders were 
killed around the 2005 presidential elections (Lillis 2006). In 2009, human 
rights activist Yevgeny Zhovtis was arrested and subjected to “the grossly 
deficient judicial proceedings”, along with a range of other officials and 
businessman (Freedom House 2010). However, the most notorious act of 
state-sanctioned violence in Kazakhstan took place in December 2011, 
when a sit-in strike of oil workers in the Zhanaozen city turned into riots and 
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the police opened fire on the strikers. Oil workers in Zhanaozen, a Western 
Kazakhstan single-industry (oil and gas) town, went on strike to demand 
higher wages and better working conditions in May 2011. The strike gained 
popularity among underpaid oil and gas industry workers with more people 
joining the protest and the nearby towns supporting the action. The state’s 
violent response to the strike was unexpected: police and riot troops 
“showered the people with bullets” on 16 December 2011 (Sindelar and 
Toiken 2012). 16 people were shot dead and trade union activists were 
arrested. The regime carried on the crack down on unions and opposition 
across the country and adopted more restrictive legislation (Freedom House 
2013; Al Jazeera 2011).  
In Kyrgyzstan, political assassinations started under President Bakiev’s 
regime, which has been relying upon brute force to get rid of dissidents: 
members of the parliament, politicians, businessmen, journalists and even 
famous sportsmen fell victims to assassinations (Ovchinnikova 2009). 
However, political oppression has always been present in one or another 
form under all four political regimes in Kyrgyzstan, but its scope was 
considerably lower than in Kazakhstan.  
Better democratic situation in Kyrgyzstan owes to more open political system 
and freedom. Despite such positive signs of democracy in Kyrgyzstan as a 
vibrant civil society, opposition political parties and relatively independent 
mass media, it is impossible to note a stable democratisation record. 
Regular returns of authoritarianism and two violent regime changes leave 
continuous concerns about stability of Kyrgyzstan as a state and the 
uncertain future of its hybrid political regime. Against the background of its 
highly authoritarian neighbours, Kyrgyzstan appears as a relatively 
democratic country and boasts being the first case of the peaceful transition 
of power in the region, and the first and only parliamentary-presidential 
republic, but its instability does not make is a particularly exemplary 
showcase of successful democracy.  
Unlike Kyrgyzstan, protest is virtually absent in Kazakhstan, but this does 
not necessarily imply universal consent with the regime. Potentially 
dangerous topics of oppression and human rights violations are managed 
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through mass media control and diversion of public attention to other issues 
(BTI KZ 2014, p.17). Nevertheless, the public generally does seem to 
support the president’s course of “stability, accord and growth” (BTI KZ 
2014, p.17), thus sustaining the stable authoritarian rule of President 
Nazarbayev. 
In summary, in the last decade, there was a steady decline in democratic 
governance, freedoms and rights in Kazakhstan and an uneven 
democratisation record in Kyrgyzstan. In both cases, it is too early to speak 
of any improvement in the area of good governance, rule of law, human 
rights and democracy. Kazakhstan remains a stable authoritarian regime 
with little space for political pluralism and free and fair elections. The political 
system in Kyrgyzstan is characterised with a mixture of authoritarian and 
democratic features and is continuously undermined by regular outbursts of 
violence and instability. 
 
3.4 Regime Stability 
The varying paths of economic development can be explained by two 
important contextual factors: regime stability and the degree of economic 
development. Stability in general and regime stability in particular presents a 
crucial contextual factor, which shapes democratisation process and affects 
the success of external democracy promotion initiatives. Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan find themselves on the two opposite extremes of the stability 
factor. While in Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev managed to build and 
maintain a stable non-democratic regime, the Kyrgyz political system is 
subject to frequent and turbulent changes of ruling elites. In this section, I 
examine degrees of regime stability in Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev and 
Kyrgyzstan under its four post-independence regimes through the analytical 
framework developed by Lucan Way. Way identified three sources of 
authoritarian organisational capacity in the post-communist countries that 
define the ability of ruling elites to ensure the loyalty of regime supporters 
and the elimination or reduction of regime opposition. These sources are 
ruling party strength, coercive capacity of state and state control over 
national wealth. In addition, Way developed a system to evaluate each of 
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these sources of authoritarian organisational capacity as weak, medium or 
high (Way 2010, pp.229-252). In order to analyse the regime stability in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the post-Soviet period (1991-2014), I will first 
explain Way’s analytical framework and, afterwards, I will apply this 
framework to Kazakhstan under President Nursultan Nazarbayev (1991-
present) and Kyrgyzstan under President Askar Akayev (1991-2005), 
President Kurmanbek Bakiev (2005-2010), the Provisional Government 
(2010), and President Almazbek Atambayev (2011-present).  
Before embarking upon an analysis of the regime stability and regime 
survival in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it is important to explain the sources 
of regime stability. Ruling party strength is a vital source of authoritarian 
regime stability. Ruling parties ensure the loyalty of elites uniting them within 
a structured and hierarchical organisation, where the top patron is the 
president himself. In addition, ruling parties and the president support each 
other during and in between electoral campaigns. The presidential backing 
helps winning votes during parliamentary elections. In return, ruling party 
mediates the presidential will and ensures control over legislature. Way 
differentiates between three levels of ruling party strength (Way 2010, 
pp.230-231). The absence of a ruling party or reliance upon several smaller 
parties signify a weakness. Medium strength requires a well-organised 
single ruling party. A strong ruling party refers to a well-organised party with 
other, non-material sources of legitimacy, in particular, an established 
ideological tradition. 
State coercive capacity implies the regime’s ability to contain regime 
opposition and prevent or stop large-scale protests through state security 
apparatus (Way 2010, pp.232-234). In order to have coercive capacity, state 
security networks and law enforcement bodies need to be well-paid, well-
equipped, coherent, loyal and ready to use force against the regime 
opposition (civilian fellow citizens). In the ideal for the regime scenario, the 
security forces would also have some experience in using force either 
against external enemies or against domestic opposition. If the security 
forces have these characteristics, state coercive capacity is deemed strong. 
If they have all characteristics apart from experience, state coercive capacity 
- 71 - 
l 
is medium. State coercive capacity is weak where security forces lack 
funding, equipment, training and experience. 
The last, but not the least pillar of regime stability is state control over 
wealth, which refers to the leaders’ ability to access national resources in 
order to buy off opposition, keep supporters loyal, and maintain a strong 
ruling party and well-financed security forces (Way 2010, pp.234-235). In 
addition, access to national resources, gives the leader the control over the 
entire society’s wealth and the monopoly of resources distribution. This 
ensures the conformity of the large proportion of less well-off population 
(Ross 2001, pp.349-351). The population have to regularly demonstrate their 
loyalty to the regime, e.g. through electoral support or non-participation in 
regime opposition and protests, in order to keep their jobs and have access 
to social benefits - crumbles from the resources-pie. State control over 
wealth is high if the leadership has dominant control over the economy or 
rely on mineral resources for more than 50% of total exports. 
Table 3: Analytical framework for the evaluation of authoritarian 
organisational capacity 
 Weak Medium Strong 
Ruling Party 
Strength 
No/multiple parties Single ruling party Single party with an 
established ideology  
State Coercive 
Capacity 
Under-funded, 
under-paid and 
unequipped  
Well-funded, well-
paid, 
inexperienced in 
actual combat  
Well-funded, well-
equipped and 
experienced in 
combat  
State Control 
over Wealth 
Lack of resources; 
Extensive 
privatisation 
Limited amount of 
resources; 
Partial state 
control over 
economy 
Oil-rich states (>50% 
exports are 
resources); 
Centrally planned 
economies. 
Source: Way 2010, p.236 
This table crystallises the analytical framework and clarifies the regime 
stability evaluation criteria. Originally, Way applied this framework to 
evaluate regime stability and survival in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine in 1999-2001. I apply it to 
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Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and make a distinct differentiation between all 
four Kyrgyz regimes within the 1991-2014 timeframe. This differentiation is 
required to provide a sufficient degree of accuracy when addressing the 
local political context.  
 
Ruling Party Strength 
Ruling parties in the Central Asian context usually use a vote-seeking logic. 
A ruling party does not need a competitive political ideology or attractive 
policy proposals. It relies upon the regime’s existing policies and seeks to 
get as many members as possible by avoiding a clearly defined ideological 
position (Bader 2010, p.8). Such pattern is wide spread in Central Asia, 
where ruling parties are a popular instrument for cementing the regime and 
attaching democratic façade to undemocratic electoral politics.  
The Otan party, the predecessor of the current ruling party Nur Otan in 
Kazakhstan was established in 1999 through merging a number of pro-
presidential political parties. It was renamed Nur Otan after another merger 
in 2006, now with the Asar party headed by President Nazarbayev’s 
daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva. In 2007, Nursultan Nazarbayev officially 
headed Nur Otan. As a classic ruling party, Nur Otan is based upon the key 
organising principle – loyalty to the president. The loyalty to the president 
borders with the cult of personality as one can see from the official party 
doctrine:  
The first President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Elbasy Nursultan Nazarbayev is the founder of our party. We relate finding of Independence and recognition of achievements of Kazakhstan with his name on the international scene. Elbasy's state course defines the future for our people. Elbasy has not only designated strategic objectives for Kazakhstan, but has also created conditions for the achievement of those objectives. His wisdom, humanity, strong will, aspiration for the better future and selfless service to the people will always be an example for us and future generations to come (Nur Otan 2015) 
The political platform of Nur Otan mirrors President Nazarbayev’s 
prioritisation of non-political matters, such as education, economic 
development, healthcare etc. Nur Otan’s party doctrine does mention such 
principles as freedom, rule of law and civil society in a descriptive and non-
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committal way. However, the official declaration to dominate contradicts and 
undermines these principles: “The «Nur Otan» party intends further to keep 
the dominating role in the life of the country” (Nur Otan 2015). 
In compliance with Way’s analytical framework, Nur Otan is a medium-
strength ruling party. It does not have any competitor political parties in 
Kazakhstan, partly thanks to the legislative restrictions on creating political 
parties (Isaacs 2010a, pp.201-204). Nur Otan enjoys strong material backing 
as the country is striving economically and the national wealth is largely in 
the heads of the ruling regime and the party. However, it lacks a strong 
ideological platform and non-material incentives to be a strong ruling party. 
As many observers note, the fate of Nur Otan is tied to President and it is 
impossible to predict whether the part will keep its “domination” after 
President Nazarbayev leaves his position due to natural or other causes 
(Isaacs 2010a, pp.211-2012; interviews 41 and 42 with the leaders of two 
opposition political parties in Kazakhstan, 17 May 2013).  
The first Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev (1991-2005) followed the regional 
patterns of autocracy consolidation through ruling parties. His ruling party - 
“Alga Kyrgyzstan!” was established in 2003 through merging of 4 smaller 
parties. Akayev’s daughter Bermet Akayeva headed the party because, 
according to the Kyrgyz Constitution, the President could not belong to 
political party. Similarly to Nur Otan in Kazakhstan, Alga enjoyed a quick 
success: it promptly recruited a large number of new members and won the 
majority seats at the Parliament (Lewis 2010, pp.48-50). However, due to 
the different political setting in Kyrgyzstan the electoral fraud and the 
consolidation of the ruling party strength brought the demise of Akayev’s 
regime closer. In March 2005, in the course of flawed parliamentary election, 
Alga party won 69 out of 75 places at the parliament. This contributed to the 
ongoing public dissatisfaction with the Akayev’s rule, made the political elites 
threated by the regime consolidation. Eventually, the public and elites’ 
frustrations led to a regime change - the Tulip revolution (Radnitz 2010a). 
Alga party fell apart immediately after the revolution. While Akayev did 
establish a unified ruling party, the party failed to prove its viability and 
lacked both financial and non-material backing to stay in power, i.e. Alga had 
low strength.  
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President Kurmanbek Bakiev followed the example of his predecessor when 
creating a new ruling party - Ak-Zhol. Again, just like other presidents in the 
region, he sought to consolidate his power through taking over the majority 
seats at the parliament during controversial parliamentary elections in 2007 
(ENEMO Elections Report 2007). The plan worked for few years as the loyal 
Parliament adopted few constitutional amendments, which increased 
presidential powers at the expense of parliamentary and executive powers 
(Bader 2010, p.5). However, in 2010, as an outcome of increasingly 
oppressive and violent regime, President Bakiev was ousted from power in 
the course of the second Kyrgyz revolution. Ak-Zhol party was dismissed on 
the next day. As the ruling party did not meet the President’s expectations 
and failed to survive the regime change, it is clear that it had low strength. 
The Provisional Government headed by first female President in Central 
Asia – Roza Otunbaeva, which took over the power in between the 
revolution and the presidential elections in 2011. Due to the diversity of 
political elites involved in ousting President Bakiev and running the country 
in 2010-2011, there was no ruling party during this period.  
The current President Almazbek Atambayev has a ruling party as well, but 
his situation is drastically different from his less successful predecessors. 
Firstly, President Atambayev established the Social Democratic Party of 
Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) long before coming into power. The SDPK developed 
naturally based upon a small group of supporters with a shared ideological 
platform (social democracy). Secondly, the SDPK does not have majority 
seats at the Parliament; unlike Alga and Ak-Zhol, the SDPK is just one of 
five powerful political parties at the Parliament. As such, it has to negotiate 
and cooperate with parliamentary opposition. The position of the SDPK is 
probably a positive sign for democracy in Kyrgyzstan, but for regime survival 
and consolidation the SDPK is a medium-strength party. The SDPK is 
reasonably strong as the President, the Speaker and the majority 
Government are either SDPK members or associates, but it is not as solid 
as Nur Otan in Kazakhstan. 
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State Coercive Capacity 
The Soviet regime left an invaluable legacy – a well-organised, extensive 
and diverse security services with well-trained human resources. However, 
the distribution of this legacy was quite uneven: Kazakhstan inherited a large 
military infrastructure, available weapons, including nuclear weapons, and a 
considerable proportion of the former Soviet military-industrial production. 
Kyrgyzstan received a limited military infrastructure and lacked any 
meaningful military industry. In addition to the unequal starting conditions, 
Kazakhstan managed to sustain, reorganise and consolidate its security and 
law enforcement bodies thanks to the steady economic growth in the 2000s. 
Kyrgyzstan has not only failed to strengthen its security networks, but lost a 
large part of the inherited Soviet security infrastructure due to limited 
financial resources and the lack of perceived threats (Marat 2007, pp.84-85, 
90-95). Due to these differences in state security framework, Kazakhstan 
has medium-high coercive capacity while Kyrgyzstan has only scored low 
under all four regimes. 
The Kazakh security services are well-equipped and well-paid, but they have 
not been “baptised by fire”, i.e. tested their capacity in an armed conflict. The 
only test the Kazakh security forces have had so far took place in the town of 
Zhanaozen in West Kazakhstan, where the police used weapons against a 
group of striking oil workers.  
In Kyrgyzstan, due to the limited financial resources, the security forces have 
always been weak and incapable of sustaining the regime against organised 
protests. Severely underpaid and unequipped police forces could not do 
much to help saving Akayev’s and Bakiev’s regimes against the protestors in 
2005 and 2010 (Way 2010, pp.232-233). However, there are variations of 
the weak: Bakiev attempted strengthening the grip on the country’s coercive 
apparatus by appointing his brother Janysh Bakiev, Head of the State 
Security Service in 2008. This measure only slightly increased the 
oppressive capacity of security forces in 2010, when they used lethal 
weapons having shot about 90 people dead and hundreds injured (ICG 
2010). The Provisional Government had very limited control over security 
forces whatsoever due to the limited funding, the inter-ethnic crisis and the 
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legitimacy controversy (the Provisional Government was not elected; it came 
into power through a violent regime change in 2010). The current President 
Atambayev exerts a certain degree of control over security forces. However, 
against the background of an overall less stable regime, he is unable to gain 
full control: political elites, both formal and informal, have their own networks 
within security services and can effectively prevent the concentration of 
power in the President’s hands.  
 
State Discretionary Economic Control 
Finally, the last pillar of regime stability is state control over economic 
resources. According to Way’s classification, country cases are considered 
to have high state economic control if states rely on mineral wealth for more 
than 50% of their exports (Way 2010, pp.234-235). Kazakhstan’s primary 
source of income is oil and oil products and President Nazarbayev allegedly 
has access to this national wealth. The inter-relation between authoritarian 
regime stability and petro-wealth will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section on economic development. President Nazarbayev’s regime enjoys a 
high degree of economic control, which makes it possible to sustain the 
other two pillars – the ruling party and the security apparatus. 
In the considerably poorer Kyrgyzstan, the weak economic performance has 
made it difficult to ensure regime stability for each president and the general 
political stability. In the course of extensive privatisation in the 1990s, all 
more or less important and profitable companies landed in hands of foreign 
investors and local business elites. The local business elites used their 
share of wealth to build patron-client networks, which gave them some 
capacity to claim a share of formal power either at the Parliament or within 
the executive branch. The access to the nation’s scarce wealth sources has 
become both means and aim for political and business elites. The wealthy 
seek to invest in public support or in formal positions of power in order to 
protect their status and to increase their wealth (Radnitz 2010b). As a result 
of such practices, the Kyrgyz state has turned into an investment market 
with unwritten rules and regulations based upon corruption, favouritism and 
informal politics (Engvall 2015). President Bakiev attempted to take control 
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over the country’s finance by establishing the Central Agency of 
Development and Innovation and appointing his son Maxim as the Agency 
Director. All state revenue and distribution of budget money went through 
the Agency, but the system proved short-lived as President Bakiev was 
ousted in 2010 and the Agency was abolished (Matveeva 2010, p.3). Apart 
from this impressive take on the budget, there were no successful or 
considerable attempts to control the national wealth.  
 
Incumbent Regime Survival 
After having analysed the pillars of regime stability in Kazakhstan under its 
sole leader Nazarbayev and in Kyrgyzstan under the leadership of three 
Presidents and the Provisional Government, it is possible to evaluate the 
regime stability. In Kazakhstan, the regime stability and survival rate remains 
medium to high as all key sources of power are in place and under the 
control of President Nazarbayev. In Kyrgyzstan, the regime survival has 
traditionally been low for almost all regimes. The inability to sustain the ruling 
party strength and the excessive electoral fraud cost Presidents Akayev and 
Bakiev their power. The Provisional Government was too short-lived and 
diverse to build any viable political alliance. From the beginning, it was clear 
the Provisional Government is a temporary transitional measure. The under-
funded and weak security services could not offer a stable foundation for any 
regime consolidation in Kyrgyzstan. Finally, the poor economic performance 
and the lack of substantial resources made the regime reliance on national 
wealth obsolete. In the absence of significant resources, the Kyrgyz ruling 
regimes could not have sufficient resources to strengthen security services 
or to stabilise the social welfare state. Nevertheless, President Atambayev 
has chances to make it to the end of his term without being ousted.  
Atambayev’s regime survival owes to several factors. First, President 
Atambayev relies on a political party with some ideological platform and 
long-standing history. Thanks to more than two decades of consistent and 
active participation in politics, the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan 
seems to be more reliable than the hasty attempts to build a loyalist party of 
his predecessors. Second, the current political system in Kyrgyzstan has 
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stricken a fragile balance. This is not necessarily a sign of successful 
democratisation because the competing political elites are not always 
inclined to pursue democratic objectives. To the contrary the pluralism and 
multi-polarity in the Kyrgyz politics stem from the diversity of small powerful 
leaders each pursuing their own selfish interests (Lewis 2010, p.45).  
Third, there is an overall public saturation with the mass protests and drastic 
political changes. The tumultuous political life in the last ten years has 
gradually shaped the public opinion on protest. Finally, President Atambayev 
enjoys a degree of international support. While President Atambayev proved 
himself pro-Russian, he managed to keep good relations with other 
important international actors, China, the EU and the US. These factors 
might be insufficient on their own, but together they make the current regime 
in Kyrgyzstan slightly more stable than the previous one. Nevertheless, one 
should bear in mind that “the position of affairs changes not every hour, but 
every minute” (General Mikhail Skobelev as cited in Bellairs 1900, p.164). 
Table 4: Organisational Power and Incumbent Regime Survival in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 1991-2015 
 Ruling Party Strength 
State Coercive Strength 
State Discretionary Economic Control 
Incumbent Survival 
Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev, 1991-present 
 Medium  Medium-High 
 High  Medium-High 
Kyrgyzstan under Akayev, 1991-2005 
 Low  Low  Low  Low 
Kyrgyzstan under Bakiev, 2005-2010 
 Low  Low  Low  Low 
Kyrgyzstan under Provisional Government,  2010-2011 
 Low  Low  Low  Low 
Kyrgyzstan under Atambayev  2011-present 
 Medium  Low  Low  Medium-Low 
Based upon Way 2010, Table 9.1. “Organisational power in 1999-2001 and 
incumbent survival through the mid-2000s”, p.236 
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Overall, the state of regime stability in the two case study countries differs 
quite drastically. Thanks to the strong leadership positions of President 
Nazarbayev and the energy riches Kazakhstan managed to establish a 
stable but authoritarian regime. The neighbouring Kyrgyzstan has had few 
democratic openings but could not ensure the stability of its political system. 
 
3.5 Economic Development  
The success of Kazakhstan in building and sustaining a stable authoritarian 
regime stems from an important factor – its strong economic performance. 
Kyrgyzstan, as a poor nation with limited resources, finds it difficult to 
maintain political stability, not speaking of successful democratic reforms. 
The differences in economic development of the two target countries are 
significant (see Table 5). With the GDP 30 times smaller than in Kazakhstan 
and more than one third population living below the poverty line, Kyrgyzstan 
finds itself in a poor economic situation and has to rely extensively on 
external loans and donor aid. 
Table 5: Key economic performance indicators of Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan 
 Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan 
Income level Upper middle Lower middle 
GDP $212.2 billion $7.404 billion 
GNI per capita $11,670 $1,250 
Poverty ratio 2.9% 37% 
Human Development Medium Low 
HDI Rank 70 125 
Sources: World Bank 2015a and 2015b; UNDP 2014 
Despite these differences in economic performance, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan share one feature: they are both rentier states dependent on 
exported resources and externally generated income. Kazakh petro-wealth 
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is an impediment to successful external democracy promotion as the country 
represents an economically successful authoritarian country that undermines 
the usual democracy-development association. The Kyrgyz relative 
dependence on donor aid provides external democracy promoters with a 
good leverage, but the dynamic nature of the Kyrgyz rentierism might make 
this leverage less efficient as Kyrgyzstan uses a combination of externally 
produced rents and does not depend much on a single rent source. 
 
Kazakh Rentier State 
Kazakhstan is extremely rich in natural resources. Deposits of 99 elements 
of 110 total known elements have been discovered on the Kazakh territory, 
of which 70 were explored and 60 are extracted. Kazakhstan has 50% of the 
world reserves of tungsten; 21% of the global uranium reserves; 23% of 
chromium; 19% lead; 13% zinc; and, 10% of the world reserves of copper 
and iron (Investor’s Guide 2013, p.22). Kazakhstan’s energy resources are 
impressive as well: 30 billion barrels of proven oil reserves; 45.7 trillion cubic 
feet of proven natural gas reserves; and, 33.6 million tons of proven coal 
reserves. Kazakhstan produces approximately 1.64 million barrels of oil per 
day. Production has continued to grow in recent years thanks to the 
development of its massive Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan fields, 
which are located in Western Kazakhstan. The offshore Kashagan field (13 
billion barrels) is the world’s largest oil discovery of the last three decades. 
The Caspian onshore Tengiz deposit (6-9 billion barrels) is the main site of 
oil exploitation in Kazakhstan as Kashagan is still under development. 
Finally, Karachaganak, an onshore oil deposit add impressive 8-9 million 
barrels oil to the Kazakh petro-wealth (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013, pp.166-
171). Gas deposits are considerable as well: from 1.8 trillion m3 of proven 
gas reserves (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013, p.169) to 2.5 trillion m3 (Johnson 
2007, p.38). 
The exploitation of natural resources in Kazakhstan stems back to the Soviet 
period, but the foundation of the current economic boom was laid in 1999s 
when the oil production and exports rapidly increased (Spechler and 
Spechler 2010, p.75). The steady increase in oil and gas exports allowed the 
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Kazakh government to buy back some of its shares in private companies 
and develop a solid negotiations position in the economic cooperation with 
key international stakeholders: Russia, which owns and controls the main 
pipelines; China, which shows an increasing interest in purchasing Kazakh 
energy resources; and the European countries, who are interested in 
diversification of energy supply sources. As some researchers argue, the 
petro-wealth brought some political benefits as well: in 2010, Kazakhstan 
received enough support from member-states to chair the OSCE (Spechler 
and Spechler 2010, p.76). 
Kazakhstan has an export-oriented resource-based economy. In 2014, the 
total Kazakh exports amounted to 78.2 billion USD. At that, the crude oil 
exports amounted to 53.6 billion USD, i.e. 68.5% of the total Kazakh exports 
is crude oil (KAZNEX INVEST 2015). Other exports include ferrous metals, 
copper, aluminum, zinc and uranium. At that, Kazakhstan produces the 
largest share of uranium from mines - 41% of world supply in 2013. While it 
is possible to measure the country’s petro-wealth in financial terms, its 
importance in social and political terms is difficult to evaluate. The level of 
the state’s hydrocarbons addiction was best described by a local politician, 
who bitterly noted that “the entire country is shooting itself up with oil” 
(interview 41, leader of a Kazakh opposition political party, 17 May 2013). In 
numerical terms, the dependence on the export of hydrocarbons amounts to 
39% of the state revenues in 2010. In the same year, the mining and 
petroleum industries accounted for 33% of GDP (Revenue Watch 2013). At 
that, only 12% GDP are collected through oil-free taxation, so, the state 
hardly depends on its citizens’ contributions in economic terms.  
Kazakhstan’s energy riches play ambiguous role in the country’s 
development. On one hand, the availability of large amounts of petro-wealth 
helps sustaining the country’s regime despite limited freedoms, and regular 
human rights abuses. On the other hand, petro-wealth fuels the growing 
social gap in the country. Astonishing flow of foreign investment and profits 
had its casualties: a stark inequality of wealth (Johnson 2007, p.34). Despite 
Kazakhstan’s striking economic performance indicators, the wealth of the 
nation is unevenly distributed. The disproportion between the new rich and 
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the new poor steadily increases thanks to the blooming oil industry and 
decline in other economic sectors.  
Firstly, there is a considerable gap between the centre (President and his 
immediate circle of family and officials), which single-handedly manages and 
distributes the country’s riches, and periphery (people and local 
administrations), which survives under conditions of oil-oriented economy 
and “enjoys” the decaying Soviet transport, communications and social 
welfare infrastructure. Centre-periphery relations in Kazakhstan are 
characterised with resentment-submission dynamics as local leaders cannot 
openly challenge centre’s policies and are reluctant to explicitly display their 
discord. For example, oil and gas-rich Western and Northern provinces and 
former capital city Almaty, which remain crucial contributors to the national 
budget or so-called “donor provinces” (Cummings 2001, p.22), do not 
necessarily receive as much as they contribute: virtually all revenue goes to 
the national budget and is redistributed among all provinces. At that, 
substantial part of budget funds is directed to grand construction projects 
and international forums in Astana that often serve the aim of aggrandizing 
the country’s achievements and boosting its international profile. As one of 
my interviewees, a local political party leader explained “Yes, the capital 
[Astana] is beautiful, but the capital lives at the expense of regions” 
(interview 42, 17 May 2013).  
Secondly, the difference in living standards is particularly striking in the 
provinces without developed oil and gas industry which are often left behind 
the country’s economic boom. About 75% of the oil is located in the Western 
Kazakhstan (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013, p.166). With the attention of the 
political and economic elites focused on hydrocarbons in the Western 
Kazakhstan, other provinces find themselves in an under-privileged position 
with much less employment opportunities and declining living standards. 
Disparities between oil-rich regions and other regions, as well as imbalance 
in wages and living standard of those involved in energy economy and the 
rest is striking for external observers as well. An EU Delegation to 
Kazakhstan staffer noted that oil is the basis of the Kazakh economy, but it 
is also a big social risk as whoever is cut out of oil economy is cut out of any 
opportunities (interview 36, 14 May 2013).  
- 83 - 
l 
Thirdly, there are issues in oil and gas rich provinces. Western provinces 
have high GDP per capita because of the oil extraction, but big social 
problems because the employment opportunities exist only in oil and gas 
(interview 36, 14 May 2013). Thanks to the domination of petroleum-based 
economy, many towns have turned into single-industry towns with high cost 
of living and lack of basic infrastructure (HRW 2012, p.21). While petroleum 
companies make sure the industrial sites are equipped with contemporary 
technology, local residents do not have such basic things as paved roads, 
electricity, and running water (HRW 2012, p.21). Thus, despite being one of 
the most oil- and gas-rich provinces, the Mangystau region, Western 
Kazakhstan, remains one of the poorest ones. The poverty rate in the region 
reached 21.2% in 2010, and was the highest in Kazakhstan. 
These disparities and inequality were noted by various international 
organisations and observers. IMF analysis recommended Kazakhstan to 
diversify its economy away from the petroleum sector (IMF 2011). As IMF 
warns against continuous disparity between the rich and the poor: “A key 
challenge is ensuring that the benefits from the oil wealth are shared by the 
population as a whole” (IMF 2011, p.27). Similar concerns were voiced by 
my interviewees in Astana: both local and European officials and experts 
noted oil dependency, lack of economy diversification, and inequality as 
major challenges in Kazakhstan.  
The oil and gas industries and the revenue generated by them remain 
largely under the control of the state. The state-owned Kazmunaygaz 
controls about half of the country’s hydrocarbons industry, and the 
generated revenue is managed by the National Oil Fund. The Fund was 
established in 2001 to stabilise state income through covering budget 
shortfalls in case oil prices fall below a certain level. There is no clear data 
on the Fund’s assets, transactions and investments, and one can only 
imagine how much wealth is accumulated in the Fund given the country’s 
intense oil and gas trade. However, it is clear that the President controls the 
Fund (Revenue Watch 2013), and, as such, can easily use the country’s 
immense resources to further consolidate and extend his stable authoritarian 
rule.  
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Kyrgyz Rentier State 
Despite significant economic reforms and shock therapy, it is unclear 
whether the uneasy transition to market economy succeeded and 
Kyrgyzstan turned into a full-fledged market economy. As Pomfret notes, 
Kyrgyzstan’s old central planning appeared to be being replaced by a rentier 
economy in which insiders live off the resource rents rather than generating 
new output (Pomfret 2003, pp.11-12). Up until now, the Kyrgyz economy is a 
surprise for the Kyrgyz officials themselves. Minister of Economy of the 
Kyrgyz Republic Sariev once noted that “The Kyrgyz economy is nonsense” 
as it does not fit into usual ratios of import and export, income and 
expenditures. Minister Sariev acknowledged that three factors keep the 
national currency alive: labour migrant remittances, shadow economy and 
criminal money.  
In reality, Kyrgyzstan has several sources of income: Kumtor gold mine 
(about 37% GDP), labour migrant remittances (25%), taxation (24%), and 
donor aid (average 8% in 2000-2010). Most of these income sources will be 
discussed below. 
Kyrgyzstan has modest, especially when compared to Kazakhstan, deposits 
of natural resources. Oil and gas are available in limited amounts in the 
Fergana valley, Southern Kyrgyzstan. Most of the sector is involved in 
mining: there are 161 active mining companies; the State Geology and 
Mining Resources Agency has issued about a thousand licenses for 
prospecting, exploration and mining (National Statistics Committee of 
Kyrgyzstan 2015). Most of these mines are small ventures, but there is one 
mine, which makes single largest contribution to the Kyrgyz economy – 
Kumtor gold mine in the Issyk-Kul province, Northern Kyrgyzstan. The site is 
operated by the Kumtor Operating Company (KOC), a subsidiary of Centerra 
Gold Inc. (Canada). Kumtor gold mine accounts for 37.7% of the industrial 
sector in Kyrgyzstan, and constituted 6.2% of the total GDP in 2013 (Ministry 
of Economy of the Kyrgyz Republic 2013).  
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The site is operated by the KOC, but the whole venture is a joint partnership 
with the Kyrgyz Government, which is represented by the Kyrgyzaltyn JSC, 
a state-owned company. The partnership represents an interesting case of 
strategic mutual dependence. Centerra Gold Inc. is Kyrgyzstan’s single 
largest investor, while Kyrgyzstan via Kyrgyzaltyn JSC is Centerra’s largest 
shareholder with 33 % of the common shares, which value more than 1.5 
billion USD (Kumtor’s 2nd Quarterly Report 2011). The initial agreement 
between the Kyrgyz Government and Centerra Gold Inc. was signed in 
1992. After several years of the project capacity development, the site 
started its full operation in 1997. The Kumtor mine is a growing enterprise: 
during nine months in 2011, the Kumtor mine produced 444, 460 ounces of 
gold, which is 31 % more than during the same period in 2010. The Kumtor 
mine provides 2,663 jobs with 95% employees being Kyrgyz citizens, and 
funds local community support projects and charity (Kumtor’s 2nd Quarterly 
Report 2011). The KOC pays considerable amount of taxes to the Kyrgyz 
state budget. The payments include revenue-based tax, pollution tax, 
income tax, payments to the social insurance fund, customs duties and 
payments to the Issyk-Kul Development Fund (Kumtor’s 2nd Quarterly 
Report 2011).  
While Kumtor provides some data on its activities, the Kyrgyz government 
reports are less clear. As a result, there is no clear shared knowledge or 
understanding on to what extent Kumtor contributes to the national budget. 
Officials highlight the importance of Kumtor, but the specific data on the 
extent of Kumtor’s contribution remains rather unclear. This might indicate 
both incompetence of state officials in dealing with economic reporting and 
deliberate hiding of actual profits. The only thing all parties agree upon is 
that Kumtor is important, and will remain important source of the state rent.  
The access to international resources plays a pivotal role in survival strategy 
of the Kyrgyz government (Kavalski 2010, p.17). Within the last twenty two 
year (1991-2013), Kyrgyzstan has in total received 7.7 billion USD 
international aid (Aid Flow charts 2013). In total 49 various funding 
organisations have been providing and still provide donor aid through 6,032 
projects to the country (Aid Data 2013). Top international donors include the 
World Bank, United States, ASDB Group, Japan, and International Monetary 
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Fund (Aid Data 2013). On 10 July 2013, at the second donor conference, 
Prime Minister Satybaldiev appealed to donors asking 5 billion USD to 
implement 77 national projects. The projects require 10 billion, and 5.5 billion 
will be covered from other sources.  
Many recent projects, run and funded by various donors, are devoted to 
helping the Kyrgyz Government manage its internal and external debts and 
support its budget. Kyrgyz public budget deficit in year 2008 is 0.1 % of 
GDP, while in year 2009 it is 1.5% of GDP. National Bank of the Kyrgyz 
Republic attributes this substantial change to the introduction of new Tax 
Code, which reduced the total number of taxes, reduced VAT rate, and the 
increased need for additional budget expenses (NBKR 2010).It is forecasted 
that Kyrgyz budget deficit will reach 5.1% of GDP in 2010. The widening 
deficit is said to be a result of the increased budgetary allocations for the 
development budget (mainly infrastructure projects), monetisation of 
benefits, higher pensions, and increased compensation to vulnerable social 
groups. Public budget support is an important factor for development aid, as 
many development agencies seek ensuring sustainability of their aid, and 
request the local government to carry out projects on their own expenses 
after the life of development projects. However, this is not often possible due 
to the public budget deficit.  
One more external rent comes from former and current Kyrgyz citizens, who 
travel abroad to work and send money back to support their families in 
Kyrgyzstan. As employment prospects are getting more challenging in 
Kyrgyzstan, more and more young capable people leave abroad in pursuit of 
better paid jobs to earn their living and support their families, who often stay 
in Kyrgyzstan. Since the early 90-s and up to the date, labour migrants, or 
gastarbeiters as they are usually called in the region, have contributed 9.7 
billion USD to the Kyrgyz economy. Labour migrant remittances rose from 
less than 30 million USD in 2002 to more than 2 billion USD in 2012. In 
2011, the country received 1.709 billion USD in personal labour remittances, 
which amounted to 27% of the 2011 total GDP (6.198 billion USD; World 
Bank Data 2013). Thanks to the increasing flow of remittances, the Kyrgyz 
Republic is one of the largest recipients of remittances (relative to GDP) in 
the world. 
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The dependence on labour migrants’ remittances is so strong, that any 
crises in Russia or Kazakhstan affect the influx of money to Kyrgyzstan. The 
global crisis of 2008 did not affect Kyrgyzstan directly, but the downfall of 
GDP growth from 8.4% in 2008 to 2.3% in 2009 can be explained by 
economic downturns in two major economic partners of Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
and Kazakhstan (ADB 2010). At the grass roots level, the crisis was more 
feasible as it hit the livelihood of many families. As Reeves observed in 
2010, many families in Kyrgyz provinces who expect receiving money from 
family members in Russia once every one or two months have been waiting, 
without transfers, for a year or more as the financial crisis stopped Russia’s 
mid-2000s construction boom in its tracks (many Kyrgyz migrants work at 
construction sites; Reeves 2010, pp.3-4). These families clearly lacked this 
financial source, and this might have affected their capacity to ensure 
adequate housing, food, education, and healthcare.  
A side effect of this dependence on labour workers remittances is that it 
increases the country’s dependence on Russia and to lesser extent on 
Kazakhstan as most of the Kyrgyz labour migrants travel to these countries 
in pursuit of jobs. Dependence on these remittances implies a certain degree 
of dependence on Russia, and might actually facilitate Russia’s autocracy 
promotion (as discussed further in Chapter 6). This dependence on 
neighbouring authoritarian countries might be an alarm bell for external 
democracy promotion. The leverage the authoritarian Russia, Kazakhstan 
and China have on Kyrgyzstan is difficult to ignore as it operates on many 
levels. In addition to migrant remittances, Kyrgyzstan depends on these 
countries in terms of exports and imports. Kyrgyzstan benefits from trading 
activity that takes place in the trading “corridor” from China to Kazakhstan 
and Russia. In addition, Kyrgyzstan imports more than exports, and the 
imported goods are critical for the basic survival of majority population: fuel, 
wheat, and fertilizers. At that top importers of fuel, wheat and fertilizers are 
Russia (33.1%), China (22.9%) and Kazakhstan (9.5%; Ministry of Economy 
of the Kyrgyz Republic 2013). The inter-relation between Kyrgyzstan and its 
three top trade partners is a case of increasing economic dependence, 
which might also imply political dependence. Any change in trade policies of 
these countries might affect Kyrgyz economy and deteriorate social and 
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economic conditions of citizens, which might result in social unrest. There 
has already been a case when international politics strongly affected 
economics. In April-June 2010, as a reaction to the violent change of regime 
in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan closed its border with Kyrgyzstan. As a result, 
there was a quick rise in fuel and bread prices, which was upsetting for the 
wider population and caused certain dissatisfaction with the Provisional 
Government (news reports by Kabar and AkiPress information agencies 
2015). 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter sought to outline, discuss and analyse historical, political and 
economic context in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Despite some drastic 
differences in territory, population, energy resources, democratisation 
record, and economic performance, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan share some 
historical, political, social, and economic features. These include similar 
societal nomadic structures in the pre-Soviet period, the shared Soviet past, 
the initial post-Soviet transition to market economy, limited political pluralism, 
and significant dependence on external rents.  
Throughout the last two centuries, the Kazakh and Kyrgyz peoples have 
undergone drastic social, political, economic and cultural transformations 
that have significantly shaped contemporary Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
However, transformation processes were usually initiated, designed, and 
implemented by external powers. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have limited 
experience in state-building, institution-building, and democratic governance. 
They had traditional nomadic communities with uru and tribal hierarchy 
before becoming parts of the Soviet Union; the Soviet governance was on 
the brink of totalitarian and authoritarian regime; and the post-Soviet 
transition has resulted in an unstable semi-democracy in Kyrgyzstan and 
stable authoritarianism in Kazakhstan.  
The transition from command economy to market economy after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union is important for the research project for several 
reasons. Firstly, it is instrumental to understanding the current state of affairs 
in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz economic sectors. Secondly, it explains certain 
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degree of distrust and disillusionment in the Western reform proposals in the 
region. Finally, it provides some insights into the emergence and dynamics 
of informal economics, which, together with informal politics, constitute a 
grey area that makes democracy promotion challenging for external actors. 
The transition period did not lead to expected economic growth or improved 
social welfare. Much to the opposite, these changes resulted in negative 
effects, increasing the financial vulnerability of many people, reducing 
available jobs, and decreasing the quality of life. Unintended socio-economic 
outcomes of the transitional reforms included poverty, gap between the new 
rich and the new poor, accumulation of wealth through unfair and obscure 
privatisation, change of popular perceptions of the state and external actors; 
and informal (sometimes illegal) economic activities and practices. 
Relatively dynamic political life in the early years of independence in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan did not last long; the ruling elites in the two 
countries quickly sought to tighten the grasp on their newly-obtained power 
domestically and simultaneously maintain the “democracy facade” for the 
international community. As a result of the divergent political system 
formation process, the countries have developed their respective political 
regimes: unstable democracy in Kyrgyzstan, and stable authoritarianism in 
Kazakhstan. Instability in Kyrgyzstan has put the importance of democracy 
for public well-being and development under question, while authoritarian 
Kazakhstan unexpectedly served as a bright illustration of good economic 
performance without democratic governance. This might significantly 
undermine external democracy promotion efforts and the very cause of 
global democracy promotion.  
Economic context in the two countries is characterised with rentier economy. 
Understanding rentierism under Central Asian conditions might provide 
significant insights into the issue of local responsiveness to external 
incentives to adopt certain political and economic practices. Kazakhstan is a 
large oil rentier state, while Kyrgyzstan has a different rentierism pattern: it 
survives on a combination of externally retrieved rents: gold mining revenue, 
labour migrant remittances, and donor aid. Rentier economies might 
contribute to understanding of the enduring stable authoritarianism in 
Kazakhstan, and inability of Kyrgyz leaders to sustain authoritarianism in 
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Kyrgyzstan without fluctuations between democracy and autocracy. As it will 
be discussed in more detail further in the dissertation, Kazakhstan’s stable 
authoritarianism might be supported by the country’s petro-wealth: Kazakh 
officials welcome know-how and technology exchange, but are increasingly 
reluctant to accept the Western criticisms on poor human rights and 
democracy records. Kyrgyzstan is more responsive to external material 
incentives due to the lack of natural resources and overall moderate 
economic performance. However, Kyrgyzstan has developed a combination 
of various external rents, and if it fails to obtain grants and technical aid from 
one external actor, it might fill in the gap with other rents.  
Despite of the shared Soviet past and relatively similar starting position in 
the early independence period, Kyrgyzstan’s and Kazakhstan’s paths of 
economic and political development significantly diverged in the new 
millennium. In the course of two violent changes of political regime in 2005 
and 2010, two inter-ethnic conflicts in 1991 and 2010, numerous 
constitutional amendments and dynamic political life, Kyrgyzstan has 
transformed into an unstable imitation democracy. Kazakhstan has 
consolidated a strong authoritarian presidential rule based upon a steady 
economic performance and an enormous petro-wealth, i.e. became a stable 
autocracy.  
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have formed distinct types of political regimes. 
Kyrgyzstan demonstrates better democracy scores than Kazakhstan but its 
political and economic performance are significantly impeded by continuous 
instability. Kazakhstan, on the other hand represents a strong authoritarian 
presidential rule based on the personality of President Nazarbayev, 
oppressive regime, and sound economic performance.  
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Chapter 4 EU Democracy Promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The European Union (EU) embarked upon building bilateral and multilateral 
ties with the Central Asian Republics soon after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The EU member states were quick to recognise the newly 
independent states, establish diplomatic relations, and consider trade and 
economic cooperation opportunities. However, due to the geographic 
remoteness and the socio-economic crisis in Central Asia at the time, the 
engagement of EU member states was rather limited. The EU engagement 
with the region has largely concentrated on the development aid provided to 
the distressed former Soviet countries under the framework of the Technical 
Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) in 1991-
2006 (Frenz 2008).  
In June 2007, the Council of the European Union adopted the Strategy 
towards Central Asia 2007-2013, which signalled a new phase of inter-
regional and bilateral relations between the EU and its member states and 
the five republics of Central Asia. The Strategy outlined seven broad 
cooperation areas, including democracy, good governance, rule of law and 
human rights (Council of the EU 2007, pp.12-15). Democratic principles and 
democracy promotion have already become an integral part of the EU’s 
evolvement as an international actor and a normative power. Due to this, the 
inclusion of democracy assistance to the Central Asia Strategy was 
unsurprising, and the EU continued its role of a democracy promotion agent 
in this less than democratic region.  
The EU applies a range of mechanisms and instruments to further normative 
elements of its foreign and development policy. The EU funds, implements 
and oversees democracy related projects, engages in political and human 
rights dialogue, as well as provides technical assistance to various local 
actors, including government and civil society organisations. These activities 
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involve a variety of actors on the EU side, such EU institutions and EU 
member states. The complexity of the EU’s institutional framework and the 
multi-dimensional nature of its external democracy promotion can be 
overwhelming at times. Further analysis in this thesis will require to 
aggregate and categorise the available information on key stakeholders, 
their interests and motivation, as well as to analyse the EU conception of 
democracy and its implementation through democracy promotion activities 
abroad. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to explore EU engagement in 
democracy promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. For this purpose, the 
chapter aims to identify and analyse what actors are involved in EU 
democracy promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Secondly, it is crucial 
to explore the legal and normative foundation of EU democracy promotion 
globally, regionally and at the level of individual countries. Thirdly, the 
chapter aims to identify the spectrum of available democracy promotion 
instruments and their implementation in the two target countries. While the 
previous chapter provided the context in the target countries, this chapter 
provides the context of the democracy promotion agent and transitions the 
thesis’ narrative from contextual discussion to empirical analysis. 
Understanding the EU actors, their motivation, the legal and normative 
framework, and implementation of democracy promotion activities is vital for 
the evaluation of EU democracy promotion in the chapter that follows this 
chapter.  
In order to address these issues, the chapter is structured as follows. The 
first section explores the role, capacities and interests of relevant EU actors. 
Afterwards, I map the legal and normative framework of EU democracy 
promotion and identify what efforts the EU undertakes to promote 
democracy. Finally, the chapter focuses on the existing mechanisms and 
instruments of EU democracy promotion and their application in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, then concluding by systematising and summarising the key 
discussion points. 
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4.2 EU Actors and their Interests in Central Asia 
The EU is one type of actor, while its member states are another type of 
actor, and their interests might diverge. 
Kyrgyz foreign policy analyst (interview 1, 31 July 2012) 
The EU presents a unique supranational multilateral actor in the making. 
The dynamic evolvement of the EU’s institutional set-up and policies have 
led to the multiplication of actors within the EU. Exploring the issue of EU 
actorness is challenging due to the sheer number of institutional, national 
and subnational actors and stakeholders within the Union. In order to 
address this challenge, I divided the actors, who might be directly or 
indirectly involved in external democracy promotion, into two large groups. 
The first group refers to the EU’s institutional actors and their roles in 
external democracy promotion. Such institutions as the European 
Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European External Service play 
a significant role in shaping, implementing and monitoring EU democracy 
promotion activities abroad. The EU member states, on the other hand, have 
varying degrees of interest in promoting normative objectives abroad and 
prioritising cooperation with certain regions. The role of the EU member 
states in decision making should not be underestimated because any 
significant action related to common policies requires consent of the member 
states. For this reason, addressing the interests and stakes of the EU 
member states in Central Asia might provide certain insights and contribute 
to the understanding of the difficulties associated with EU democracy 
promotion in Central Asia. Therefore, this section first explores the variety of 
the EU’s institutional actors involved in external democracy promotion at 
different levels. Afterwards, it discusses the interests and positions of the 
key member states engaged in the region. Finally, this section concludes 
with a brief overview and analysis of the EU actors, their capacities and roles 
in order to narrow down the focus of this research and highlight the most 
relevant information.  
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EU’s Institutional Actors 
The European Council is in charge of determining the high-level political 
direction and priorities for the EU. The European Council convenes twice a 
year and is composed of the heads of member states and the President of 
the European Council, who facilitates cohesion and consensus in the 
European Council’s decision making. The European Council’s role in 
external democracy promotion is significant as it sets general guidelines of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and external democracy 
promotion presents a part of CFSP. However, the European Council’s area 
of activities is so high that it does not have a considerable impact on the 
substance, contents or other vital details of democracy promotion in specific 
regions and countries.  
The Council of the European Union is an intergovernmental body 
responsible for non-legislative acts in external relations and definition of 
strategic priorities. The Council consists of ministers of EU member states. 
The Council participates in shaping CFSP, which includes external 
democracy promotion and regional strategies. As an important decision 
maker in the EU foreign policy, the Council is responsible for prioritisation of 
regional and bilateral partnerships, as well directions of EU foreign policy. In 
addition, the Council is involved in regular monitoring and revision of the 
strategies’ implementation. Within the Council’s structure several bodies are 
of particular importance. The Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER), composed of the member states’ permanent ambassadors to 
the EU, presents the opinions and interests of the member states and 
prepares the Council meetings (article 240, European Union 2012c). 
COREPER meets weekly and shapes the agenda of the Council meetings, 
but it does not have decision making powers. It is its engagement in the 
preparation of the Council meetings that makes COREPER a CFSP actor to 
be considered. Political and Security Committee (PSC), a permanent body of 
the Council, is in charge of monitoring the international situation where it 
concerns CFSP. As such, it plays an important role in the way the EU 
responds to significant international developments or crises (Eur-Lex 2011, 
no pagination).  
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The rotating Council Presidency by the member states is another body 
within the Council, which plays a role in shaping the Council’s agenda and to 
a certain extent – the strategic direction of external action and development 
policies. The COREPER and the Presidency can potentially influence the 
preparatory stages of agenda setting. However, their influence on decision 
making might remain limited because in the post-Lisbon instutional structure 
they share powers in external action with other agents, in particular, the 
Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Head of the EEAS (Vandecasteele et al 2013, pp.12-13; 
Vandecasteele et al 2015, pp.562-568). As both COREPER and the Council 
Presidency consist of representatives of the member states, their proposals 
are often informed by specific policies and interests of the member states. 
The European Parliament is a legislative and representative body of the EU 
directly elected by European citizens. The European Parliament shares its 
legislative competences with the Council. The majority of legislative acts 
need to be agreed upon by both the Council and the European Parliament 
through the so-called co-decision procedure. The European Parliament 
plays a particular role in external democracy promotion. Firstly, through the 
co-decision procedure, it participates in the adoption of legislative acts, 
some of which might concern external democracy promotion. Secondly, in 
compliance with the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has a say in 
EU expenditures through its participation in the budgetary procedure (Hix 
and Hoyland 2013, p.173). Thirdly, the European Parliament oversees the 
activities of other EU institutions to ensure implementation of democratic and 
transparent governance of the Union. Finally, the European Parliament is a 
large political forum for discussing EU’s policies and activities. As the only 
directly elected institution of the EU, the European Parliament is less 
constrained by the member states’ interests and institutional politics and has 
more freedom to express opinion on such sensitive topics as the state of 
democracy in third countries. Nevertheless, the European Parliament’s 
powers and capacities should not be overestimated. Firstly, due to the 
institutional set-up and separation of powers, the Parliament generally has 
less power than the Council (Thomson 2011, p.13). Secondly, as a large 
institution consisting of multiple political parties and individuals from different 
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member states, the European Parliament often lacks unity on the relations 
with the regions, which represent less strategic interest for the EU. The 
European Parliament can exert more influence on decision making when 
there is a certain degree of unity across political factions (Hix and Hoyland 
2013, pp.174-175). In the case of the EU-Central Asian relations, this unity is 
absent as hardly a dozen Members of the European Parliament (MEP) raise 
Central Asia to the agenda (interview 17, a European Parliament clerk, 10 
March 2013; Tsertsvadze 2014, pp.1-2). Therefore, while it is important to 
acknowledge the European Parliament’s role in voicing opinions on the 
general state of democracy in Central Asia and the EU activities in the area 
of democracy promotion, these power and capacity limitations should be 
taken in consideration.  
The European Commission, together with the Council of the EU and the 
European Parliament, is involved in legislative process (it has the right of 
legislative initiative), decision making, and implementation and monitoring of 
EU common policies. The Commission consists of 28 Commissioners, 
including the President of the Commission (European Commission 2015, no 
pagination). Structurally, the Commission consists of Directorate-General 
(DGs) and services. From among the Commission’s DGs, the Directorate-
General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) is 
primarily responsible for defining EU development policy and implementing 
development aid, including democracy assistance. As development 
cooperation is intertwined into the external relations framework, DG DEVCO 
closely cooperates with the European External Action Service (EEAS) and 
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy acting as the 
Vice-President of the Commission. Until recently, the European Commission 
has been in charge of EU diplomatic missions abroad and development aid 
was coordinated within the Commission, between DG DEVCO and 
Directorate-General for the External Relations (DG RELEX). In 2010, the 
newly established EEAS took over these duties and, in 2011, DG RELEX 
merged with the EEAS. Nowadays, DG DEVCO relies on the extensive 
network of the EU Delegations to collect information on development needs 
to implement and oversee its activities in third countries (Julian 2012, no 
pagination). The importance of the Commission and, in particular, DG 
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DEVCO for external democracy promotion in Central Asia can hardly be 
overestimated as the Commission is an important decision maker and 
implementer in the development policy area. 
The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the 
EU’s diplomatic service, in 2010 has enabled the EU to facilitate the 
developmental and political components of external democracy promotion. 
In compliance with the new institutional set-up and separation of duties, DG 
DEVCO implements development aid, while the EEAS, together with such 
political figures as the High Representative or EU Special Representatives, 
engages in political and human rights dialogue. The EEAS and the 
Commission’s DG DEVCO share programming competencies for 
development cooperation and report to the Council and the Commission 
(Donor Tracker 2014, p.3).  
The EEAS consists of geographical and thematic units, each dealing either 
with a specific region or topic. Six geographical departments manage the 
EU’s diplomatic relations with Asia and the Pacific (MDI), Africa (MDII), 
Europe and Central Asia (MDIII), North Africa, Middle East, Arabian 
Peninsula, Iran and Iraq (MDIV), Americas (MDV) and multilateral relations 
(MDVI). Two EEAS departments work in the areas that are relevant for EU 
democracy promotion activities. Central Asia Unit of MDIII is in charge of 
diplomatic and political relations with Central Asia, each Central Asian 
country is allocated a desk officer (interviews 18, 19, 20, EEAS, 10-11 March 
2013). Directorate on Human Rights and Democracy of MDVI is directly 
involved in the preparation and conduct of human rights and political 
dialogue between the EU and third countries (interviews 21 and 23, EEAS, 
11-12 March 2013).   
Until 2010 the EU did not have a significant diplomatic presence in the 
region. The European Commission opened its Delegation in Kazakhstan in 
1994 and extended its area of responsibility to the other four Central Asian 
states. Only in 2010 the EU missions in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were 
upgraded to the status of EU Delegations. EU mission in Uzbekistan was 
upgraded in 2012, and Turkmenistan still does not have a full EU diplomatic 
mission (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013, pp.58-59). EU Delegations carry out a 
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variety of roles, which makes them an important player in external 
democracy promotion. EU Delegations monitor and manage development 
and cooperation programmes on the ground and, consequently have greater 
knowledge about the local context in target countries. In addition, EU 
Delegations act as a focal point for all local actors and stakeholders, 
including governments, civil society, specific beneficiaries and the general 
public.  
Under the framework of external action, there is one more institute, which 
might be relevant for external democracy promotion. The institute of EU 
Special Representatives (EUSR) was established in July 2005. In total, there 
are nine EUSRs, who are nominated by member states, appointed and 
funded by the Council, managed by the Commission and are accountable to 
the High Representative for CFSP (EEAS 2015d). The EUSR for Central 
Asia participates in political and human rights dialogues, carries out regular 
visits to the region, and issues statements on various occasions. So far there 
have been five EUSR for Central Asia appointed: Ján Kubiš (2005-2006); 
Pierre Morel (2006-2012); Patricia Flor (2012-2014); Janos Herman (2014); 
currently Peter Burian (2015; EEAS 2015d). The role of EUSR for Central 
Asia primarily revolves around symbolic representation, communication and 
public diplomacy functions. EUSRs are not key decision makers, but they 
are crucial for increasing the visibility of the EU in the region and smooth 
communications at political level.  
Overall, it is possible to state that each key EU institutions is in one way or 
another involved in external democracy promotion. The graph 1 below 
illustrates the EU institutions and their duties in relation to external 
democracy promotion. In addition to the top three EU institutions – the 
Council of the EU, the European Parliament and the European Commission, 
EEAS is a recent institutional body, whose functions directly relate to 
external democracy promotion.  
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Graph 1: EU institutions involved in external democracy promotion 
 
 
While all these institutions contribute to EU external democracy promotion, it 
is important to note that the extent of these contributions vary. In order to 
understand the share of responsibility and involvement of relevant EU 
institutional actors in external democracy promotion it is useful to map the 
external democracy promotion policy within the framework of larger EU 
policies (see graph 2). The EU’s shared policies have significantly evolved 
and diversified over the last few decades. The most recent changes in the 
institutional set-up and policies division took place after the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which established the European External Action Service 
responsible for the CFSP implementation, and permanent presidency of the 
European Council. As a unique supranational organisation that unites 28 
nations, the EU is involved in the regulation and management of 15 different 
areas of shared interest (European Commission 2015, no pagination). One 
of these areas is external relations and foreign affairs, which, in its turn, 
consists of three policy areas: CFSP, emergency assistance and foreign 
policies (focuses mostly on international trade). Emergency assistance and 
foreign policies are less relevant for analysing EU external democracy 
promotion in Central Asia and they can be skipped here. CFSP deals with a 
variety of issues, including specific geographic and thematic policies. From 
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among this variety of CFSP components, development and the EU in the 
world deserve our attention as external democracy promotion finds itself at 
the intersection of these two policy areas. On one hand, the EU applies a 
developmental approach to democracy promotion and considers democracy 
assistance an integral part of its development policy. On the other hand, 
democracy assistance to third countries fits into the framework of EU 
relations with these countries, and, as such, it inevitably constitutes a part of 
the EU’s external action. 
Graph 2: Mapping EU democracy promotion within broader policies 
  Thus, external democracy promotion belongs both to the larger development 
policy and the external action area. Due to this positioning within the larger 
framework of EU external relations and foreign affairs, implementation of 
external democracy promotion is managed by the EU institutions, which are 
primarily responsible for development policy and external action, i.e. 
respectively the European Commission’s DG DEVCO and the European 
External Action Service. These institutions and their structural bodies, along 
with the powerful Council of the EU, are the key institutional actors involved 
in EU democracy promotion abroad.  
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EU Member states 
After having discussed the EU’s institutional actors who are engaged in 
external democracy promotion it is important to examine the roles and 
interests of EU member states. Central Asia represents a strategic interest 
for some member states. This interest primarily stems from the participation 
of EU member states in the recently completed military campaign in 
Afghanistan, as well as the rich energy resources of Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan practice more state control over natural resources and do 
not welcome foreign investment, i.e. the access to energy resources in these 
two countries varies from limited in Uzbekistan to virtually absent in 
Turkmenistan (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013; interview 19, EEAS, 10 March 
2013). Due to limited resources and poor economic performance, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan do not attract much attention from the part of EU 
member states, whose engagement with these countries is limited to donor 
aid. As a result of these dynamics, it is mostly Kazakhstan, who represents a 
reasonably significant strategic interest for EU member states in Central 
Asia.  
The implementation of the EU Strategy towards Central Asia overlapped 
with an important international development. In 2003-2014, a number of the 
EU member states contributed to the United States-led War on Terror by 
having sent their troops to Afghanistan to support the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF). During this period, the ISAF troop contributing 
nations from the EU (see Appendix D) were interested to ensure a 
continuous and reliable involvement of the Central Asian governments. 
Central Asian countries formed a vital part of the Northern Distribution 
Network (NDN), an alternative to the less safe Pakistani transportation route 
used by ISAF to transport cargos and military personnel to and from 
Afghanistan. Against the background of this increased interest in the region, 
the Central Asian states intensified their cooperation with the EU.  
While the ISAF campaign had a specific timeframe and ended in 2014, the 
trade cooperation with the region might have longer term significance. In the 
global context Kazakhstan is hardly a top trade partner for the EU, but in the 
regional setting it is the main trade partner. Kazakhstan is the richest 
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economy in Central Asia (Pomfret 2011, pp.132-148). When compared to its 
poorer neighbours, Kazakhstan is seen as a success story: “an enthusiast 
player in international and regional organizations, successfully 
denuclearized, economically thriving, relatively stable politically” (Laruelle 
and Peyrouse 2013, p.608). But what makes Kazakhstan the top regional 
priority for the EU and its member states is its rich energy resources: 92% of 
Kazakhstani exports to Europe are hydrocarbons (European Commission 
2014b).  
The need for energy supply diversification was fuelled by recent issues with 
the key gas supplier to Eastern Europe and Germany - Russia. In 2006, 
Russia disrupted the gas supply to core transit and customer states of 
Eastern Europe. Russia could not amicably settle its disputes over prices 
and payment with Ukraine and Belarus so cut gas supply for a short period 
(Haghighi 2007, p.357). This disruption made some EU states realise the 
extent of their dependence on Russian gas supplies and consider alternative 
options. The Kazakh gas has been a strategic commodity for the EU before 
the gas crisis of 2006. A key gas supplier to the EU, Russian Gazprom had 
heavily relied on purchasing the Kazakh gas and reselling it to Europe 
(Matveeva 2006, pp.72-75). European-Kazakhstani energy trade could have 
been facilitated by relative geographic proximity of Kazakhstan (Denison 
2009, p.4), but at the moment this remains a prospect rather than a reality. 
Most Kazakh (and Uzbek – Uzbekistan is another country rich in gas in the 
region) gas is consumed domestically. The existing exports are mostly 
exported to Russia and China. Nevertheless, the EU considers Central Asia 
as a potential alternative source of energy resources (Dickel et al 2014, 
p.26). However, not all EU member states benefit equally (if they can benefit 
at all) from the economic cooperation with Kazakhstan and other countries in 
the region.  
As the country-by-country analysis below demonstrates, such factors as the 
presence of EU member states’ businesses, dependence on energy imports, 
and historical ties (or, lack thereof) contribute to the perceived importance of 
the Central Asian countries by individual EU member states. Perspectives 
and approaches of states are often affected by the interests of respective 
intrastate actors. As Moravcsik (1997, pp.516-520) notes intrastate actors in 
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the economic domain (commercial companies) and the role of individual 
member states (in this case, EU member states) often inter-relate. The 
states with large commercial companies active in undemocratic countries 
might have other priorities than the states without any companies active in 
these countries. On the other hand, some states are not interested in Central 
Asia simply because they have no previous history of relations topped with 
very limited economic and political interests.  
Germany, one of the largest European economies, is a key economic 
partner for Central Asia. The EU Strategy towards Central Asia was drafted 
largely by the German initiative, promoted and adopted under the German 
Presidency at the Council (interview 15 with an official from the German 
MFA, 13 February 2013). Due to economic and socio-historic reasons, 
Germany is engaged with the region more than any other European country. 
This special relationship is conditioned with an extensive presence of 
German businesses in Kazakhstan. German companies focus on a variety of 
projects in the country ranging from the energy sector to the electronics and 
training of specialists. Economic interests are reciprocated by strong 
willingness to cooperate on the Kazakh side: German investors and 
experience are much welcomed in the country (interview 39 with German 
Embassy to Kazakhstan officials 15 May 2013). For Germany, Kazakhstan is 
the most important trading partner in Central Asia (German Federal Foreign 
Office 2015, no pagination). For Kazakhstan, Germany is the top European 
trading partner (Ministry of Economy of Kazakhstan 2015). In addition to 
strong economic relations there is a solid social connection as well. The 
180,000-strong German diaspora in Kazakhstan and the 800,000 
Kazakhstan-born Germans (German Federal Foreign Office 2015, no 
pagination). 
Italy has assumed a very pragmatic position with regard to the cooperation 
in Central Asia. Italy sees avoiding harsh criticism and refraining from 
normative mission as a key to successful cooperation in Central Asia (Indeo 
2013, p.2). Italy has been quite successful in securing an access of its 
companies, namely ENI, to the rich energy resources in Kazakhstan, as well 
as in establishing a small but solid commercial presence at least in 
Kazakhstan (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013, p.69).  
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Spain’s approach to its relations in Central Asia displays a similar degree of 
pragmatism as it focuses primarily on economic cooperation with 
Kazakhstan (De Pedro 2012, p.3). 
The case of the UK relations with Central Asia is an interesting one because, 
on one hand the UK’s development agency DFID runs a set of democracy 
related projects in the majority of Central Asian republics on the top of its 
contributions to EU democracy promotion through the shared EU policies 
(DFID 2015, no pagination). On the other hand, the UK has a large business 
representation in Kazakhstan (in other countries the share of foreign 
businesses in general is insignificant). British companies are among the 
largest foreign investors in the Kazakh economy. British investments operate 
mostly in the energy sector, but there are attempts to diversify the scope of 
investment and get involved in the industries and services other than oil and 
gas: BG Group and Shell in the energy sector, AMEC and Schneider Electric 
in infrastructural construction and management, and more than a hundred 
British smaller companies in other sectors (Walker 2013, p.2). In addition to 
commercial companies, there are individuals, whose personal relations with 
Central Asian leaders or other interests, put them under the spotlight. Thus, 
former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s PR Company was hired by the 
government of Kazakhstan to promote the country’s image abroad and serve 
as President Nazarbayev’s personal advisor. Current British Prime Minister 
David Cameron’s support in improving Kazakhstan’s profile was publicly 
acknowledged by Kazakh authorities (Watt 2013, no pagination). The UK’s 
dual role as a seemingly committed democracy promoter through DFID and 
a loyal partner of less than democratic regimes stems from the diversity and 
power of intrastate actors in the UK. While this is an interesting topic, it might 
be less relevant for this research.  
France’s foreign policy interests traditionally Foreign policy lie in its former 
colonies and francophone countries (Peyrouse 2012, p.2). These 
prioritisation of bilateral partnerships stem from foreign policy considerations, 
commercial interests and increasingly important migration dynamics. French 
assistance to Central Asia is not substantial and is mostly concentrated on 
cultural and education exchange (Peyrouse 2012, p.3).  
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Portugal has its priorities far from the region as well: its key non-EU 
partnerships lie in Brazil and Africa, where Lisbon believes it brings added 
value to the shaping of European approaches (Simao 2012, p.4). Like 
several other EU member states, France and Portugal has largely delegated 
the issues of democracy and human rights to the EU level. 
The Baltic States have some expertise in the region, but even they 
acknowledge that this expertise might be outdated: “the region has changed 
and we haven’t kept up with the changes there as we had experienced 
drastic changes ourselves” (interview 22 with a clerk from an EU member 
state’s representation to the EU, 12 March 2013). The Baltic States are 
primarily interested in business opportunities in Kazakhstan. Thanks to 
Kazakhstan’s growing economy and the Baltic States’ economic difficulties, 
the latter explore opportunities to get involved in business and trade in 
Kazakhstan. Baltic States do not get involved in human rights and 
democracy projects “for fear of endangering their trade relationships” 
(Jekabsone 2013, p.2). Until recently, ISAF withdrawal was on the agenda, 
but not a priority as Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia’s troops in Afghanistan 
were quite limited (Jekabsone 2013, p.3).  
Belgium and Luxembourg demonstrate very little interest in the region and 
Central Asia is “only marginally” important to their foreign policies (Bossuyt 
2013, p.1).  
Greece had limited security or business interests in Central Asia, but not 
much engagement in promoting democratic principles. Its limited 
engagement with democracy promotion took place through multilateral 
institutions, particularly the EU and the OSCE (Zyga 2013, p.4). Against the 
background of the continuous economic crisis in Greece, the cooperation 
with Central Asia in general and democracy promotion in particular have lost 
any, even limited appeal to Greece. 
This country-by-country overview might leave an impression that the majority 
of EU member states are only concerned about their energy, trade and 
security, and have little regard to normative objectives. However, the issue is 
more complex than that. EU member states might be interested in realpolitik 
issues, but, as a part of the EU, they share its normative discourses.  
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When addressing the intrinsic drivers behind EU decision making one should 
not ignore the role of norms. The dynamic interplay of norms and interests in 
the formation of the EU, its further development and current functioning 
might explain some of the inconsistencies associated with EU democracy 
promotion abroad. The EU was established on the basis of mutual interests 
and shared norms of its founding member states. Interests and norms are 
still at the core of EU decision making, but it is difficult to state how much 
they weigh against each other because every issue of shared EU concern 
and any international partnership in question might have their specific 
interest-to-norm ratio. Interests and norms do not necessarily contradict 
each other. On the contrary, they can display varied interaction patterns, 
including convergence, complementarity and conflict. These interaction 
patterns are far from set in stone. As the circumstances surrounding each 
issue or partnership change, so does the pattern of the norms and interests’ 
interplay.  
In the case of Central Asia, the EU displays a degree of duality. On one 
hand, the rich energy resources in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan and the prospects for insecurity in the wider region are 
matters of strategic interest for some of the EU member states. On the other 
hand, the spirit of the EU and its normative background make the inclusion 
of normative, non-material objectives unavoidable. This, per se, does not 
represent an issue. However, given the local context in the highly 
authoritarian region, the promotion of democratic norms and principles 
affects relationships with the local leaders and governments which, in turn, 
might affect their decisions on the EU access to national energy resources. 
So far there is a shared view that the EU has not managed to strike a 
balance between its interests and norms that would ensure an access to 
energy resources without undermining its normative commitments. Crawford 
(2008, p.188) notes a large gap between the EU’s value agenda and its self-
interests. Cooley (2008, p.1186) insists that security and energy in Central 
Asia are and will remain the primary interests for external actors. 
The argument in this thesis tends towards this opinion as well, but offers a 
more nuanced analysis by explaining some underlying reasons and 
implications of this duality and resulting inconsistencies (see chapter 6). The 
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positions of the EU institutions and EU member states on the subject of the 
democracy promotion in Central Asia are not antagonistic, but the 
differences are noticeable. With the establishment of the EEAS and 
appointment of the HR for CFSP and EU Special Representatives for 
Central Asia and for Human Rights, some EU officials expressed an opinion 
that the normative burden on the member states slightly decreased and they 
preferred to let the EU’s institutional actors deal with such sensitive issues 
as democracy and human rights in the authoritarian countries of Central 
Asia, while the governments and non-state commercial stakeholders from 
the member states develop trade and economic relations in the region 
(interviews 18 and 19, EEAS, 10 March 2013). Nevertheless, despite the 
fact that interests often win over norms in Central Asia, democratic principles 
and norms are embedded in the structure and the psyche of both the EU’s 
institutional actors and its member states to such an extent that democratic 
norms and discourses   
Norms and discourses affect EU policies in the sense that they inform social 
behaviour of institutional and individual decision makers (Laffan 2001; Diez 
1999). The appeal and power of norms within the EU are often strong 
enough to hold back selfish realist inclinations of its member states and 
ensure a degree of equality between larger and smaller states, richer and 
poorer nations (Laffan 2001, p.716). In this regard, it is important to examine 
both legal and normative foundations of EU democracy promotion in Central 
Asia and discuss what kind of democracy the EU uses in its discourse and 
practice. 
 
4.3 Legal and Normative Framework of EU Democracy Promotion 
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
Treaty on the European Union, article 21, European Union 2012b 
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The legal and normative foundation of the EU democracy promotion policy in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan can be divided into three tiers. The first 
fundamental tier includes general EU policy documents, which define the 
very essence of the EU, set forth its principles and values, and serve as a 
guidance to conduct a normative foreign policy globally. The second tier 
refers to regional policy documents that define directions of regional 
cooperation with Central Asia. The third tier includes partnership and 
cooperation agreements (PCAs) and other bilateral documents specifying 
country-specific programmes and activities. It is interesting to point out that 
as these tiers progress from general global to more specific, country-tailored 
documents, the significance attached to democracy decreases. 
 
First Tier: Global Framework 
Democratic principles and norms have become well integrated into the EU’s 
internal structure and external relations through continuous rigorous 
inclusion of these norms into a broad range of EU legal and normative acts, 
declarations and statements. As early as in 1972 at a summit in Paris, 
Heads of States of the Community expressed their determination “to base 
the development of their Community on democracy, freedom of opinion, the 
free movement of people and of ideas and participation by their peoples 
through their freely elected representatives” (European Communities 1972, 
p.2). As the Union evolved, the commitment to democratic principles and 
human rights have spilled over from domestic domain to external relations. 
Thus, in 1991, the Council of the European Communities defined the 
promotion of democracy and human rights as both an objective and a 
necessary condition of development cooperation in its resolution (Council of 
the European Communities 1991).  
Since adoption of the Treaty on the European Union in 1992 in Maastricht, 
the inclusion of democratic principles to external relations and development 
cooperation have been become a consistent feature in any related 
documents issued by EU institutions. The Maastricht Treaty listed 
development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms among main provisions 
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on a common foreign and security policy (article 11, European Union 1992). 
The Amsterdam Treaty put the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law at the core of the EU’s 
foundation (article F, European Union 1997). The Nice Treaty stated that the 
EU’s cooperation with third countries shall be guided by these principles 
(article 181, European Union 2000). In 2007, the Lisbon Treaty consolidated 
all previous provisions on democratic principles in domestic and foreign 
policies, and made the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU legally 
binding. The Charter reinforces the provision that the EU “is founded on the 
indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and 
solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law” 
(Preamble, European Union 2012a), and corresponds to the overall 
democratic spirit of the EU. The current Treaty on the EU consolidates and 
reinforces all above-mentioned provisions and lists support of democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law as the 
EU’s foreign policy objectives (article 21, European Union 2012b). Given that 
TEU serves as informal constitution and guides all common EU policies, it is 
possible to say that democratic principles are expected to be incorporated 
into any domestic or external actions.  
Promotion of democracy and human rights plays a varied role as an 
objective, a pre-requisite to global security, and a development cooperation 
condition. The European Security Strategy interprets democracy promotion 
not only as an objective in itself but also as an instrument to ensure 
European security: “The best protection for our security is a world of well-
governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social 
and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing 
the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of 
strengthening the international order” (Council of the EU 2003, p.10). The 
provisions on democracy and good governance as development aid 
conditions can be found in all major development-related documents of the 
last three decades. The Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries adds good governance to the respect for human 
rights, democratic principles and the rule of law to the list of essential 
Agreement elements (2000). Other documents that refer to democratic 
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principles include the European Commission‘s Communication of May 2001 
on “The EU‘s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third 
Countries” (European Commission 2001), the European Consensus on 
Development, adopted by the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Commission (European Union 2005), and in the Council Conclusions on 
Democracy Support in the EU‘s External Relations (Council of the European 
Union 2009). The list of these documents can be quite long, but the point 
made here is that the promotion of democracy and human rights is an 
integral element of the first-tier global policy-setting documents of the EU, 
which define the Union’s international identity and guide its relations with 
third countries and international organisations.  
 
Second Tier: Regional Framework 
While the EU-Central Asian relations have generally followed the normative 
guidelines set by the first-tier global legal and normative framework, the EU’s 
strategy towards Central Asia (Council of the EU 2007, p.12) has become 
more specific, tailored to the region document, which emphasised 
democracy and other related concepts as an important part of multilateral 
regional cooperation. The Strategy explains the EU’s general interests in the 
region and highlights its cooperation instruments and mechanisms. The 
document identified seven cooperation areas of the EU’s policy in the region: 
(1) human rights, rule of law, good governance and democratisation; (2) 
youth and education; (3) promotion of economic development, trade and 
investment; (4) strengthening energy and transport links; (5) environmental 
sustainability and water; (6) combating such common threats and challenges 
as border management, organised crime, drug trafficking, weapons trade 
and corruption; and, (7) inter-cultural dialogue. The Strategy often serves as 
a reference point in discussions on the EU policies towards the region as it 
sets the cooperation framework and declares the EU’s commitment to 
certain areas of development in the region. The adoption of this strategy has 
completed the collection of regional strategies adopted by the EU in order to 
regulate its foreign policy. Other strategies included Black Sea Synergy, EU 
Arctic Policy, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, European Economic Area, 
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European Neighbourhood Policy, and Northern Dimension (EEAS 2015b, no 
pagination). European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a relative strategic 
priority as it covers the immediate neighbourhood. The ENP received 12 
billion euros in 2007-2013 (for 12 participating countries) compared to the 
EU Central Asia Strategy, which was worth 719 million euros for the same 
period and included 5 participating countries (EEAS 2015b, no pagination). 
The Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) for Assistance to Central Asia 2007-
2013 issued by the European Commission is another core document, which 
specifies the implementation and funding details of the EU Strategy towards 
Central Asia. The RSP reiterates the EU strives to promote human rights 
and democracy worldwide but slightly scales down the commitment to 
democracy promotion. The RSP focuses on the democracy and 
development bundle and closely associates one with another. They are seen 
as reciprocating elements, which reinforce each other and together help the 
target countries ensure stability, security and well-being of its citizens.  
 
Third Tier: Bilateral Framework 
At the bilateral level, it is up to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
(PCAs) with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to regulate relations of this 
countries with the EU and the incorporation of normative elements into 
bilateral framework. PCAs set provisions of mutually beneficial cooperation 
and regulate political, economic, trade, and cultural relations between the 
EU and the two Central Asian countries. It is notable that both PCAs 
unambiguously state that respect for democracy and human rights are 
crucial for bilateral relations with these countries (article 2, European 
Communities, their Member States and Kyrgyz Republic 1999; European 
Communities, their Member States and Republic of Kazakhstan 1999), but 
the overwhelming majority of the Agreements’ provisions focus on trade and 
economic cooperation.  
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, negotiated between the 
European Communities and Kyrgyzstan in 1995, entered into force in 1999. 
The PCA served to supplement the TACIS support to Kyrgyzstan, and to 
replace the old Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic 
- 112 - 
l 
Cooperation, negotiated between the European Communities and the USSR 
in 1989. The PCA main focus areas are political dialogue, trade in goods, 
business and investment, legislative cooperation, economic cooperation, 
cultural cooperation, and financial assistance-related cooperation (European 
Communities, their Member States and Kyrgyz Republic 1999; European 
Communities, their Member States and Republic of Kazakhstan 1999). 
Kazakhstan and the EU have recently negotiated an enhanced PCA, which 
emphasised the privileged relationship the EU has with Kazakhstan. 
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the first-tier documents set the general 
direction and explain the spirit of the EU policies. The second-tier documents 
provide more specific account of the EU policy towards Central Asia, and the 
third-tier documents (PCAs) specify bilateral relations with Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. As one may have noticed, the significance attached to 
democracy decreases as the scope of these documents goes from global to 
local. As further discussion in this thesis will demonstrate, the same pattern 
applies to the reality of EU democracy promotion implementation: as the EU 
moves from global level to local level, the importance of democracy seems 
to lose its appeal.  
 
The EU Concept of Democracy 
In compliance with the Treaty of the EU, the EU’s external action should be 
guided by the principles of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (article 21, European Union 2012b). However, neither 
the Treaty nor the majority of the first, second and third-tier legal and 
normative documents provide sufficient explanation of the meaning of 
democracy. Given that democracy is an integral element of EU legal and 
normative framework the absence of a clear uniform definition of democracy 
in the EU is striking. In the absence of a shared definition, researchers, 
including myself, have to scrutinise the rich bulk of relevant legal and 
normative documents and explore discourses of the EU’s institutional actors 
in order to unravel the EU concept of democracy. Due to the subjective 
nature of such effort, the outcomes might vary (cf. chapter contributions in 
Wetzel and Orbie 2015; Axyonova 2014; Hobson and Kurki 2012).  
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In pursuit of a clear-cut functional definition of democracy I turned to the two 
EU bodies that are responsible for the implementation of EU democracy 
promotion policies abroad, the EEAS and the Commission’s DG DEVCO. 
EEAS defines democracy as “the political system that best – through proper 
mechanisms – allows people to enjoy their civil, political, social, economic 
and cultural rights” (EEAS 2015c, no pagination). DG DEVCO does not offer 
a straightforward definition of democracy but indicates the essential 
components of democracy – human rights, participation in political decision 
making, free mass media and a strong civil society (DG DEVCO 2015, no 
pagination). The inclusion of these components and the overall institutional 
narratives within EEAS and DG DEVCO suggest a broad and quite blurred 
concept of democracy and its association with human rights and socio-
economic development.  
The so-called Copenhagen criteria were the next point of reference in the 
search of an all-EU definition of democracy. Any candidate to the EU is 
required to meet the following criteria: stable institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, a functioning market economy, and, sufficient administrative and 
institutional capacity to implement the acquis communitaire – EU law. As 
these criteria are essentially an entry requirement for all EU member states it 
is logical to assume that, in theory, each current EU member state has met 
them. The Copenhagen criteria might shed some light upon what constitutes 
the domestic definition of a democracy as it is applied to EU member states, 
and it is logical to extend this definition to the external domain of EU politics. 
If this is even partly so, the EU concept of democracy as suggested by 
Copenhagen criteria clearly indicates a preference for a procedural-
institutional type of democracy. This type of democracy resembles the 
classic Dahlian concept of polyarchy and differs from the broad definition of 
democracy as formulated by EEAS and DG DEVCO.  
The third point of reference was the higher institutional level – the top three 
EU institutions and their documents. From among numerous publications of 
the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament, I have selected 
a few, which go into some detail when explaining the concept of democracy. 
The Council Regulation of 1999 is probably the closest to offer a reasonably 
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detailed definition of democracy as it highlights the key components of 
democracy support (article 2.2., Council of the EU 1999). The Regulation 
closely links democracy to a set of inter-related concepts such as good 
governance and the rule of law, which is characterised with an independent 
judiciary, a humane penitentiary system, constitutional and legislative 
reforms, and abolition of the death penalty. It also emphases procedural 
elements of democracy, the separation of powers, public participation in 
political decision making, and free and fair electoral processes. Finally, the 
Regulation outlines the conditions that facilitate creation and consolidation of 
democratic environment: political pluralism with a strong civil society, 
independent mass media and political freedoms. Thus, the Council provided 
a definition of democracy that goes beyond the minimalist set of procedural-
institutional democracy. The European Commission also opts for broader 
definition in its Programming Guide for Strategy Papers on Democracy and 
Human Rights: “A democratic political system is inclusive, participatory, 
representative, accountable, transparent and responsive to citizens’ 
aspirations and expectations“ (European Commission 2008, p.7).  
The European Parliament’s Office for Promotion of Parliamentary 
Democracy lists the following essential elements of democracy: public 
participation and elections; political freedoms; separation of power; a strong 
and independent parliament; the rule of law; political pluralism; transparency 
and accountability; and, free mass media (OPPD 2009, pp.17-27). This list 
of essential democracy components is largely inspired by the UN General 
Assembly’s resolution. The decision to use the UN definitions is both 
practical and normative as it stems from the desire to follow the most 
universal definitions available and avoid a euro-centric definition of 
democracy (OPPD 2009, p.5).  
As this overview of democracy definitions in the EU demonstrates, there is 
no single uniform concept of democracy, but the essential components of 
democracy mentioned in relevant EU documents are often similar: 
participatory politics, the rule of law, human rights, good governance, and 
political pluralism. Nevertheless, it is difficult to disagree with Milja Kurki, 
who describes this thin and complex conceptual foundation of EU 
democracy promotion as “fuzzy liberalism”. Kurki argues it is an intentional 
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effort from the part of the EU to keep the concept of democracy blurred. This 
blurred, or “fuzzy”, concept makes the EU flexible in its democracy 
promotion efforts in specific target regions and countries. In addition, it 
allows the EU to incorporate social and economic elements of development 
into the democracy promotion agenda and avoid purely political and 
sensitive dialogue with partner governments (Kurki 2015, p.41). As an 
outcome, the EU definition of democracy requires a case-specific attention 
and the following section will address the EU’s approach to democracy 
promotion in Central Asia, and in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in particular. 
 
4.4 Implementation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan  
Before engaging in a region and country-specific discussion of EU 
democracy promotion activities, it is useful to recall general information on 
democracy promotion mechanisms. This is required to identify which 
mechanisms are available in general and define which ones are applicable 
to Central Asia and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in particular. In addition, this 
puts EU democracy promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan into a larger 
perspective, which will later help analyse the effectiveness of EU democracy 
promotion and the factors affecting it. 
At the most general level, democracy promotion can take unintentional and 
intentional forms (see graph 3 below). Unintentional forms, which require 
much less effort (if any) in promoting values and principles, are usually 
referred to as diffusion or contagion. Unintentional spread of democratic 
values can occur through regional organisations with a strong democratic 
tradition (Pevehouse 2002, p.613), geographic proximity to and extensive 
interactions with a powerful democratic state (Brinks and Coppedge 2006, 
pp.479-482). In the case of the EU and Central Asia, the unintentional forms 
of democracy promotion are less plausible as the Central Asian republics 
cannot join the EU and are located too far to experience the neighbourhood 
democratic spill over effects.  
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Graph 3: Democracy promotion classification  
 
Intentional forms of democracy promotion can refer to military intervention 
and democracy support. Military intervention as a democracy promotion 
mechanism has become an unpopular measure due to the controversial 
nature and high political and economic costs with unpredictable results 
(Pickering and Peceny 2006, pp.555-556; Youngs 2002, pp.22-23). The EU 
is particularly reluctant to rely on hard power as it contradicts the spirit of the 
EU and its emphasis on the use of non-coercive means in external action 
(Youngs 2006, pp.53-54). Democracy support or democracy assistance, on 
the other hand, has gained popularity and become a mainstream form of 
democracy promotion. Democracy assistance is wide-spread among 
relevant policy making circles to the extent that democracy promotion and 
democracy assistance are often used interchangeably. As the EU largely 
relies on this form of democracy promotion, the further discussion will 
revolve around various mechanisms of EU democracy assistance and their 
implementation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
Due to the extensive research on EU democracy promotion that has been 
going on in the last decade or so, there are numerous typologies of various 
EU democracy promotion mechanisms and instruments. Inventing a new 
typology for this research would be an unnecessary exercise, especially 
taking into consideration that these typologies are repetitive and similar in 
many ways. Instead, I opted to use the existing research on the subject 
Democracy promotion
Intentional 
Intervention
Democracy support
Unintentional Diffusion/Contagion
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adjusting it to the case of EU democracy promotion in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. It is possible to highlight three mechanisms of EU democracy 
promotion: strategic calculation (Schimmelfennig 2005; Checkel 2005), 
normative suasion (Warkotsch 2008), and democratic empowerment (Borzel 
and Risse 2004; Axyonova 2014).  
Strategic calculation refers to the conditionality-based mechanisms and 
involves a set of social and material incentives or punitive measures from 
the part of democracy promotion agent and a cost-and-benefit analysis from 
the part of target countries (Checkel 2005, pp.808-810). Incentives, or 
positive conditionality, link incentives to meeting the EU requirements on 
democratic values and principles. Incentives can vary from the prospects of 
joining the EU to trade privileges or increased development aid. Punitive 
measures, or negative conditionality, include trade embargoes, visa bans 
and other sanctions imposed on the state or individual officials, who, in the 
view of the EU, are responsible for the violation of democratic norms and 
human rights. The logic of strategic calculation is based upon an assumption 
that the target countries and their governments are pragmatic rational actors, 
who can weigh the costs of compliance with the EU requirements on 
democracy and related norms against the benefits of doing so. If the benefits 
are higher in the eyes of target country and its representatives, the EU 
democracy support proposals are more likely to succeed.  
The second mechanism of EU democracy promotion, normative suasion 
seeks to engage target countries and their political elites in a democratic 
socialisation process through continuous discussion of democratic norms 
and persuasion to adopt these norms. Normative suasion operates through 
the “power of better argument”, appropriateness of behaviour, persuasion 
and complex learning. The adherents of this mechanism insist that only 
normative suasion can ensure long-term success of democracy promotion 
and a genuine ownership of the democratisation process on the ground 
(Warkotsch 2008, pp.241-242). In order to be successful normative suasion 
requires a degree of conviction, commitment and consistency on the side of 
socialiser – the EU. To what extent this is achievable for the EU remains a 
question to be discussed further in the thesis.  
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Democratic empowerment is somewhat less researched and less frequently 
listed as an EU external democracy promotion mechanism compared to 
strategic calculation and normative suasion. Democratic empowerment is 
more often discussed with regard to the internal democracy consolidation in 
the EU (Vauchez 2008) and support to democracy consolidation in the 
prospective and recent EU member states (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2004). Democratic empowerment presents a useful mechanism in highly 
authoritarian environments as it does not require the target country 
government’s consent and works directly with domestic actors, who might 
bring or support change – e.g. civil society organisations, mass media or 
youth organisations. Such non-state targeting does not fit into the strategic 
calculation logic as the local political elites in Central Asia are not likely to 
see benefits in a strong civil society or free mass media. Neither does it fit 
into the normative suasion mechanism as it democratic empowerment is 
based on capacity-building rather than on persuasion: the beneficiary are 
supposedly already persuaded, but they might lack skills, knowledge and 
experience to implement changes (Axyonova 2014, p.29).  
Thus, EU democracy promotion mechanisms in Central Asia include 
strategic calculation (conditionality), normative suasion, and democratic 
empowerment. After having established that, it is possible to examine 
specific EU instruments used to promote democratic principles and norms in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In order to structure further discussion, I group 
instruments within each mechanism and discuss how they are applied in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As EU democracy promotion finds itself at the 
intersection of EU development aid policy and EU external action, the range 
of implementation instruments includes both development aid instruments 
and foreign policy tools. Development-related instruments find themselves 
mostly within the strategic calculation and democratic empowerment groups, 
while foreign policy tools are mostly relevant for the normative suasion group 
(see Table 6 below).  
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Table 6: EU democracy promotion (DP) mechanisms and instruments 
Mechanisms Strategic 
Calculation 
Normative Suasion Democratic 
Empowerment  
Instruments Positive conditionality: 
 EU accession 
 ENP 
 Trade 
opportunities 
 Development aid 
Negative 
conditionality: 
 PCA clause 
 Sanctions 
 Political 
dialogue 
 HR dialogue  
 CFSP 
instruments  
 Electoral 
observation 
 Capacity-
building  
Implementers Council of the EU 
DG DEVCO 
DG Trade 
EEAS 
EU Delegations 
Council of the EU 
European 
Commission 
European Parliament 
EEAS 
EU Delegations 
EU SR for Central 
Asia 
EIDHR  
DCI NSA-LA 
Targets State actors State actors  Non-state actors 
Based upon Axyonova 2014, pp.28-30; Warkotsch 2008; Schimmelfennig 2005 
Strategic calculation instruments require some leverage available, “carrots 
and sticks”, which should ideally look sufficiently meaningful for the target 
government in order to engage in a cost-and-benefit analysis and choose 
proposed democratic changes. From among available EU strategic 
calculation instruments only a few can be applied in Central Asia. Due to the 
geographic and political circumstances, the most powerful leverage of the 
EU - the “golden carrot” of EU accession could not offered as an incentive to 
adopt and implement democratic norms and principles (Freire and Simao 
2013, p.178). Another incentive, a privileged relation with the EU can be 
used only to a limited extent. The EU has a range of regional partnerships 
and strategies, one of the most privileged ones in Eurasia is the Eastern 
Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP). ENP offers the recipients closer relations 
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with the EU, which involve such attractive stimuli as a facilitated visa regime 
and trade provisions (Buscaneanu 2015, p.252). However, the ENP does not 
include Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
Unable to use its first and second most effective incentives, the EU has to 
rely on other incentives such as trade opportunities and increased 
development aid. Trade opportunities are most applicable to Kazakhstan, 
the economic powerhouse of the region with strong trade relations with the 
EU member states. Enhanced trade and economic cooperation are already 
offered to Kazakhstan under the framework of the Enhanced Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiated in 2014 (DG Trade 2015, no 
pagination). This opportunity has not been used to its full extent to 
encourage Kazakhstan’s compliance with the principles of democracy and 
human rights. The European Parliament issued three resolutions calling both 
Kazakhstan and the EU to link the adoption of the Enhanced PCA to the 
human rights situation and political reform in Kazakhstan (European 
Parliament 2012a, 2012b, 2013). Despite these calls, the negotiations 
proceeded with minor delays, but not on the EU side. Kazakhstan has been 
too preoccupied with securing its membership in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and proceeding with its participation in the Eurasian 
Economic Community and the Customs Union with Russia and Belarus 
(interview 24, DG Trade, 12 March 2013; interview 37, Kazakh MP, 15 May 
2013). 
Development aid as an instrument of democracy promotion was applicable 
to both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 2007-2013 through the DG DEVCO. 
The European Commission’s development agency – DG DEVCO runs a set 
of geographic and thematic instruments. The largest geographic instrument, 
which covers Central Asia, is the Development Cooperation Instrument 
(DCI) The thematic instruments include the Instrument for Stability (IfS), the 
European Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and few 
others which are not relevant for Central Asia. DCI is the primary instrument 
of development aid and democracy promotion, through which the most of the 
allocated funds are spent. The EU’s total budget for the implementation of 
the Central Asia Strategy is 750 million euro; 635 million of which are 
channelled through the DCI (Tsertsvadze and Boonstra 2013, p.1). These 
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funds go to regional and bilateral programmes and projects (see graph 
below). 
Graph 4: EU Regional and Bilateral Funding in Central Asia 2007-2013  
 
Source: European Commission 2011a, p.6  
The general DCI objectives were directed towards helping developing 
countries meet MDGs. In the Central Asian context, DCI prioritised poverty 
reduction and sustainable development “while not ignoring democracy, good 
governance, rule of law, and human rights” (Boonstra and Hale 2010, p.5). 
The current (2007-2013) development aid priorities in Kazakhstan are good 
governance, judicial reform, education and economic trade, especially in 
regions and rural areas. Starting from 2015, Kazakhstan is no longer eligible 
to receive development aid as a middle income country. In Kyrgyzstan 
priorities include rule of law, education, and social protection, including 
improving public financial management. In addition to area-specific 
Kyrgyzstan receives budget support, which contains some near-democratic 
provisions such as the requirements on transparency, accountability and 
anti-corruption measures. At the regional level, the EU-funded programmes 
prioritize cooperation in the field of energy and transport, environment, 
education, security and stability (European Commission 2011a; interviews 
25 and 26 with DG DEVCO officials, 12 March 2013).  
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In the area of democracy, human rights, good governance and the rule of 
law, the EU applies two-dimensional approach. Regional programme aim to 
facilitate democratisation through enhanced cooperation between the 
Central Asian republics. For example, in 2008 the EU launched the Rule of 
Law Initiative for Central Asia to support reforms and share experiences 
between the EU and within Central Asia in the area of legal and judicial 
reforms. The Initiative consists of two components: an EU-Central Asia Rule 
of Law Platform which implies a high-level regional political dialogue and 
smaller technical assistance projects (Rule of Law Platform 2015). The 
activities under the Rule of Law Initiative included providing expertise, 
training, support of legal reform, and international exchange. At the bilateral 
level, the EU prefer a project-approach where democracy promotion and 
development goals are implemented through a number of projects carried 
out by European and local organisations with the EU funds. The number and 
nature of these projects constantly changes as they emerge and close down. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I chose 17 projects in Kazakhstan and 16 
projects in Kyrgyzstan listed under the “Governance, democracy, human 
rights, and support for economic and institutional reforms” category on the 
websites of EU Delegations to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
In addition to positive conditionality instruments (trade and development aid), 
the EU has a limited ability to apply negative conditionality when the target 
countries in Central Asia fail to respect democratic values or human rights. 
The only legally binding document, which foresees a punitive measure for a 
substantial violation of democratic principles or human rights, is the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiated between the EU 
and third countries on bilateral basis. PCAs with Central Asian countries 
follows the same pattern and the “essential elements” can be found in the 
body of the PCA’s text: 
Respect for democracy, principles of international law and human rights as defined in particular in the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, as well as the principles of market economy, including those enunciated in the documents of the CSCE Bonn Conference, underpin the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitute an essential element of partnership and of this Agreement (Article 2; PCA with Kazakhstan 1999; PCA with Kyrgyzstan 1999) 
- 123 - 
l 
In compliance with the PCAs’ article 93, violation of the essential elements 
set out in article 2 constitute a break of the Agreement and might lead to 
suspension of any trade or other privileges and imposition of sanctions. 
However, the EU is generally very reluctant to apply the essential elements 
clause. In the case of EU-Kazakh and EU-Kyrgyz relations this clause has 
never been applied despite continuous criticisms with regard to the human 
rights situation and the state of democracy in these two countries. In the 
broader regional setting this clause was applied once and to a limited extent 
in Uzbekistan in response to the Andijan massacre (Youngs 2006, p.55; 
Warkotsch 2008, p.246). The sanctions against Uzbekistan included an 
arms embargo and a visa ban for 12 officials, but they were scaled down to 
just the arms embargo within a year. 
Second, normative suasion instruments include political dialogue, human 
rights dialogue, foreign policy tools, and other means of non-material 
encouragement of democratic reform in target counties. The EU has been 
discussing democracy and human rights from the moment of establishing 
bilateral and multilateral relations in the region. However, it is under the 
framework of the EU Central Asia Strategy in 2007, the EU established a 
structured regional political dialogue at the level of foreign ministers and 
bilateral human rights dialogues with each Central Asian republic (Council of 
the EU 2007, p.2). Political dialogues have higher level participants but do 
not always focus on human rights and democracy. In this regard, human 
rights dialogues are more useful as an instrument of democracy promotion 
as they are devoted solely to human rights and related issues and aim to 
persuade the Kazakh and Kyrgyz state representatives of the need to 
respect human rights and follow democratic principles (Axyonova 2014, 
p.59). In compliance with the Council’s Guidelines on Human Rights 
Dialogues, they need to involve non-state actors – civil society 
organisations, activities and experts (Council of the EU 2009). Non-state 
participants do not usually attend the formal dialogue rounds, but meet with 
the EU representatives prior and after the official meetings are held 
(Axyonova 2014, p.92). For non-state actors, these dialogues are often a 
much needed opportunity to have their opinions heard at the state level.  
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In 2007-2013, the EU held six rounds of human rights dialogues with both 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Human rights dialogues in Kyrgyzstan 
concerned the national framework for the protection of human rights and 
human rights protection of vulnerable groups of population - women, 
children, refugees, and prisoners. In Kazakhstan, the EU usually expressed 
concerns about freedom of expression, the prevention of torture, civil society 
organisations and freedom of religion. In addition to structured dialogue 
platforms, the EU uses a variety of foreign policy tools as both means of 
normative persuasion and non-material conditionality. These tools include 
demarches, declarations, common positions, and joint actions (Crawford 
2008, p.177). However, in the case of Central Asia, these tools are rarely 
used. The European Parliament is relatively vocal in issuing various 
statements, but due to the nature of the EU politics, these statements are 
less likely to make difference than, for example, common positions.  
Third, in addition to these instruments, which involve state actors in the 
target countries, the EU has two institutions that support democratic 
empowerment and do not require the formal consent from the part of the 
target countries’ governments: the European Institute for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) and the Development Cooperation Instrument’s 
Non-State Actors-Local Authorities (DCI NSA-LA) thematic programme. The 
EIDHR provide support to non-state actors through democracy and human 
rights related projects. The DCI NSA-LA supports local participation in 
development and decision making. Both programmes aim to develop the 
capacity of non-state actors, give them opportunities to be heard and 
accounted for in domestic politics. However, both programmes are quite 
under-funded given the scope of their work and its importance for 
democracy promotion. Thus, in Kazakhstan, the EIDHR received 2.36 million 
euro and the DCI NSA-LA received 3.15 million euro from the total 74 million 
euro of bilateral aid to Kazakhstan (Tsertsvadze and Boonstra 2013, p.8). In 
Kyrgyzstan, the EIDHR received 2.7 million and the DCI NSA-LA received 
3.75 million euro (Tsertsvadze and Boonstra 2013, pp.9-10). Taking into 
consideration that these money were allocated for eight years, the funding 
does seem sufficient to pursue the ambitious objectives set by the EU 
Strategy towards Central Asia.   
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Although, each mechanism has distinct set of instruments, some of 
instruments play a double role and can be categorised to operate through 
two or even three mechanisms simultaneously. For example, human rights 
dialogue extends its action throughout all mechanisms. Prior to a human 
rights dialogue, the EU holds consultations with civil society organisations 
thus empowering them with an opportunity to be heard at higher level 
meetings through the EU. The human rights dialogue itself aims to both 
persuade target state of the need to respect human rights and democratic 
norms and reward or punish through acknowledging or condemning the 
target state’s actions or inaction.  
Despite having some limitations with regard to the use of its most effective 
instruments, accession and privileged partnership, the EU does employ a 
wide range of mechanisms and instruments. The extent to which these 
instruments are used seem to be rather limited, which might partially explain 
the uneven outcomes of its democracy promotion activities in Central Asia. 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
This chapter examined EU democracy promotion in Central Asia by 
identifying the EU institutional and national stakeholders, the legal and 
normative framework of EU democracy promotion in Central Asia, and the 
implementation details in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
As a unique international entity the EU consists of a variety of actors whose 
identities and interests can converge, complement each other and even 
contradict each other. The European Commission, Council, and to lesser 
extent the European Parliament are the powerhouses of the EU’s general 
policy towards Central Asia. European External Action Service, the EU’s 
foreign policy agency, manages the key subdivisions and institutions, who 
are involved in the implementation of EU policy on the ground, reporting and 
monitoring. In addition to these institutional actors, the chapter discussed EU 
member states, whose varying degrees of interest in Central Asia stem from 
their participation in Afghanistan campaign and the involvement of their 
commercial companies in Central Asian economies. Due to the variety of 
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internal actors, the EU has to juggle and reconcile a variety of interests in 
the region, which range from such Realpolitik considerations as geopolitical 
location, security issues and trade to normative considerations. The 
Realpolitik agenda of the EU in the region is informed by such global issues 
as the international security framework informed by the US-led War on 
Terror; the need to diversify energy sources supply; and the EU’s most 
recent Eastern enlargement, which brought the region closer to the EU 
borders. In terms of security interests, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan per se 
are relatively less crucial for the EU; their importance stems from their 
geographical proximity to other strategically important countries and regions, 
namely Afghanistan, Russia, and the European Neighbourhood.  
While, it is true that normative and non-normative areas of cooperation are 
not necessarily incompatible, they still might affect the EU’s drivers to 
promote normative goals in Kazakhstan and to lesser extent in Kyrgyzstan. 
Increasing business interests of EU member states might affect the 
willingness and readiness of inter-governmental institutions of the Union and 
national government to push harder and apply conditionality when needed 
with regard to local governments. 
The EU democracy promotion in Central Asia lies upon a three-tier legal and 
normative foundation. First tier is the EU’s general policy documents. 
Second tier is region-specific policy documents. Finally, country-specific 
agreements represent third tier. The strategy towards Central Asia sits on 
the second tier and represents a key policy document that regulates EU 
democracy promotion in the region. Human rights, rule of law, good 
governance and democratisation are noted as a priority area in the region. 
The conceptualisation of democracy presents a universal challenge for both 
academics and policy makers. There is no universally accepted conception 
of democracy, which could be used for measuring or promoting democracy, 
but specific agents of democracy promotion or democracy watchdog 
organisation often compile their sets of ideas and principles that define 
democracy. The absence of a functional and shared definition of democracy 
complicates programming, planning, implementation and evaluation of EU 
democracy promotion abroad. The implementation of EU democracy 
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promotion activities corresponds to the blurred nature of the conceptual 
definition of democracy. The EU employs three mechanisms of democracy 
promotion in Central Asia: strategic calculation, normative suasion, and 
democratic empowerment. However, the extent to which these mechanisms 
and associated instruments are used is rather limited and scattered.  
While such state of affairs might seem paradoxical and unreasonable, it 
might indicate two important implications to bear in mind. Firstly, each EU 
institutions and even subdivisions within these institutions seem to have their 
specific definition and vision of democracy set forth in legal and normative 
documents. These definition are not significantly different from each other, 
but the absence of a uniform shared definition of democracy is a sign of a 
conceptual disarray within the EU. Secondly, the “fuzzy liberalism” in place 
of a clear and functional definition of democracy might be intentional. The 
blurred concept of democracy can be shrunk or expanded depending on 
specific context or situation, and such freedom of using this concept is quite 
instrumental to ensure a tailored approach and positive evaluation of any 
efforts as the following chapter demonstrates.  
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Chapter 5: Evaluation of the EU Democracy Promotion in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 In any case, this is better than nothing. 
The European External Action Service Staffer (interview 21, 11 March 2013) 
This chapter evaluates EU democracy promotion efforts in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan in 2007-2013 under the implementation framework of the EU 
Strategy towards Central Asia. This chapter answers the first part of the 
thesis’ primary research question: To what extent has the EU democracy 
promotion been successful in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? In order to 
answer this question the chapter evaluates each EU democracy promotion 
mechanism - strategic calculation, normative suasion, and democratic 
empowerment, against the empirical evidence collected through primary and 
secondary sources. Thus, the structure is as follows. The section following 
this introductory note evaluates the strategic calculation mechanism and its 
implementation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The second section explores 
the normative suasion mechanism. The final substantial section analyses EU 
efforts to empower non-state actors in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
It is important to clarify what evaluation implies at the outset. Evaluation is 
an objective assessment of a project, programme or policy, its design, 
implementation and results. Evaluation aims to define to what extent the 
assessed project, programme or policy has been relevant, how far they have 
been fulfilled, and to see how efficient, effective and sustainable they are 
(Molund and Schill 2004, p.106). Under the framework of this thesis, 
evaluation implies an objective assessment of EU democracy promotion 
mechanisms, their design, implementation and results. I chose to focus on 
individual mechanisms because while they are interconnected and are often 
implemented together, the logic of their operation varies and should be 
tested separately. At that, the thesis focuses on the intrinsic evaluation, i.e. 
the evaluation of democracy promotion in terms of its own democratic 
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objectives as opposed to extrinsic evaluation, which is to what extent 
democracy promotion serves other policy objectives of the democracy 
promotion agent (e.g. counter-terrorism or support to economic 
development; Burnell 2007, p.22).  
An evaluation of external democracy promotion is a daunting task due to 
several reasons. First reason is rooted in the flawed conceptual framework 
of external democracy promotion. Democracy is a difficult-to-measure 
debated notion. Debates on what constitutes a democratic system and which 
countries could be considered “genuine democracies” have never ceased to 
exist in both policy making and academic worlds. There is no single uniform 
position on the concept of democracy within the EU as well. This significantly 
impedes evaluation of the outcomes of EU democracy promotion because 
there are simply no clear criteria to measure them against.  
Secondly, any attempt to measure individual contribution of an external 
democracy promotion agent to democratisation process in a target country 
inevitably encounters the problem of attribution. It is very challenging, if 
possible at all, to identify the exact contribution of an external democracy 
promoter to the democratisation processes due to the multitude of 
overlapping domestic and external factors, which affect democratisation. The 
EU impact on the democratisation process, or lack thereof, in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan is particularly challenging as these two countries host a 
variety of external state and non-state democracy promotion agents (more in 
Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan though) on the top of a range of domestic 
actors, each of which might have contributed to political development..  
Finally, external democracy promotion strategies and tactics vary among 
different democracy promotion. Moreover, the substance and 
implementation of democracy promotion of one democracy promotion agent 
might vary from one target country to another as the domestic context 
informs the choice of mechanisms, instruments and approaches to 
democracy promotion. The general principles in specific regions might be 
similar, but the choice and prioritisation of democracy promotion 
components, instruments and funding allocations are informed by EU 
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interests in regions and countries, the domestic political context and local 
needs and expectations. 
These and other difficulties associated with evaluating democracy promotion 
put any researcher, who undertakes this task, under the pressure of 
elaborating their own criteria. This research is no exception as it applies a 
distinct set of criteria, which take into consideration the peculiarities of EU 
democracy promotion in Central Asia. In order to develop suitable evaluation 
criteria, I identified several aspects to be taken into account, or “criteria for 
evaluation criteria”. Firstly, the evaluation criteria need to be tied to EU 
objectives and evaluation criteria as set in the EU Strategy towards Central 
Asia (Council of the European Union 2007), the Regional Strategy Papers 
(European Commission 2006), and joint progress reports issued by the 
Council of the EU and the European Commission (2008, 2010, and 2012). It 
would be unfair to expect the EU to achieve absolute victories in an 
environment that is not particularly conducive to democracy. Therefore, it 
makes sense to measure against the EU’s self-imposed objectives and 
scrutinise what the EU positions as key components and achievements of 
EU democracy promotion in Central Asia.  
The other “criteria for evaluation criteria” were inspired by the participatory 
approach to evaluation of development assistance promoted by Crawford 
and Kearton (2001 pp.84-99). The participatory approach to evaluation 
acknowledges that external democracy promotion does not take place in an 
isolated environment, where the amount of invested efforts directly 
correlates to the outcomes. The participatory approach takes into 
consideration the political context, where democracy promotion takes place 
and the perspectives of domestic actors (Crawford and Kearton 2001, p.vii). 
The local political context and domestic views on external democracy 
promotion could help explain whether specific democracy promotion 
instruments have been relevant, effective and adequate, while the view of 
local actors could shed some light on the responsiveness of beneficiaries 
and the sustainability of democracy promotion efforts on the ground.  
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In order to incorporate these criteria – focus on the EU objectives, the 
political context, and the local perspectives, I analyse the democracy 
promotion mechanisms employed by the EU in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
through the local context conditions and the opinions on the ground. As it is 
difficult to evaluate the exact contribution of EU democracy promotion to the 
democratisation processes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan I also discuss the 
general democratisation progress in these two countries in order to see 
whether Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have become more democratic during 
the increased engagement of the EU in the region. The EU notes some 
positive developments in the region, yet acknowledges that overall 
developments have not been “as good as hoped for” (Council of the EU and 
the European Commission 2012, p.36). The last section discusses the 
developments in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the area of democracy, 
human rights, rule of law and good governance. This section differs from the 
rest as it attempts to track the general democratisation progress in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. One should acknowledge that due to the 
attribution issue it is impossible to associate democratisation progress or 
regress with the EU involvement because there are other actors and factors, 
which affect the state of democracy in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
In order to ensure a comprehensive and reliable analysis I use a variety of 
primary and secondary sources. The EU’s formal self-evaluation - joint 
progress reports are useful for identifying EU objectives and achievements. 
In compliance with the requirements on transparency and accountability, the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission 
(EC) regularly review and report on the implementation of the EU’s Strategy 
towards Central Asia to the European Council. The Council of the European 
Union (the Council) finalises and approves progress reports and makes 
them available for the public. Since the adoption of the EU Strategy towards 
Central Asia in 2007, three joint progress reports were issued in 2008, 2010 
and 2012. A joint progress report assesses the overall strategy 
implementation, evaluates progress in key sectors, overviews 
implementation instruments and mechanisms, and reflects upon 
achievements and shortcomings of the EU Strategy towards Central Asia for 
the given period. The reports are very general and lack specific benchmarks 
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and achievements, but they do indicate whether the EU believes it has or 
has not achieved something in the area of democracy and related issues. 
Another important source of formal reporting was unfortunately unavailable. 
Once a year, all EU-funded technical assistance projects undergo the 
Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) process  conducted by externally hired 
experts. ROM reports supposedly ensure an external, objective and impartial 
feedback on the performance of European Commission aid projects and 
programmes (Hall and Clauss, 2012). ROM reports are highly technical and 
might have been very insightful for this research, but they are not publicly 
available.  
To balance the democracy promoter’s view, it is important to provide as 
many views on EU democracy promotion in Central Asia as possible and to 
test it against the empirical evidence on the ground. For this purpose, I made 
an extensive use of the empirical evidence collected during my fieldwork 
trips in 2012-2013. The views of EU officials, local beneficiaries and 
observers, and other relevant actors enforce the participatory approach to 
evaluation and bring insights into potential relevance and sustainability of 
external democracy promotion on the ground. These views should be taken 
with some reservation as some of them might be informed by the position of 
the interviewed persons and the institutions and organisations they belong 
to. Nevertheless, they provide an invaluable snapshot of the current trends 
and opinions both within the EU and in Central Asia.  
Finally, it is important to acknowledge and to make the full use of the onoing 
research that has been done by other, academic and non-academic 
observers such as EUCAM. Established in 2008, a year after the adoption of 
the EU Strategy for Central Asia, EUCAM has been scrutinising European 
policies towards Central Asia through research and discussions. EUCAM 
enjoys a certain degree of independence as its project activities have been 
coordinated, sponsored and supported by a variety of actors, including 
charities, the European Parliament, think tanks, and academic institutions. 
Academic publications on the subject might be limited, but they often offer 
certain insights in different comparative perspectives. For example, Vera 
Axyonova’s research on EU democracy promotion highlights the differences 
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in EU approach in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and focuses on the micro-
level to evaluate EU democracy promotion. While this thesis focuses on a 
different set of countries and incorporates both micro, meso and macro 
levels, Axyonova’s work can be extremely useful to put things into a truly 
regional perspective. In addition, publications by Bossuyt, Kubicek, 
Warkotsch, Hoffmann and others offer various perspectives across time, 
space and different thematic aspects. 
 
5.2 Evaluation of the Strategic Calculation Mechanism  
They pretend to reform, we pretend to open our 
markets to them. In effect, neither of us has 
genuine intentions to do so. 
Michael Leigh, German Marshall Fund of the US, “Neighbours of Our 
Neighbours” Conference, College of Europe, Bruges, 15 November 2012 
Cited by the permission of Mr Leigh  
This section evaluates the application of the strategic calculation mechanism 
of democracy promotion by the European Union in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. The strategic calculation mechanism employs tangible and 
intangible rewards and punishments to encourage target governments to 
accept and implement principles of democracy, rule of law, good governance 
and respect to human rights. From among the EU range of strategic 
calculation instruments (see Table 7 below), only a limited number of 
instruments are applicable and used in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. As the 
EU cannot offer Central Asian governments to join the Union or its closer 
cooperation frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Partnership 
Instrument, it lacks its most powerful “carrots” in the region. At the same 
time, the EU is reluctant to apply the available “sticks” - suspension of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA clause) or other sanctions, in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In the absence of other means of meaningful 
leverage the EU has to rely on enhancing trade opportunities and the 
provision of development aid.  
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Table 7: Strategic calculation instruments: Applicability and usage 
 In Kazakhstan In Kyrgyzstan 
Strategic Calculation 
Instruments 
Applicable Used Applicable Used 
EU accession No No No No 
ENPI No No No No 
Trade opportunities Yes Yes Yes No 
Development aid Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PCA clause Yes No Yes No 
Sanctions Yes No Yes No 
 
Therefore, it makes sense to focus on these the provision of trade 
opportunities and development aid as instruments of the democracy 
promotion in order to evaluate the efficiency and success of strategic 
calculation for the intrinsic purposes of democracy promotion, i.e. promotion 
of democratic principles, human rights, rule of law and good governance. 
 
Trade opportunities  
Trade with the EU, an economically developed and internationally active 
region, is regarded as an important benefit, which might assist normative 
conditionality. However, using trade opportunities with the EU as an 
instrument of positive conditionality has not worked as intended in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
In Kyrgyzstan, the provision of trade opportunities was not and could not be 
used as a reward for compliance with democracy and human rights 
standards due to the current limited trade capacity and the strict EU trade 
regulations in place. The EU-Kyrgyz trade is insignificant for both parties. 
Kyrgyzstan imports from the EU more than it exports to the EU, but overall 
the trade volume is not crucial even for Kyrgyzstan (Ministry of Economy of 
the Kyrgyz Republic 2013). As a senior official at the Kyrgyz Ministry of 
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Economy explained the Kyrgyz production does not meet the strict European 
standards (interview 2, 3 August 2012). There is a limited potential for 
Kyrgyzstan to export organic agricultural products, but in the absence of 
certified laboratory to confirm the organic nature of these products this 
potential will remain abstract. As it is highly unlikely that the EU would 
change its trade regulations to let Kyrgyzstan into its market, the trade 
opportunities for Kyrgyzstan are limited, which removes trade from the toolkit 
of EU democracy promotion in Kyrgyzstan.  
In this regard, trade could have been a considerable leverage in 
Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is the top trade partner for the EU in the region with 
the trade with Kazakhstan accounting for 85% of the total EU-Central Asian 
trade (EEAS 2009a, no pagination). China and Russia remain Kazakhstan’s 
top trade partners, but Italy and Netherlands are top exporters and Germany 
is among top importers (KAZNEX INVEST 2015, no pagination). In addition, 
despite the impressive economic performance, Kazakhstan still requires 
significant foreign investment and is certainly interested in deepening and 
widening trade and economic relations with the EU. 
Under these circumstances the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement negotiations between the EU and Kazakhstan in 2011-2014 
presented an opportunity to enforce the EU’s normative profile and push for 
more specific and decisive steps to improve the political and human rights 
situation in Kazakhstan. The enhanced PCA included, among other 
provisions, an important trade and investment measure – reciprocal most-
favoured nation treatment for trade in goods, which could have been an 
attractive tangible reward for Kazakhstan (House of Commons 2015). Due to 
the high-profile of this type of Agreement and the fact that Kazakhstan was 
the only country from the Commonwealth of Independent States to be invited 
to an enhanced partnership, researchers and civil society alike had high 
hopes that the new PCA will push forward the existing democracy and 
human rights concerns (Tsertsvadze and Axyonova 2013; interview 16, 10 
March 2013; interview 41, 17 May 2013).  
This opportunity has been largely missed as the enhanced PCA with 
Kazakhstan was adopted without much progress on the normative 
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conditions on the Kazakh side. Despite several calls from the European 
Parliament to put a stronger emphasis on democracy and human rights and 
to enforce the “more for more” policy (European Parliament 2013 and 
2012a), the negotiations proceeded with less attention to normative 
conditionality. Conditions were in place, but their substance was limited to 
the continuation of political dialogue. The Enhanced PCA does highlight the 
importance of the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as the core universal values (House of Commons 2015; EEAS 
2014). It does not have any mechanisms in place to ensure that trade 
preferences follow positive progress in the area of democracy and human 
rights. Just as with the previous PCA, only suspension of the Agreement can 
be used in cases of a grave violation of human rights, and, as the 
experience shows, even this limited measure is not likely to be applied.  
Moreover, the negotiations were somewhat paradoxical given seemingly 
different bargaining positions of the EU and Kazakhstan. One might assume 
that Kazakhstan, as an economically less developed partner with a humbler 
international profile, should have had a weaker position. In reality, 
Kazakhstan was not only able to shape the direction and substance of 
negotiations, but also delayed them throughout eight rounds in three years. 
From the interview with the European Commission’s DG Trade official 
(interview 24, 12 March 2013), it appears that the delays in the negotiations 
on the enhanced PCA came from the Kazakh side. The negotiations did not 
depend on Kazakhstan’s progress in the area of democracy and human 
rights, they depended on the availability and readiness of the Kazakh 
counterparts to negotiate. This stands far from the official narrative of 
ultimate success and achievement (EEAS 2014), and contradicts the logic of 
“carrots and sticks” as applied in strategic calculation mechanism. Moreover, 
it has sent a message around the region that despite its normative rhetoric 
the EU is reluctant to attach conditionality to its cooperation offers (Hoffmann 
2010). 
 
 
- 137 - 
l 
Development aid 
Technical and other assistance channelled through projects has become a 
significant part of the EU’s democracy promotion tactics in the region. The 
EU has continuously reported positive progress in the field of democracy, 
human rights, rule of law and good governance. The joint progress reports 
highlight the EU’s support to democracy under the framework of 
development aid and assistance with constitutional, judiciary and prison 
reforms (Council of the European Union and European Commission 2008, 
2010, 2012). 
Development aid is important for the intrinsic evaluation of democracy 
promotion because it advances normative objectives in two capacities, as a 
reward and as a democracy support instrument. Firstly, the democracy 
promotion agent can use development aid as a reward for compliance with 
human rights and democracy standards. In this regard, it is important to 
pursue the “more for more” principle: increased compliance with the donor’s 
requirements should ideally ensue increased allocation of development aid. 
Secondly, the EU approach to development assistance closely links 
democracy promotion to development aid. Mainstreaming democracy into 
other areas of cooperation is based on the assumption that “human rights 
and democratisation linkages can be established for all sectors” (European 
Commission 2008, p.3). As a result of such approach, EU projects on the 
ground found themselves at the cross-section of democracy, development 
and other related areas, and some projects support democratisation 
processes in target countries through direct and indirect means.  
Below, I evaluate to what extent development aid has worked as a strategic 
calculation mechanism of democracy promotion in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz 
settings. I place the analysis into the larger politico-economic context and 
incorporate local perspectives on the importance and efficiency of EU-
funded democracy related projects and activities. 
Due to different levels of economic development (see Table 5 for an 
illustration of differences between the two countries), Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan represent drastically different environments for development 
assistance. Two factors need to be in place for development aid to be an 
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appealing reward and have some leverage over the local governments: a 
high demand for external aid in target countries and a meaningful supply 
from the part of donor. In terms of high demand, the EU development 
assistance had been more appealing for the poorer Kyrgyzstan than for the 
“upper middle income” Kazakhstan (World Bank 2015a and 2015b). In terms 
of meaningful supply of development aid, it is difficult to argue that the EU 
contributions have had an impact. To remind the reader, the total budget for 
the implementation of the EU Strategy towards Central Asia in 2007-2013 
amounted to 750 million euro, 70% of which were channelled through 
bilateral assistance programmes in all five Central Asian republics (Council 
of the European Union 2007, p.28). In total, Kazakhstan received 75.6 
million euro as bilateral development assistance during the reported period. 
The EU’s total development assistance allocations in Kyrgyzstan amounted 
to 106.2 million euro (DG DEVCO 2015). For Kazakhstan, this amount might 
be unimpressive (interview with Kazakh MP, interview 37, 15 March 2013), 
but for Kyrgyzstan any amount is welcomed and appreciated (interview 2, 3 
August 2012).  
 
Development aid in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
Kazakhstan is a tricky recipient of EU aid because the actual demand for 
assistance is questionable. In this regard, EU support to Kazakhstan reflects 
certain controversies inherent to the general EU aid dynamics in the world. 
As Booth and Herbert (2011, p.11) note, EU aid is poorly targeted at regions 
and countries that suffer the most and some of its development aid goes to 
regional strategic partners rather than the countries in most need. For 
example, in 2009 only 46% of EU aid reached lower income countries 
(Booth and Herbert 2011, p.11).  
On the other hand, the perceived need of conditional development 
assistance seems to be limited. Kazakhstan is the 51st most developed 
country in the world, and the country’s ambition is to get into the top 30 by 
2050 (the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2013). 
In the 1990s, Kazakhstan required foreign aid to address the consequences 
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of the Soviet disintegration and shock therapy reforms (see section 3.3 and 
3.5 for more details). Nowadays, the situation and more so – the domestic 
perception of the situation, is drastically different. Kazakhstan’s changing 
perception attitude to Europe can be illustrated with few recent examples.  
A panel at Astana Economic Forum 2013 was devoted to the question “Can 
Russia and Kazakhstan help the European Union out of the current 
economic crisis and recession?” (Astana Economic Forum 2015). Panellists 
discussed possibilities for building a new, non-Western-centric financial 
system and creating the world of Razvitie (Russian word for development). 
The use of transliterated Russian word in an English-language agenda is 
remarkable on its own: insisting on a Russian word in pre-dominantly 
Western area of development assistance might indicate the willingness to 
challenge what the local elites perceive as the Western monopoly on what is 
right and what is wrong (interviews 37, 38, members of Kazakh Parliament, 
15 May 2013).  
Moreover, Kazakhstan has recently transitioned from receiving development 
aid to providing it to other countries. The Kazakh government implements 
Presidential Decree on the Conception of Official Development Aid (2013), 
which foresees establishing a development assistance institution – KazAid, 
whose organisational principles are similar to the existing Western 
development agencies. The Conception declares its commitment to the 
humanitarian mission, but also emphasizes that the development agency 
and global aid is required for the prestige of the country (Presidential Decree 
2013). This transition signifies not only an important shift in the international 
role of the country, but also in the perception and perspectives of 
Kazakhstani political elites. The informal and unrecorded conversations with 
few civil servants in Kazakhstan had a very different tone from similar 
conversations in Kyrgyzstan. The Kazakh officials expressed less 
excitement about foreign aid and mentioned that the country is rich enough 
to take care of itself.  
Understanding these circumstances, the EU development aid to Kazakhstan 
was accompanied with limited conditions. The conditions revolved around 
the Kazakh commitment to reforms and agreement to let the projects 
operate. The commitment was reported to be present (European Court of 
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Auditors 2013), but there is an important question to bear in mind: To what 
extent the local commitment to accept normative conditions and adopt 
democratic principles is genuine. Opponents of strategic calculation as a 
democracy promotion mechanism in Central Asia (Warkotsch 2011, p.104) 
rightfully question what happens after the beneficiary receives its reward. It 
is difficult to trace or measure the degree of true commitment and what it 
might imply for democracy promotion.  
Given the Kyrgyz dependence on foreign aid, it is legitimate to assume that 
the EU would apply stricter conditions attached to development assistance. 
It was interesting to discover that the conditionality in Kyrgyzstan has also 
been limited to mostly technical conditions, which do not necessarily 
promote democracy. At that, a part of funds were allocated under the 
sectoral budget support framework, which remains a subject of heated 
debates in the development-related research as controversial (Hayman 
2011) or even counterproductive for democracy promotion (Handley 2009).  
As “the country in the region most committed to democratic reforms” 
(European Commission 2011a), Kyrgyzstan, along with Tajikistan, is a 
recipient of sectoral budget support. The primary objectives of the sectoral 
budget support are to promote macroeconomic stability and political 
progress, to strengthen the government’s commitment to carry on reforms, 
and, to send a signal to other countries in the region that the EU will support 
countries, which embark on the path to democracy and political reforms 
(European Commission 2011b). A low income country with regular budget 
deficits and 37% poverty rate (World Bank 2015b), Kyrgyzstan welcomes 
any financial contribution to the development. Local officials refer to EU 
assistance as timely and useful (interview 3, Ministry of Finance, 3 August 
2012). The EU assistance allows paying social benefits to the population, 
but it also proves that Kyrgyzstan depends on foreign assistance. 
While budget support might be reasonably useful for supporting the social 
welfare state in Kyrgyzstan, its role as an indirect democracy promotion 
instrument remains limited. It is not unusual for donors to use budget support 
as an instrument of political conditionality and attempt to “buy” reforms on 
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the ground (Molenaers 2012, p.791). However, the conditions attached to 
the budget support provided by the EU to Kyrgyzstan do not seem to 
address political issues. EU officials provided only blurred indication of the 
conditions having said that the government needs to achieve “certain 
indicators” in terms of policies (interview 25, 12 March 2013). The Kyrgyz 
officials were more open and explained that conditions included reforms and 
legislative changes, but are mostly there to ensure smooth implementation 
of the social projects (interview 2, 3 August 2012). There might be indirect 
contribution of budget support to democracy promotion though: the EU is 
quite strict about addressing the issues of corruption, transparency and 
accountability, and through this it might contribute to developing a political 
culture within the Kyrgyz institutions that would meet at least some minimal 
standard of democracy, good governance and rule of law.  
In the short-term perspective, the budget support entails several concerns. 
First concern is the above mentioned minimal conditions. The European 
Commission made three tranches to support the Kyrgyz budget upon an 
assessment of progress in the area of public financial management. The 
assessment only demonstrated that the Kyrgyz government “remained 
committed to further reforms” (European Court of Auditors 2013, p.26). This 
is a worrying trend in the general EU-Central Asian cooperation: for the local 
governments it is sufficient to demonstrate “commitment”, which then is 
interpreted as an achievement on the EU side and a reasonable ground to 
continue providing benefits. Meanwhile, this commitment does not 
necessarily imply a genuine readiness to democratise the political system or 
otherwise make the politics in the Central Asian countries more open and 
accountable. From observations of the politics in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan, as well as from the existing research on Central Asia, it is 
possible to conclude that this commitment is “little more than liberal window 
dressing” (Hoffmann 2010, p.90). The Central Asian government mastered 
the art of making “cosmetic change or tactical concessions” and exchanging 
them for both tangible and intangible Western rewards (Warkotsch 2007, 
p.496). This trend has already affected the democratisation process in 
Central Asia. The current political systems in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
are often referred to as hybrid regimes, patronal regimes, or imitation 
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democracies. These categorisation is legitimate, but the core reason behind 
this co-existence of democratic façade and authoritarian reality is the 
numerous compromises made by democracy promoters. Central Asian 
regimes found a convenient way of reconciling the domestic reality with the 
external requirements of democratisation. They have quickly learned that 
“commitment” and imitation are sufficient to meet the conditions of the EU 
partners. This is not likely to change in the near future unless democracy 
promotion agents change their perception of success and achievement and 
start pushing harder.  
Second concern with regard to budget support is its potential effect on 
maintaining status quo domestically. A number of reasons contribute to the 
Kyrgyz budget deficit. Some of them are objective, e.g. the lack of natural 
resources, the global economic crisis, which affects labour migrant 
remittances from Russia. Other reasons are rooted in poor governance and 
corruption. When the EU attempts to fill in this gap, it actually rectifies the 
government’s poor performance in distribution of resources and creation of 
opportunities for people, and indirectly contributes to sustaining the status 
quo, i.e. poor resource management. Continuous budget support to poorer 
countries like Kyrgyzstan helps to sustain otherwise incapable corrupt 
regimes, which use the provided assistance to cover holes in the budget 
caused by poor management and corruption. In this sense, budget support 
pursues unintended objectives and, instead of providing temporary solution 
during transition period, sustains poor governance and authoritarian 
regimes.  
 
Project-approach: Promoting democracy? 
The EU’s general approach to democracy promotion incorporates 
democracy promotion into larger development assistance framework and 
blends promotion of democratic principles into a large scope of activities. 
Therefore, it would be unreasonable to expect a project or a set of projects, 
which would have a clear-cut focus on democracy. However, it is worth 
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examining what kind of projects and activities the EU pursues under the 
democracy promotion agenda.  
The number and substance of the EU-funded projects in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan listed under the “Governance, democracy, human rights and 
support for economic and institutional reforms” category constantly changes 
as projects open and close (average lifespan of a project is roughly two-
three years). In order to avoid confusion, I chose a time point – 23 May 
2013, and used the publicly available data on the projects that were 
operational at this particular date. The selection of date was informed by the 
completion of fieldwork interviews and the fact that the implementation of the 
EU Strategy towards Central Asia was in its full swing.  
The majority of EU-funded projects in both countries are devoted to 
facilitating socio-economic conditions for democracy. From among the 
project listed under the category of governance, democracy, human rights 
and support for economic and institutional reforms, several projects aim to 
improve the administrative capacity in both countries. The attention to the 
institutional capacity building overwhelms the EU development assistance at 
both regional and bilateral scale. In Kazakhstan, priorities are judicial reform 
and improvement of public services for social and economic reforms. In 
Kyrgyzstan, the judicial system reform, human rights and public financial 
management present top priorities.  
Project-approach had a potential to be useful for democracy promotion, but 
the way it was implemented under the framework of the EU Strategy to 
Central Asia made its success limited and raised certain concerns and even 
light distrust from the local actors, both state officials and civil society. 
The first and most discussed issue was the large number of projects in 
general and the number of projects related to democracy, good governance, 
rule of law and human rights. In an attempt to cover all cooperation areas 
indicated in the Strategy, the European Commission dispersed the fairly 
limited funding across a broad variety of regional and bilateral programmes, 
this resulted in small project budgets and enormous administrative burden 
on the EU Delegations. The limited finance did not allow projects to go in 
depth and limited their operations to “cheaper”, quick win activities, such as; 
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training, legislative reforms and limited-scope awareness raising campaigns 
(interview 8, a staffer of an EU-funded project in Kyrgyzstan, 17 August 
2012). The administrative and management burden on the Delegations was 
great as they had to oversee up to 40-50 projects simultaneously in addition 
to other activities. At that, these projects involved multiple lines of reporting 
and budgeting (European Court of Auditors 2013, p.7). One of interviewees, 
an MEP, expressed a suspicion that the Delegations were deliberately 
understaffed and overloaded to keep the thorough reporting to minimum 
(interview 43, 11 July 2013). To what extent this suspicion is true remains a 
question, but the amount of work the Delegation staffers had to do left at 
least one visible shortcoming: the publicly available information on the 
projects was limited.  
The second issue with the implementation of the project approach was the 
substance the projects have been promoting. Most of these projects 
contribute to both normative and non-normative interests of the EU. 
Prioritisation of judicial reforms and administrative economic reforms in 
Kazakhstan were largely improving the investment climate and ensuring 
smoother access to the local markets for European companies (Bossuyt and 
Kubicek 2015, p.180). While there is nothing inherently wrong with improving 
the investment climate, the goal of promoting democracy and human rights 
was at times overshadowed by other objectives and concerns. In 
Kyrgyzstan, the interplay of normative and non-normative objectives in 
development assistance was less obvious and the project approach was 
focused on promoting a broader democracy (Bossuyt and Kubicek 2015). 
Finally, in an attempt to investigate and incorporate the local perspectives on 
EU development aid and project approach, I have discovered that local civil 
society representatives, state officials and relevant domestic experts were 
largely confused, suspicious or disillusioned about the EU democracy 
promotion efforts. In Kazakhstan, I was unable to interview state officials, but 
the available civil society representatives and political opposition simply 
accused the EU of double standards. In their opinion, the EU was close 
friends with Nazarbayev’s regime and despite the declared commitments to 
democracy and human rights, it failed to address these issues in 
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Kazakhstan. These views should, of course, be taken with some caution and 
understanding that these interviewees might have been frustrated with the 
little attention they get from the democracy promotion agents operating in 
Kazakhstan. However, the existence of these views among local actors 
cannot be ignored. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the local perspectives were diverse. State officials were 
largely confused about the EU activities and asked me to clarify for them 
what the EU exactly promotes and how. Some of the interviewees did this 
with a degree of visible scepticism remarking that the Cold War was not over 
and it just took a different format (interview 27, Kyrgyz MP, 22 April 2013). 
Local civil society and experts expressed concerns about the actual 
spending in EU-funded projects. In their opinion, the overwhelming majority 
of funds return to the EU in the form of salaries of the expatriate staffers and 
invited experts and trainers. In their opinion, it was a waste of resources for 
Kyrgyzstan because foreign experts are much more expensive than local 
experts and have very limited knowledge and understanding of the local 
setting. However, they also pointed to the shortcomings of hiring 
domestically: local experts are not totally independent in their work. They 
might be professionals, but they are too much aware of what they are 
expected to deliver, and often sacrifice their objectivity for the sake of good 
project indicators (interview 6, 13 August 2012). It was not possible to fully 
verify the allegations on project budget spending as individual project reports 
are not publicly available. The European Court of Auditors reports that 
administrative costs (salaries) represent 14.6% of the development spending 
in Central Asia, but it does not specify how much is paid to hired experts and 
trainers, who are accounted as part of project activities (European Court of 
Auditors 2011, 2013, p.23). 
Nevertheless, the democracy related projects might have long-term impact 
on the overall democratic culture in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Project 
activities serve as a complementary mechanism of socialisation where local 
institutional and individual beneficiaries (state bodies and civil servants) 
learn principles of democracy, transparency and accountability from the 
experience of cooperating with the EU institutions and officials. Given the 
number of these projects and the number of beneficiaries, who in one way or 
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another were engaged in project activities, there is a chance that some basic 
principles have been noted on the ground. 
 
Concluding remarks for the evaluation of the strategic calculation 
mechanism 
From the variety of EU democracy promotion instruments based upon 
positive or negative conditionality, the EU used only trade opportunities and 
development aid in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Other instruments, in 
particular the “golden carrots” – EU accession or ENPI, are not applicable to 
the region. Negative conditionality (PCA clause and sanctions) is applicable, 
but hardly ever used. For these reasons, I focused on trade opportunities 
and development aid as strategic calculation instruments aimed to promote 
democratic objectives. Due to different economic and political settings, these 
instruments were applied differently in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but the 
results were largely similar. Trade opportunities were not used as a positive 
conditionality mechanism in Kyrgyzstan, and it is impossible to measure their 
success. In Kazakhstan, the EU did not attach considerable conditions to the 
provision trade opportunities and this instrument failed to be used as a 
reward for compliance with democratic and human rights standards. 
Development aid has been partially successful, but less in the capacity of a 
reward. It is more likely to be successful in the long-term perspective, as an 
element of socialisation.  
Kyrgyzstan is more dependent on external assistance and conditionality was 
applied more successfully over there. Kazakhstan does not need much 
technical assistance or budget support. Kazakhstan can afford the lack of 
democracy and human rights violations, while Kyrgyzstan is too poor and 
dependent on donor aid to allow human rights violation on a large scale. For 
this reason, the scope of democracy promotion activities in the two countries 
was slightly different. In Kazakhstan, the democracy related projects were 
mostly indirectly promoting democracy and focused on technical, non-
sensitive issue. The overall narrative of the EU officials on the ground and 
the character of project operations indicated the overarching caution from 
the EU side not to “offend” or alienate the ruling regime by “pushing too 
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hard”. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan is an easier ground for democracy 
promotion, but the overall success of strategic calculation has been limited 
because the available instruments have not been used or were used to a 
limited extent. The project approach might have beneficial in the long-term 
perspective as the numerous projects engaged large numbers of local 
institutions and individuals, who might have internalised some of the 
normative principles that the projects promoted either directly or indirectly.  
Table 8 below summarises the findings of this section. As the findings 
demonstrate, the strategic calculation instruments have not been successful 
due to limited or partial application of the available tools.  
Table 8: Strategic Calculation Instruments: Applicability, usage and success  
  
In Kazakhstan 
 
In Kyrgyzstan 
Strategic 
Calculation 
Instruments 
 
Applicable 
 
Used 
 
Successful 
 
Applicable 
 
Used 
 
Successful 
EU 
accession 
No No N/a No No N/a 
ENPI No No N/a No No N/a 
Trade 
opportunities 
Yes Yes No Yes No N/a 
Development 
aid 
Yes Yes Limited 
success 
Yes Yes Limited 
success 
PCA clause Yes No No Yes No No 
Sanctions Yes No No Yes No No 
Finally, I would like to note a surprising fact that was raised few times by 
interviewees (interview 16, EUCAM expert, 10 March 2013; interview 19, 
EEAS, 10 March 2013). It might seem paradoxical, but EU assistance to 
Central Asia lacks transparency. The general information, e.g. joint progress 
reports, is available, but specific implementation details are difficult to obtain. 
The list of projects on the EU Delegations’ websites is not up to date; the 
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links are often broken (especially in Kyrgyzstan) and contain very limited 
information (usually, the budget, implementer and timeframe). On few 
occasions, I requested information at the EU Delegations on the projects, 
but would receive the same links to the Delegation websites. The results-
oriented monitoring reports on individual projects exist but are unavailable 
for public. It is unclear whether country by country reports are issued. When 
asked about country by country reports, the EEAS officials appeared 
defensive and seemed cautious about the objectives of my interview and 
questions (interview 18, EEAS, 10 March 2013). The only available sources 
of EU’s self-evaluation are joint progress reports, but they focus on macro-
level and provide a blurred picture of EU achievements in the region. 
 
5.3 Evaluation of the Normative Suasion Mechanism 
No one has the right to tell us how to live and how to build our country. 
President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev (as cited in KazInform 2013) 
Normative suasion as a democracy promotion mechanism operates mainly 
through bilateral and multilateral dialogue platforms, where the EU 
representatives attempt to persuade the Central Asian governments to 
accept and enforce the principles of democracy, good governance, rule of 
law and respect to human rights. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan this 
mechanism is implemented in the form of regular regional political dialogue 
and bilateral structured human rights dialogue. Political dialogue existed 
before the adoption of the EU Strategy towards Central Asia in 2007 and 
was held under the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements with Central Asian governments. With the adoption of the 
Strategy, the political dialogue’s profile has been raised to the regional level. 
Human rights dialogue was a new form of cooperation introduced by the 
Strategy, which aimed to make raising human rights concerns a regular 
occurrence in the EU-Central Asian relations. This section evaluates the 
implementation of these two normative suasion instruments and their 
effectiveness in pursuing democracy promotion objectives by the EU. In 
order to provide a comprehensive evaluation of this democracy promotion 
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mechanism, I will first look at the EU self-evaluation and identify what the EU 
see as successful normative suasion. Afterwards, I will analyse whether the 
political leadership of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the primary targets of this 
mechanism, have served the intrinsic objectives of democracy promotion.  
 
EU evaluation of the implementation of political and human rights dialogues  
The official EU reporting highly evaluates its dialogue-based instruments. 
The joint progress reports regularly highlight the intensification of multilateral 
and bilateral high-level meetings between the EU and Central Asia as one of 
major achievements of the Strategy implementation (Council of the 
European Union and European Commission 2008, p.35; Council of the 
European Union and European Commission 2010, p.6; Council of the 
European Union and European Commission 2012, p.6). The reports do 
acknowledge that human rights dialogue is particularly sensitive and the 
progress in human rights protection and promotion is halted by the local 
factors. Nevertheless, the very fact of the structured human rights dialogue’s 
existence is often reported as a great achievement. Thus, the second joint 
progress report praises the dialogues for being open and frank and for 
conveying European good practices, experience and policies in the area of 
democracy, human rights and good governance (Council of the European 
Union and European Commission 2010, p.6). 
EU officials, especially those involved in the preparation and conduct of 
these dialogues, hold onto the official institutional discourse when explaining 
why they should be considered achievements: 
This might be a game: we ask, they promise. But in any case, this is better than nothing. We express our concerns about human rights in these countries; UN does the same, so do other actors. And this makes Central Asian governments think that something needs to be changed. This is putting diplomatic pressure (Interview 21, EEAS Human Rights Unit, 11 March 2013) 
Officials at the EEAS and EU Delegations to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
acknowledge that the results are not as visible and significant as the external 
observers would expect but they also warn of the risks and dangers of 
pushing Central Asian partners too hard (interview 18, EEAS, 10 March 
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2013; interview 20, EEAS, 10 March 2013; interview 35, EU Delegation to 
Kazakhstan, 14 May 2013). The lack of immediate results shall not put the 
actors involved in democracy promotion off; the key to success is continuity 
and consistency, as well as a balance in the relations with the local 
governments. More pushy strategies and stricter rhetoric might affect the 
willingness of the governments to cooperate and exclude the EU from 
having any, even minor role in the region. Closing these doors shut might 
affect not only the EU interests in the region, but also the local population, 
“who will suffer the most” from the EU turning its back to these countries 
(interview 20, EEAS, 10 March 2013).  
This discourse persists not only across the EU institutions (the 
Commission’s DGs DEVCO and Trade; EEAS), but also throughout time. 
Laruelle and Peyrouse interviewed the European Commission’s desk 
officers for Central Asia in 2010 and discovered the same discourse: 
democracy promotion is a slow gradual process, and democracy cannot be 
imposed from outside and more push will alienate partners on the CA side 
(Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2013, p.61).  
This “better than nothing” discourse that I have repeatedly heard throughout 
my fieldwork trips left me puzzled for some time as I expected more specific 
and ambitious success stories. However, given the official objectives set by 
the EU Strategy towards Central Asia, this discourse is both understandable 
and legitimate. The Strategy sets two key objectives for the human rights 
dialogue: to discuss questions and enhance cooperation on human rights, 
and to raise the EU concerns on human rights in the Central Asian countries. 
As far as one can judge from the official coverage of the human rights 
dialogue rounds, the EU does exactly this: discusses human rights issues 
and raises the EU concerns. The political dialogue’s objective, as set by the 
EU Strategy, is even less ambitious: it just needs to be established, which 
has been done as early as in 2007, almost immediately after the Strategy’s 
adoption (Council of the European Union 2007, p.27). The reported 
achievements might be commensurate with the objectives as stated in the 
Strategy, but their effectiveness in promoting principles of democracy, good 
governance, rule of law, and human rights remains doubtful.  
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In the course of investigating the intentional and unintentional effects of the 
EU normative suasion, I have identified several unintended short-term 
outcomes of related to the implementation of the dialogue-based instruments 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Firstly, the ruling political elite, especially in 
Kazakhstan, use the intensification of contacts with the EU as a tool to 
consolidate and legitimise their axis of power domestically. Secondly, there 
are concerns that, instead of international socialisation of Central Asian 
regimes, i.e. convincing them to accept international standards of democracy 
and human rights, reverse socialisation took place. Central Asian elites 
managed to shift the EU discourses in the region to hard security concerns 
at the expense of less attention to democracy and human rights. Thirdly, the 
EU’s tailored approach to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan resulted in tailored 
responses from the part of the target governments. The target governments 
have figured out the sort and approximate amount of rhetoric and shallow 
action to keep the EU reasonably satisfied and able to report achievements 
and responsiveness on the ground. Below, I will discuss these outcomes in 
more detail. 
 
EU dialogues and regime legitimisation  
Normative suasion aims to socialise the political elites in Central Asia, but in 
reality the local ruling elites often use the dialogue platforms and increased 
number of official visits to convince domestic audiences that the regime 
enjoys international recognition. As local government officials acknowledge, 
the leaders of Central Asian countries understand the importance of 
international recognition and legitimacy for domestic and foreign politics 
(interview 1, Kyrgyz President’s Administration, 31 July 2012). Cooperation 
and regular mutual visits to the established democracies increase the 
prestige of the ruling political elites and allows them build a narrative of 
universal recognition and international success for domestic audiences. For 
this reason, the visits to Europe are used to demonstrate that they are 
accepted by Western countries as legitimate and democratic leaders despite 
negative assessment of elections. 
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In this regard, the Kazakh government has succeeded the most: it manages 
to maintain an image of the country, which attempts to improve its 
democracy and human rights situation, without actually doing anything 
substantial. Thanks to the regular attendance of the human rights dialogue 
rounds, Kazakhstan get the credit for its commitment to human rights and 
uses “rhetorical manipulation of EU–Kazakhstani ties” to (Ansechi 2014, 
pp.13-15). Similar to other, more authoritarian countries in the region, 
Kazakhstan has figured out that mere participation and no active opposition 
to the EU dialogue is sufficient to please the EU partners and to look 
cooperative in their eyes (Stroehlein 2015). An outcome of such situation is 
that a status quo can carry on forever as it is convenient for both democracy 
promotion agent and target government.  
Moreover, EU democracy promotion in the form of political dialogue might 
actually be assisting the countries’ backslide to authoritarianism. Increased 
communications and visits of high profile EU officials to Kazakhstan 
considerably boosted Nazarbayev’s regime image and prestige, and sent a 
controversial message to the Central Asian countries that authoritarianism 
and regular human rights violations do not affect relations with Europe. The 
EU needs to maintain favourable relations with the autocratic regime of 
President Nazarbayev and, in effort to please the ruling regime, it sometimes 
contradicts the efforts of other democracy promotion agents in the country. 
Thus, in the aftermath of 2012 parliamentary elections, High Commissioner 
Catherine Ashton stated: “I also welcome the fact that three parties will be 
represented in Parliament, which is a positive step towards the development 
of a pluralistic and democratic political culture in Kazakhstan” (Ashton’s 
Statement on Kazakh parliamentary elections, 2012). Meanwhile, the 
political context of these elections were far from democratic. The elections 
were called early because President Nazarbayev single-handedly dismissed 
the Parliament in the late 2011 (USDoS 2012, p.22), a hardly legitimate 
move by any accounts. The OSCE reported that the elections did not meet 
the fundamental principles of democracy elections as the Kazakh 
government barred several political parties from participation. On the top of 
them, OSCE reported ballot stuffing, carousel voting, and proxy voting 
(OSCE/ODHIR 2012). The three parties elected to the Parliament presented 
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exclusively pro-government political forces. Nur-Otan Democratic is headed 
by President Nazarbayev. The People’s Communist party was created as an 
alternative, pro-governmental Communist party that was highly supportive of 
the President (interviews 37, 38, Kazakh MPs, 15 May 2013). Finally, Ak-
Zhol Democratic party was known as a strong pro-presidential party as well. 
This context was well-known in the EU. A member of the European 
Parliament mentioned that he voiced his concerns about the flawed elections 
and the lack of opposition at the Kazakh Parliament at the European 
Parliament and informed the clerks at the European Commission and the 
EEAS (interview 43, MEP, 11 July 2013).  
It should be acknowledged that the external reinforcement of the regime only 
contributes to the regime stability. The key factors supporting it can be found 
inside: ruling party strength, state coercive strength, and state discretionary 
economic control (see section 3.4). For these reasons, in Kyrgyzstan, the 
situation is different due to the domestic instability of the ruling regime. As 
chapter 3 demonstrates, none of the four Presidents of Kyrgyzstan had 
sufficient domestic means to maintain and consolidate their power. External 
influence and increased contacts with the established democracies of the 
EU have not played a significant role in the regime survival.  
 
Reverse socialisation 
The intensification of bilateral and multilateral contacts with Central Asian 
governments pursued a variety of goals with the overarching objective to 
socialise the local political elites into accepting at least some minimal 
standard of democracy and human rights. In reality, reverse socialisation 
took place and the EU, de facto, agreed to cooperation under the local rules. 
The shift can be traced from the EU Strategy towards Central Asia through 
the joint progress reports and press releases on the rounds of regional 
political dialogue. The EU Strategy explicitly links political dialogue to 
promotion of the first area of cooperation: democracy, human rights, good 
governance and the rule of law. The first joint progress report mentions 
political dialogue as an instrument of advancing democratic principles 
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(Council of the European Union and European Commission 2008, p.7). From 
the second joint report onwards, it is evident that the focus of the regional 
political dialogue lies largely in the areas of energy cooperation (Council of 
the European Union and European Commission 2010, p.41), and, hard 
security issues, e.g. war on terror and drug trafficking (2010, p.6, 29). While 
the focus on security is not a negative thing per se, the obsession with hard 
security concerns affects the causes of democracy and human rights as they 
shift the primary focus of policy makers and the public away from the 
intrinsic goals of democracy promotion. As an outcome, the political dialogue 
carries on, but its substance focuses on hard security threats more than on 
democracy promotion through normative suasion.  
As to the human rights dialogue, it was marginalised into what Melvin 
characterised as “the ghetto of the dedicated dialogue mechanisms” (Melvin 
2012, p.4). Human rights issues are considered sensitive in the region and, 
as some EU officials report, EU member states are reluctant to raise these 
issues in bilateral relations with Central Asian states. Here, the situation 
varies of course: some EU member states express more concerns about 
normative issues, while others do not necessarily ignore, but pay much less 
attention preferring to delegate these issues to the EU institutional actors. 
Several EEAS officials, as well as experts, complained that EU member 
states outsource these issues to the EU level so that they do not have to 
deal with them at the bilateral level, which might affect other, non-normative 
interests (interview 19, EEAS, 10 March 2013; interview 20, EEAS, 10 
March 2013; interview 16, EUCAM Expert, 10 March 2013). While this might 
be a reasonable option for the EU member states, it signals that reverse 
socialisation affected them as well: Central Asian states taught the EU 
member states that human rights are sensitive issues, which should be 
avoided. Otherwise, the ruling regimes might be offended and alienated.  
 
Tailored approach and tailored responses 
The EU attempts to emphasise the parity between the parties involved in 
dialogue and provide a space for both dialogue partners to express their 
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opinions and concerns. At the same time, not all Central Asian partners are 
equal. In the case of the EU-Kazakh dialogue platform, Kazakhstan might be 
more in the position of an equal partner thanks to its strong economic 
performance and trade and commercial ties with the EU. Kyrgyzstan, on the 
other hand, often finds it in the position of a donor aid and normative advice 
receiver being less of a partner and more of a mentee. Axyonova noted a 
similar pattern when comparing human rights dialogues in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan: “the deliberative, equality-based approach was only partly 
employed in the case of Uzbekistan and absent in the case of Kyrgyzstan” 
(Axyonova 2014, p.104). Similar comparisons were made by experts. An 
expert form EUCAM compared HR Catherine Ashton’s remarks following her 
visits to Kazakhstan and to Tajikistan, and noted that the language used with 
regard to poor countries like Tajikistan is saying what they should be doing, 
while when talking to rich countries the language is different. It is more 
diplomatic and it highlights that Kazakhstan is an important trade partner 
(interview 16, EUCAM Expert, 10 March 2013).  
The local perspectives reflect these observations. When comparing the 
bilateral human rights dialogues throughout the Central Asian region, the 
Kyrgyz state officials have noted what they considered unbalanced and 
unfair treatment of poor countries in the region. Kyrgyzstan is criticised for 
much less grave human right abuses than Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan 
(interview 27, Kyrgyz MP, 22 April 2013). At bilateral and multilateral EU-
Kyrgyzstan meetings, democracy and human rights issues take more time 
and attention than economic issues, which are of more interest for the 
Kyrgyz side. Democratic discussions usually concern civil society, mass 
media and human rights (interview 2, Kyrgyz Ministry of Economy, 3 August 
2012). In Kazakhstan, economic and trade cooperation takes precedence, 
while democracy and human rights have turned into “a box to tick” (interview 
21, EEAS, 11 March 2013). In other words, once again, Kazakhstan can 
afford a certain level of human rights abuse and authoritarianism. The 
differentiated approach to richer and poorer, or more strategically important 
and less important countries in the region affects the substance of 
democracy promotion in each country: in Kazakhstan, the EU promotes 
elements of procedural democracy focusing on conditions for 
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democratisation rather than on broader democratisation. In Kyrgyzstan, the 
EU promotes more broader notion of liberal democracy (Bossuyt and 
Kubicek 2015, p.180). This tailored approach results in tailored responses. 
In Kyrgyzstan, the responsiveness was reported as very high and the overall 
climate for democracy promotion as more favourable because the local 
political elites accepted the fact that they have to comply with the EU 
requirements. In Kazakhstan, this compliance is restricted to technical areas. 
Kazakhstan’s leadership accepts only expert ideas and practical tips on 
improving different areas of activities. They believe they have sufficient 
expertise themselves, but might listen and accept some ideas from outside. 
Otherwise, they are not exactly willing to accept drastic reforms of the 
system (interview 5, EU Delegation to Kazakhstan, 19 August 2012; 
interview 35, EU Delegation to Kazakhstan, 14 May 2013). 
On the other hand, the tailored approach does not seem fair in the eyes of 
local stakeholders, who feel as if they are left behind for the sake of the EU 
balancing its relations with the government and everyone else. Local non-
state stakeholders involved in democratisation, for whom external support is 
vital, seem to be running out of hope about the EU’s role in democracy 
promotion. They refer to the gap between the EU rhetoric and action as 
“difficult-to-hide hypocrisy” (interview 42, a leader of a Kazakh opposition 
party, 17 May 2013). One of political activists referred to a recent example: 
On 31 March 2013, a group of local independent observers reported fraud at 
local elections in Semipalatinsk city, and informed the European about the 
fraudulent electoral process. To their disappointment, there was no reaction 
from the EU side. As the activist complained, “The EU receives the 
information, but keeps silent. They see everything that is going wrong in this 
country, but they carry on supporting this corrupt regime and even sending 
their advisors to help it” (interview 42, a leader of a Kazakh opposition party, 
17 May 2013). While such frustrated opinions might be an outcome of this 
particular person being left behind, it does demonstrate how some local 
stakeholders might perceive the EU’s role in democracy promotion.  
The use of normative suasion mechanism might bring some results in the 
long run as the diplomatic pressure carries on and potentially increases.  
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The implementation of dialogue-based instruments is associated with a 
number of inconsistencies. So far, it seems like reverse socialisation, i.e. 
socialisation of the EU by the stronger Central Asian regimes, is becoming a 
trend, which is convenient for both counterparts making compromises to 
accommodate each other. This continuous compromise might be more 
beneficial for the Central Asian regimes though as they carry on with the 
established hybrid regimes behind the democracy façade. For the EU, this 
compromise results in continuous criticisms and accusations of double 
standards within Central Asian communities. Double standards were 
frequently mentioned by a variety of interviewees in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. State officials were more cautious and tactful when explaining 
the EU’s double standards, but members of the parliament and civil society 
representatives openly accused the EU of double standards. Under these 
circumstances, whatever the EU does or does not do to promote democracy 
through normative suasion results in criticisms.  
 
5.4 Evaluation of the Democratic Empowerment Mechanism  
Democratic empowerment is drastically different from the two previous 
mechanisms of democracy promotion as it is directed towards non-state 
actors, who might be drivers of change on the ground. The EU uses the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and DCI’s 
thematic programme Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA/LA) to 
support civil society, independent mass media and local authorities. 
Democratic empowerment instruments are important for promoting such 
core elements of democracy as political rights, civil rights and broader 
participation in decision making (Bossuyt and Orbie 2015, p.178). Activities 
ran under the framework of EIDHR and NSA/LA do not require the host 
government’s consent and are usually more flexible and touch upon more 
“sensitive” issues than other activities. While the extent to which democratic 
empowerment is implemented is limited (e.g. EIDHR spent 9 million euro for 
the entire Central Asia in 2005-2011; Emerson et al 2010, p.6), it has made 
certain achievements. In particular, the EU has created platform for meeting 
and discussion for state and non-state actors. While in Kyrgyzstan, the civil 
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society is vibrant and vocal enough for the government to hear them, in 
Kazakhstan such platform was much needed and the country hosted the 
largest number of EIDHR projects in Central Asia (Bossuyt and Kubicek 
2015, p.180). 
Democratic empowerment in the civil society sectors in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan is often regarded as the best possible way to assist 
democratisation under the current political circumstances (Axyonova 2012; 
Bossuyt and Kubicek 2015). The NGO sector is politically safer option as it is 
usually not (or should not be) associated with the flaws and imperfections of 
the ruling regime and, as such, it is less controversial. Civil society can 
potentially lead and encourage grass-roots democratisation processes and 
build a fundament for long-term sustainable societal changes.  
EU grants and trainings provided for civil society in Central Asia through the 
EIDHR and DCI’s NSA/LA instruments are often vital for the survival and 
development of the non-state sector. Due to the non-commercial nature of 
their activities, NGOs are unable to exist on their own. Therefore, EU and 
other external sponsors literally make civil society possible in Kazakhstan 
and especially in Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, the civil society is striving. It is 
probably mostly due to the dynamic civil society and the sheer number of 
NGOs that Kyrgyzstan is sometimes regarded the “island of democracy” in 
Central Asia.  
Nevertheless, some features of the local political context might have shaped 
the implementation of the democratic empowerment on the ground. EIDHR’s 
main way of operation is through distributing small-scale grants to local civil 
society organisations. These grants are of great importance for Central 
Asian civil society, but there are few reservations to be taken into account.  
Firstly, only a limited number of NGOs are eligible and capable to apply and 
win these grants (Axyonova 2012, p.3). Representatives of civil society in 
Kyrgyzstan, the most vibrant and numerous in the region, acknowledged that 
despite the large number of NGOs operating in the country, less than a 
dozen are actually able to meet the donor’s requirements and apply 
(interview 7, a Kyrgyz NGO leader, 15 August 2012; interview 10, a Kyrgyz 
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NGO, 17 August 2012). The EU grant application procedure is notorious for 
being particularly complex and heavily bureaucratic. In addition, all 
documents need to be submitted in comprehensible English. This excludes a 
large part of the local civil society from participating as they lack English 
speaking staff and cannot afford to hire a professional translator.  
Secondly, the civil society in Central Asia has been traditionally supported 
from outside. The post-Soviet development of the non-state sector was 
largely funded by Western state and private organisations, who arrived to 
the region with agendas of their own. The civil society organisation in both 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is still hardly self-sustainable. In Kazakhstan, 
civil society relies on a mix of sources, including the Kazakh government. 
Kazakhstan has taken into consideration the external pressures to 
cooperation with civil society and the inevitability of the civil society’s 
existence and opted to control civil society organisations through direct and 
indirect support and endorsement. As a result, there is a rise of GONGOs – 
Government Organised Non-Governmental Organisations, which are 
partially funded by the government and, among other functions, help to 
create and sustain the democracy façade.  
The Kyrgyz civil society is much larger, more active and diverse, and less 
dependent on the state because the state simply lacks resources to fund the 
non-state sector. The issue with the Kyrgyz civil society lies in their 
continuous dependence on external funds. Kyrgyzstan hosts a large 
community of donors (Bossuyt and Kubicek 2015, p.188), a number of whom 
support civil society and promote their understanding of democracy. This 
demand gives the rise to the supply: in pursuit of funding to survive, local 
NGOs adjust their activities and programmes to meet the expectations and 
preferences of donors. These NGOs are often referred to as BONGOs – 
Business-Oriented NGOs. BONGOs in conventional understanding refer to 
the organisations founded by commercial companies in order to represent 
their interests and serve as a business-society medium (van Tulder and van 
der Zwart 2006, p.136). In the Kyrgyz context, these organisations are called 
BONGOs for the nature of their activities: selling civil society services for 
donor funding. The Kyrgyz BONGOs closely follow the international 
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development sector and respond to the current trends. One of the local 
interviewed experts illustrated the work of BONGOs with this example: the 
number of NGOs dealing with LGBT issues is highly disproportionate to the 
actual number of the people identifying themselves as LGBT in Kyrgyzstan 
because LGBT issues received a lot of international attention after the 
adoption of the law on gay propaganda in Russia. The international 
concerns about the treatment of homosexuals in Russia had a spill over 
effect on the entire region and international funding has become available to 
support the NGOs dealing with LGBT issues. The Kyrgyz NGOs responded 
accordingly (interview 6, a Bishkek-based expert, 13 August 2012). 
The Europeans seem to be aware of GONGOs in Kazakhstan and BONGOs 
in Kyrgyzstan, as well as other “murky affiliations” of some local civil society 
organisations, but they also acknowledge that in the absence of reliable and 
accurate information on the ground they have to work with what they have 
(interview 15, German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 February 2013; 
interview 19, EEAS, 10 March 2013).  
The “murky affiliations” of NGOs and, through their medium, of the EU have 
caused a reactionary response from the state. Following the Russian 
treatment of NGOs (Federal Law on non-commercial organisation 2012), the 
Kyrgyz Parliament drafted the bill, which classified externally funded NGOs 
dealing with political issues as “foreign agents”. The bill aims to counteract 
the foreign agents’ involvement and destructive influence over domestic 
policies. The bill was not adopted; it was recalled for further elaboration 
(Fergana 201, no pagination). Given the continuous public debate on the 
nature of NGOs activities and their external funding, there are reasons to 
believe that the bill might be raised again by the new convocation of the 
Kyrgyz Parliament.  
Overall, the EU support to democratisation through democratic 
empowerment remains mixed. On one hand, it is affected by the peculiarities 
of the civil society in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the perceptions and 
reactions to the civil society from the state. On the other hand, the EU 
contributes to the preservation and survival of the civil society sector. 
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Without external funding, these organisations would have probably gone 
extinct or accepted more government funding thus making the NGO sector 
less independent. The contribution of civil society to the democratisation is 
difficult to evaluate but it is undoubtedly informed the political dynamism and 
the public awareness of human rights and political freedoms. 
 
5.5 Evaluation of the Democratisation Progress in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan  
After having evaluated all three democracy promotion mechanisms 
employed by the EU to advance the principles of democracy, human rights 
and good governance in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, it is reasonable to 
zoom out from individual activities and their impact on local state and non-
state actors and analyse the bigger picture. This section evaluates the state 
of democratisation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during the lifespan of the 
EU Strategy towards Central Asia. While it is difficult to attribute the 
democratisation progress or lack thereof to the EU policy and activities, this 
might help understanding whether the two target countries made any 
progress at all. For this purpose, I use two sources; Freedom House and the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index, because they offer one of the most 
detailed accounts of the situation with democracy and human rights on the 
ground.  
Freedom House provides a solid evidence of stagnation with occasional 
regression (downward trends) in the democratisation process in both 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. According to the Freedom House’s Freedom in 
the World annual reports in 2007-2013, Kazakhstan has never been free 
during this period, and Kyrgyzstan has continuously been “partly free” except 
for 2010 (see Table 9). While Kazakhstan demonstrated continuous 
stagnation in its “not free” status, Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a more 
dynamic record of political change. Kyrgyzstan started the reported period 
as being partly free with the 4.5 score; has been classified as not free in 
2009, in the eve of the April 2010 regime change (see Chapter 3); and, 
restored and maintained its partly free status in 2011, but now with a lower 
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score than in the beginning of the reported period (5.0; Freedom in the 
World reports 2007-2014).  
Table 9: Freedom in the World scores for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 
2007-2014 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Kazakhstan 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Kyrgyzstan 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Scores: 1.0-2.5 (free), 3.0-5.0 (partly free), 5.5-7.0 (not free);  
Source: Freedom in the World 2015 
To fully understand the implications of these developments, it is important to 
uncover the story behind the numerical evaluation. For this purpose, I firstly 
trace the freedom and democratisation record (as reported by Freedom 
House) in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
 
Democracy in Kazakhstan 
The seemingly stagnating Kazakh democratisation record has actually been 
characterised with occasional downward trends due to a long-standing 
abuse of human rights and political freedoms and continuously shrinking 
space for civil society and free mass media. In the course of the seven 
reported years, Freedom House repeatedly highlighted several trends, which 
significantly hindered democratisation in Kazakhstan: general consolidation 
of the President Nazarbayev’s power through a largely flawed electoral 
process; political violence and oppression; continuous suppression of mass 
media and civil society; and, legislative and executive limitations imposed 
upon religious freedoms.  
Regime consolidation and fraud elections: About a year before the adoption 
of the EU’s Central Asia Strategy in 2007, Kazakh President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev secured one more term for himself winning “a crushing victory” 
(Freedom House 2007, no pagination). The electoral campaign took place 
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against the background of increased pressure on the civil society and 
political opposition in Kazakhstan. OSCE observation mission noted a 
variety of electoral fraud tactics committed by the authorities, an atmosphere 
of intimidation, mass media bias, low representation of opposition parties on 
election commissions, procedural violations, and flawed handling of post-
electoral complaints (OSCE/ODIHR 2005, pp.11, 15-19, 23-25). In early 
2007, parallel to the negotiations on the EU-Kazakhstan and EU-Central 
Asian cooperation on the eve of the EU CA Strategy adoption, the executive 
and legislative powers passed Constitutional amendments, which removed 
term limits personally for Nazarbayev by giving the untouchable status of the 
First President. The “voluntary” early dissolution of the Parliament in 2007 
and the dissolution of the Parliament by President Nazarbayev’s personal 
discretion in November 2011 made any hopes for actual separation of 
powers in the country obsolete and significantly consolidated the formal and 
actual powers of the First President (Kashkeeva 2007, no pagination). The 
flawed electoral process has always been a feature of the stagnating 
democratisation in the independent Kazakhstan, but as the time passed the 
mechanisms and instruments of electoral fraud diversified and turned more 
blatant. The 2011 presidential election once more proved that peaceful 
transfer of power through competitive and fair electoral process might be in a 
distant future, but not a real possibility: President Nazarbayev won yet 
another election with 95% vote (OSCE/ODIHR 2011) 
Political violence and oppression: In addition to electoral manipulations, the 
Kazakh authorities demonstrated an increasing worrying tendency toward 
political violence and oppression. Throughout the 2007-2014 period and 
before that, Freedom House repeatedly raised the issue of increasing 
violence and oppression directed against opposition leaders, human rights 
advocates and trade unionists. Two opposition leaders were killed before 
and after the 2005 presidential elections, in November 2005 and February 
2006 (Lillis 2006, no pagination). In 2009, human rights activist Yevgeny 
Zhovtis was arrested and subjected to “the grossly deficient judicial 
proceedings”, along with a range of other officials and businessman 
(Freedom House 2010). Long-standing tradition of oppressing dissidents 
was not anything new, but the Zhanaozen massacre in December 2011 
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came across as a surprise for both domestic and external public. The sit-in 
strike of oil workers in the Zhanaozen city turned into riots as police opened 
fire on the strikers. The clashes between rioters and police resulted in 14 
deaths and a hundred injured people (Al-Jazeera 2011). The event took 
place a year after Kazakhstan’s chairmanship at the OSCE and in the middle 
of the EU-Kazakhstan negotiations on enhanced partnership and 
cooperation agreement. A violation of human rights at such gross scale 
could not be disregarded by the EU officials, but the response was rather 
mild. The spokesperson of the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton 
(not even Ashton herself) issued a cautious statement expressing Baroness 
Ashton’s deep concerns about the events and hopes that the authorities will 
investigate and find a peaceful solution (Statement by the spokesperson of 
the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the events in the 
Zhanaozen district of Kazakhstan 2011).  
Mass media: The reported period in Kazakhstan (2006-7) started with the 
executive power’s attach on what has been left from the independent mass 
media: a new media minister held a campaign of increased state control 
over information and a new restrictive media legislation was passed. Mass 
media continued facing harassment throughout the period with regular 
legislative restrictions and crackdowns on mass media in the form of suits 
and prosecutions against critical mass media outlets (FH Kazakhstan report 
2010, 2011, 2013), new legislation on internet (FH Kazakhstan report 2010), 
and blocking attempts to open new media outlets (FH Kazakhstan Report 
2014).  
Religious freedoms: One more issue of concern throughout this period was 
the restriction of public expression of religious beliefs. In 2011, the new law 
ensured state control over religious groups and restricted public religious 
expression. The law has been criticised for being strict and excessively 
restricting freedom of expression through extra-legal measures and violent 
raids on private gathering (Human Rights Watch 2015). The freedom of 
consciousness is a key human right and the systematic abuse of this right in 
Kazakhstan has become a regular occurrence.  
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Democracy in Kyrgyzstan  
Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a different democratisation pattern thanks to a 
democratisation impetus provided by the 2005 Tulip revolution that 
overthrew President Akayev’s regime, which, after having started as the 
“island of democracy” in Central Asia (Anderson 1999), gradually turned 
autocratic (see Chapter 3 Local Context). However, the hopes for 
consolidation of the Tulip revolutions’ small victories in the area of mass 
freedom and competitiveness of political parties proved to be vane as the 
newly elected President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s regime quickly showed signs 
of the notorious Central Asian authoritarianism, which has been flourishing in 
the nearby Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  
Just as in the case of Kazakhstan, some of the most significant setbacks in 
the democratisation process coincided with the EU’s extensive consultations 
and negotiations with the Kyrgyz leadership aimed. Parallel to what later will 
be showcased by the EU as an effort to meet the local needs and 
simultaneously promote democratic principles, Freedom House, as well as 
other external observers such as the International Crisis Group, Human 
Rights Watch and Transparency International, reported deterioration of the 
political freedoms and rights. From 2007 to 2010, Kyrgyzstan has repeatedly 
received downward trend warnings due to the processes and events, which 
significantly impeded the democratisation process in the country: namely, 
the consolidation of the President Bakiev’s regime through constitutional 
amendments, fraud elections, and oppression and intimidation of free mass 
media, civil society and political opposition (tactics similar to the authoritarian 
consolidation in Kazakhstan). 
Regime consolidation: Unlike his predecessor Akayev, President Bakiev did 
not hesitate or wait long to consolidate his powers by all possible means. 
Soon after winning the presidential election in tandem with Felix Kulov, a 
Northern politician, who ensured the support of the Northern Kyrgyzstan, 
President Bakieyv forced his powerful colleague out of the tandem, from 
Prime Minister’s position and marginalised few more influential politicians 
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from the political arena (International Crisis Group 2006). In 2006-2007, 
President Bakiev and few supporters at the Parliament introduced a new 
constitution, which increased presidential power at the expense of the 
parliament in 2007. The constitution was approved by a referendum on 21 
October 2007. A day after, President Bakiyev dissolved the Parliament 
announced early parliamentary elections in December (International Crisis 
Group 2011, no pagination). At the same time, President Bakiyev worked on 
the consolidation of his political party – Ak-Jol, which was established and 
registered in just one day (registration process usually takes longer as it 
requires a considerable package of documents) on 15 October 2007. The 
pro-presidential party sought to “make Kyrgyzstan an advanced democracy” 
(Fergana 2007, no pagination), but it was too obvious that the party was 
created with the sole purpose of strengthening President’s influence at the 
new Parliament (Bader 2010, p.).  
After the October 2007 Constitution (and parallel to the increasing EU 
engagement with the region and Kyrgyzstan under the framework of the 
EU’s Central Asia Strategy) and up until the overthrow of the regime in 2010, 
Freedom House reported the flawed parliamentary elections in December 
2007, where opposition was marginalised and squeezed out of the legitimate 
domain of policy and decision making (another similarity with the Kazakh 
tactics of regime consolidation). Presidential Ak Jol party won 71 of 90 seats, 
and the second runner up political party, which happened to be an 
opposition party, was simply disqualified from Parliament (International 
Crisis Group 2011).  
In addition to this, Freedom House also covered the authorities’ efforts to 
intimidate the opposition and silence civil society and mass media to the 
ongoing reduction in political pluralism (FH report 2009). The situation with 
political freedoms and democracy has deteriorated significantly and the 
regime has been increasingly relying upon brute force to get rid of 
dissidents: members of the parliament, politicians, businessmen, journalists 
and sportsmen fell victims to assassinations (see Chapter 3 and 
Ovchinnikova 2009).  
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The downward spiral into political violence and one-party rule was eventually 
stopped by the April 2010 uprising, which ousted President Bakiyev and his 
network. The uprising launched chain of events in the country, some of 
which were negative like violent clashes in the south, and others positive – 
the adoption of a new constitution balancing presidential and parliamentary 
powers and competitive parliamentary elections in October 2010. This 
significantly improved Kyrgyzstan’s score and moved it from not free back to 
the partly free category (FH 2011). In the following three years, Kyrgyzstan 
has maintained its partly free status and had its ups and downs in the 
democratisation process. Ups included a competitive presidential election in 
October 2011, which resulted in the first voluntary transfer of power (FH 
2012); and, the establishment of a new anticorruption body. Downs revolved 
around an unfair treatment of ethnic minorities, issues with judicial 
independence, and regular dismissals and appointments of the government 
(FH 2012, 2013 and 2014).  
 
Quality of democracy in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan  
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s democratisation progress, or lack of thereof, is 
regularly monitored by a team of analysts at the Bertelsmann Foundation, 
who issue their findings in the biennial BTI reports explaining the situation on 
the ground in both quantitative and qualitative terms. BTI’s democracy status 
score indicator as it provides an aggregate assessment of key 
democratisation elements: political participation, rule of law, stability of 
democratic institutions, political and social integration (BTI website 2015). 
Another advantage of the BTI’s assessment is that the countries’ democracy 
status score is not measured against each other, but against their own 
progress through 9 years, from 2006 to 2014. As the graph below 
demonstrates, the Kazakh democracy status has been steadily declining 
throughout the period under focus: having started with an unimpressive 4.18 
score, the country managed to get a slight improvement in 2008, but 
eventually declined to 3.9 in 2014.  
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Graph 5: Kazakhstan’s Democracy Status Score in 2006-2014 
 
Based on the Bertelsmann Transition Index Reports 2006-2014, the Bertelsmann 
Foundation  
The BTI reports for this period highlight several ups and downs. A major up 
was Kazakhstan’s OSCE Chairmanship, which encouraged the country’s 
leadership to at least make declarative commitments to democratic 
principles and ideals. However, this temporary up was quickly overrun with 
few events, which significantly impeded the democratisation process in 
Kazakhstan. Each election within this period of time elections was a major 
blow to democracy. In 2011, President Nazarbayev single-handedly made a 
decision to call on early presidential elections in less than a month after the 
end of the OSCE Chairmanship and won with 99.5% of the vote (BTI 2014 
Kazakhstan Country report, p.10). A year later, he called for the early 
parliamentary election, which resulted in a very pro-presidential and 
obedient parliament (BTI 2014 Kazakhstan Country report, p.10). While this 
information is hardly a secret to any observer outside and inside the country, 
it is amazing how the joint progress reports never mention it and ignore two 
simple facts: no elections in Kazakhstan have ever been recognised as free 
and fair, and the leadership has not changed since 1989 (BTI 2014, p.10). In 
other words, there are no signs of participatory politics or fair electoral 
process, which represent basic components of a democracy. Adding political 
violence, control over religious environment, regular attempts to control 
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mass media and prosecution of dissidents do not make the Nazarbayev’s 
regime any more democratic. To what extent a regime like this is susceptible 
to democratic change is unclear, as well as it is unclear whether limited 
insufficiently funded efforts to promote democratic principles through a range 
of small technical projects have any capacity to induce change or keep what 
is left from democracy in Kazakhstan afloat.  
On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a wider range of 
fluctuations in democracy status and significantly better democracy scores in 
the 2006-2014 period. In spite of low start in 2006 in the aftermath of the 
Tulip revolution of 2005 and a temporary down in 2010 before, during and 
immediately after the 2010 revolution, Kyrgyzstan managed to improve its 
democracy score in 2012 and keep the positive progress in 2014 (see graph 
below). 
Graph 6: Kyrgyzstan’s Democracy Status Score in 2006-2014 
 
Sources: Bertelsmann Transition Index Reports 2006-2014  
Such positive signs of democracy in Kyrgyzstan as a vibrant civil society, 
opposition political parties and relatively independent mass media, all of 
which existed throughout the existence of the independent Kyrgyzstan, did 
not ensure a stable democratisation record. Regular returns of 
authoritarianism and two violent regime changes leave steady concerns 
about stability of Kyrgyzstan as a state and the uncertain future of its hybrid 
political regime. Against the background of its highly authoritarian 
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neighbours, Kyrgyzstan appears as a relatively democratic country and 
boasts being the first case of the peaceful transition of power in the region, 
and the first and only parliamentary-presidential republic, but its instability 
does not make is a particularly exemplary showcase of successful 
democracy. Another feature of the democratisation process is who sets 
directions of change in the country. From the BTI Report (2014, pp.3-4), as 
well as from the analysis of the local context in Chapter 3, it is clear that any 
significant political changes are due to the actions or inaction of political 
elites and the presidents in power. In this regard, it is difficult to state that 
individual projects or meetings make a difference. To the opposite, given the 
importance of personalities in the Kyrgyz, as well as Kazakh, politics and the 
EU’s approach, which does not work with personalities but with institutions 
and process, the EU democracy promotion is not likely to make a meaningful 
impact under the current circumstances.  
There are reasons to indicate a steady decline in the democratisation in 
Kazakhstan and an uneven record of the democratisation process in 
Kyrgyzstan. In both cases, it is too early to speak of any improvement in the 
area of good governance, rule of law, human rights and democracy because 
even the seemingly better democracy score in Kyrgyzstan is undermined 
with regular outbursts of violence and instability. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The EU’s official evaluation of its democracy promotion efforts and overall 
progress in the implementation of the EU Strategy towards Central Asia, it is 
legitimate to say that the EU, in the face of the Commission and the Council, 
who produced the joint progress reports, has been largely positive when 
evaluating the Central Asia Strategy outcomes. All three reports note good 
progress and reiterate the validity of the Strategy’s approach and 
instruments. The overarching narrative of the joint progress reports 
acknowledges that the EU Strategy set out an ambitious agenda, and insists 
that much has been achieved (Council of the European Union and European 
Commission, 2012, p.13). It is important to note that joint progress reports 
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are basically a self-evaluation attempted by potentially biased stakeholders: 
the European Commission and the Council and their subdivisions, which 
prepare and publish these reports, are the EU agencies primarily 
responsible for the formulation, planning, funding, and implementation of the 
EU Strategy towards Central Asia. Therefore, the largely positive feedback 
on the implementation of the Strategy’s activities, including democracy 
promotion activities, is confusing due its discrepancies with other evaluation 
sources, but hardly surprising. 
Non-EU sources, including local stakeholders and observers, local, 
European and international think tanks and academics, in their majority 
express negative views on the effectiveness of the EU democracy promotion 
in the region in general and in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in particular. 
Views on the ground remain less certain and more confused about the 
objectives and overall EU involvement in the region, but the EU impact on 
the ground is very limited in the eyes of the local stakeholders. Overall, state 
officials seemed to be unimpressed with the EU policy in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan and could not point to any meaningful success explaining it with 
the EU’s limited leverage (interview 1, Kyrgyz President’s Administration, 31 
July 2012), and reluctance to allocate more funds for the implementation 
(interview 27, Kyrgyz MP, 22 April 2013). Some officials accused the EU of 
applying double standards to evaluating democracy and human rights in the 
region and general inconsistency in the EU policy. 
The continuation of political and human rights dialogue and the absence of 
explicit refusal to hear about democracy and human rights on the side of the 
target countries’ governments are often considered as success and 
achievement. Given the EU efforts combined with the efforts of other 
external and domestic democracy promoters, it is possible to assume that 
some improvement of the overall democracy score has been achieved in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, the largely positive evaluation 
provided by the EU sources contradicts a number of other sources. Reports 
and other publications by INGOs, think tanks and other observers say that 
democratisation process has not improved in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
To the opposite, they provide evidence of the further consolidation of the 
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authoritarian rule in Kazakhstan and the hybrid regime in Kyrgyzstan. 
Against the background of a stable and steadily developing authoritarian 
regime in Kazakhstan, it is difficult to speak of any advances in democratic 
reforms. If anything, the country has become less democratic in the course 
of the reported period and President Nazarbayev’s power has only increased 
throughout this period.  
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Chapter 6 Factors Impeding EU Democracy Promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
 
6.1 Introduction 
While it is reasonable to attribute the inconsistency and lack of efficiency of 
EU democracy promotion to the EU approach (Axyonova 2014) or to 
unfavourable local conditions (Warkotsch 2011), a comprehensive multi-
faceted analysis is required to explain the complexity of promoting 
democracy in Central Asia. It is crucial to acknowledge and analyse diverse 
factors that undermine successful EU democracy promotion in the region. 
The EU cannot bear full responsibility for less than successful 
implementation of its policy in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan because it has 
not been the sole contributing actor in the democratisation process.  
This chapter acknowledges the limitations to the EU capacity to promote 
democracy in Central Asia and aims to identify what EU, local and regional 
factors impede a successful democracy promotion. In doing so, it answers 
the second part of the research question: Why has EU democracy promotion 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan not been successful? In order to explain the 
complex variety of actors and factors, which affect EU democracy promotion 
in the region, the chapter will unfold in three dimensions - European, local 
(Kazakh and Kyrgyz), and regional. The section following this introduction 
examines the issues, challenges, and opportunities on the EU side, i.e. 
potential shortcomings on the democracy promotion agent’s side. 
Afterwards, the focus shifts to the (pre)conditions on the ground in order to 
highlight the political, economic, and socio-cultural aspects in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, which might impede external democracy promotion efforts 
in general, and the EU efforts in particular. Finally, the last substantial 
section addresses the wider regional context of the EU democracy 
promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and discusses why and how the 
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current regional setting affects and counterbalances EU democracy 
promotion efforts in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
 
6.2 EU Factors  
Existing research on EU democracy promotion in Central Asia highlights a 
diverse range of factors which impede EU efforts in the region. These can be 
divided into factors that relate to the difficult regional context and others that 
pertain to the EU’s own shortcomings. Vera Axyonova identifies a variety of 
EU factors, which impede successful implementation of EU democracy 
promotion objectives in Central Asia. These include the weakness of the EU 
in the eyes of Central Asian elites, the lack of conditionality mechanisms, 
and, an inconsistent application of the available democracy promotion tools 
(Axyonova 2011, 2014). The failure to offer meaningful incentives, to 
respond to democratic abuses and to allocate sufficient funding to promote 
democracy are often mentioned as impeding factors (Warkotsch 2011; 
Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013; Youngs 2008).  
These factors affect EU democracy promotion in Central Asia to varying 
degrees, yet the majority of them could be addressed through a decisive 
concerted action fuelled with generous resource allocations (human, 
administrative, political, and financial). What seems to be larger problems in 
the case of Central Asia are insufficient political will caused by the numerous 
actors on the EU side, and the lack of leverage. Therefore, it is possible to 
reduce the variety of factors impeding EU democracy promotion on the EU 
side to three large root causes, which give rise to other, smaller factors: an 
insufficient prioritisation of the Central Asian region in the EU’s range of 
bilateral and multilateral partnerships around the world; the multitude of 
actors with varying interests within the EU; and, limited EU leverage in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
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Central Asia is not a top priority for the EU 
Both EU and Central Asian interviewees frequently referred to the lack of 
interest or motivation on the EU side as a fundamental root cause of the 
EU’s limited efforts to promote democracy in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Central Asian politicians observed that the EU can provide substantial 
democracy assistance and political support but only if the recipient country 
presents a strategic interest for the majority of the EU member states, or, at 
least, for the most powerful EU member states (interview 27, Kyrgyz MP, 22 
April 2013; interview 42, a leader of a Kazakh opposition party, 17 May 
2013). A similar opinion came from Brussels, where an EU diplomat noted 
that “if EU wants to have something done, it gets it done” (interview 19, 11 
March 2013).  
The insufficient EU interest in the region stems from the fact that Central 
Asia finds itself quite low in the EU’s “pyramid of privilege” (Holland and 
Doidge 2012, p.16), which refers to a complex mix of association and 
cooperation arrangements, where those at the top enjoy favourable 
treatment and those lower down have less privileges in relations with the EU 
(Sutton 2001, p.94). The pyramid of privilege is a highly dynamic construct, 
where partnerships shift up and down depending on the ever-changing EU 
and individual member states’ interests and priorities, as well as on the 
current global setting and important international events and developments. 
Due to geographic, historical and economic circumstances, Central Asia 
does not currently have what it takes to occupy a solid place in the pyramid: 
geographic proximity, post-colonial ties, or strategic interests. 
“Neighbours of our neighbours”: None of the Central Asian countries share 
any borders with the EU and cannot be considered as potential candidates 
to the EU. The lack of shared borders affects the possibility of having a 
privileged relationship with the EU. Central Asia, along with the Middle East 
and Sahel, constitute what the European Commission identifies as 
“neighbours of our neighbours” (European Commission 2006, p.11), which 
implies that from a geostrategic point of view, Central Asia is less important 
than EU’s “closest neighbours” - the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
countries (EEAS 2015a). This prioritisation dynamics can be traced through 
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a range of means, but the most explicit one is a comparison EU allocations 
to ENP countries and Central Asian countries. In 2007-2013, the EU 
assistance to Georgia, an ENP country, amounted to 452 million euros 
(European Commission 2014a), a generous allocation compared to the 750 
million euros for all five Central Asian republics allocated for the same period 
under the framework of the EU Central Asia Strategy (Council of the EU 
2007).  
Lack of historical ties: Being a distant region does not necessarily place 
Central Asia outside the EU’s pyramid of privilege. In the case of Central 
Asia, the geographic distance is accompanied with cultural distance and the 
lack of any shared past. Until recently, Europe and Central Asia have had 
limited to no interaction, and those existing scarce exchanges between the 
two regions either took place through Russian mediation or under the Soviet 
control (Costa Buranelli 2014). An outcome of this extremely limited inter-
relation between Europe and Central Asia is that Central Asia remains an 
unfamiliar region with no shared historical or cultural ties. The lack of 
familiarity with the region results in a limited regional expertise within the EU 
and less informed decision- and policy making. As some of Brussels-based 
interviewees acknowledge it is very difficult for them to understand “what is 
exactly happening in Central Asia” (interview 17, a clerk at the European 
Parliament, 10 March 2013; interview 20, EEAS, 11 March 2013). In the 
absence of a solid regional expertise in the EU, the EU representatives in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have to rely on local experts, mass media and 
international NGOs publications to get acquainted with their new place of 
work. The issue of limited expertise and understanding of the local 
conditions was often mentioned by Kyrgyz and Kazakh interviewees. For 
them, the EU unawareness of the genuine state of affairs was a matter of 
fact and a significant factor impeding a successful engagement with the 
region: “The EU attempts to promote their values in the region, but to their 
disadvantage, they lack knowledge and understanding of local politics, which 
results in less efficient contribution” (interview 6, a Bishkek-based expert, 13 
August 2012). State officials added that this ignorance was mutual: they 
could not understand the logic of the EU, while the EU could not understand 
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the way politics work in Kyrgyzstan (interview 3, Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance, 
3 August 2012). 
The lack of shared past has one more implication, which impedes the EU’s 
engagement with the region. EU democracy promotion policy constitutes an 
integral part of EU development policy and follows its prioritisation logic. The 
colonial past of the EU member states has significantly shaped and 
influenced EU development policy, which dates back to 1957 when France 
proposed including development assistance to the Treaty of Rome 
negotiations’ agenda in order to get assistance with funding “the heavy costs 
of its colonial possessions” (Holland and Doidge 2012, p.2). For many years, 
the EU’s member states-former colonial powers lobbied the provision of 
preferential trade agreements and development assistance to their former 
colonies. Whether it is due to strategic and economic deliberations of EU 
member states (Serrano 2011, p.91) or a presumed responsibility towards 
their former colonies (Grilli 1993, p.337-338), the colonial past of EU 
member states has become a contributing factor, which affected where the 
EU’s development aid goes. Yaounde (1964), then Lome (1975-2000) and 
finally Cotonou (2000) Conventions have continuously placed African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries on the top of the pyramid of privilege 
(Arts and Dickson, 2004). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and series of 
enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the EU’s development policy has become 
more diverse and it is now shaped by a larger variety of factors, e.g. the 
EU’s commitment to the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
However, even under these circumstances, Central Asia struggles to occupy 
a higher priority position in the pyramid because it is not deprived enough. 
Central Asia is not poor enough: Due to limited available resources, it is 
reasonable to ensure that the development aid, including democracy 
assistance, reaches the countries, where this assistance is needed the most. 
In this regard, Sub-Saharan Africa takes precedence over all other regions 
because it is lagging behind in terms of meeting the core MDGs (Holland 
and Doidge 2012, p.227). A snapshot of the EU’s overseas development 
assistance (ODA) from 2013 clearly demonstrates the prioritisation of Africa 
in EU development aid distribution. Central Asia, as part of a much larger 
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regional grouping that included South Asia and Far East, only received 
about 10% of the total ODA. 
Graph 7: Regional distribution of EU aid to developing countries in 2013 
These EU aid allocations largely reflect the general public opinion on the aid 
distribution (Eurobarometer 2011). The majority of EU citizens believe that 
Sub-Saharan Africa should be the priority in the allocation of development 
aid (70% respondents). The next regions in need are the Middle East and 
North Africa (33% respondents), and the Indian sub-continent (25%). Central 
Asia comes sixth in the “public pyramid of privilege” sharing its place with the 
Eastern European countries and the rest of the former Soviet Union 
(Eurobarometer 2011). 
Prioritisation of regions and countries makes it challenging to justify closer 
cooperation with Central Asia or larger aid allocations, including democracy 
assistance, because the Central Asian countries are neither strategically 
important nor sufficiently poor. Moreover, a closer look at the individual 
country dynamics demonstrates that only Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are 
considered poor, while Kazakhstan has already become an upper income 
country, which currently develops its own overseas assistance programmes 
(Kazakh MFA 2015; World Bank 2015b). As to the rest of the region, their 
key economic indicators might not be the best (see Table 10 below), but 
they are hardly comparable to the socio-economic situation in the crisis 
stricken Sub-Saharan Africa or Middle East. 
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Table 10: Key economic performance indicators of the Central Asian states 
Country Income Level Poverty 
ratio 
GDP GNI per 
capita 
Kazakhstan Upper income 2.9% $231.9 billion $11,550 
Kyrgyzstan Lower middle  37% $7.226 billion $1,210 
Tajikistan Low 47.2% $8.508 billion $990 
Turkmenistan Upper middle No data $41.85 billion $6,880 
Uzbekistan Lower middle 16% $56.8 billion $1,880 
Source: World Bank 2015a and 2015b 
Having no shared border, no historical ties and being a non-severely 
deprived region, Central Asia stays quite low in the EU pyramid of privilege 
in foreign relations. The limited interest the EU does have in Central Asia is 
shaped by the issues beyond Central Asian borders, i.e. the region is not 
important per se, but only against the background of other, wider regional 
developments such as the recently completed NATO operation in 
Afghanistan or the need to address the European dependence on Russian 
energy resources (Melvin 2012). At that, it is important to discern the degree 
of importance enjoyed by different Central Asian countries. In spite of 
Commission President Barroso’s assurances that Kyrgyzstan is “a very 
important partner” and Kazakhstan is “an important partner” in the strategic 
region of Central Asia (Barroso 2013 and 2014), in reality the EU relations 
with these two countries are visibly different. 
Kazakhstan might not be a strategic partner at the global scale, but it 
undoubtedly is a strategic priority at the regional scale, from among the five 
Central Asian republics. Thanks to the rich energy and other natural 
resources and steady economic performance, Kazakhstan is treated as a 
near-equal strategic partner in the region, while much poorer Kyrgyzstan is 
primarily seen and treated as an aid recipient, who requires assistance to 
reduce poverty and to address domestic security and stability threats. 
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Axyonova observed that the EU-Kyrgyz relations resembled “a teacher-
student relationship rather than a peer-to-peer deliberation” (Axyonova 2014, 
p.103; also, Akiner 2010). In contrast, Kazakhstan - richer and more stable 
authoritarian country, can demand a slightly different treatment (interview 20, 
EEAS, 11 March 2013).  
On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan is not strategically interesting for the EU and 
its member states. As a top foreign policy analyst from the Kyrgyz 
Government noted the stable positive relations between the EU and 
Kyrgyzstan, but stated that the EU, as a foreign policy actor, does not seem 
to have vital interests in Kyrgyzstan. European countries do not have any 
vital commercial interests in Kyrgyzstan as none of European companies are 
commercially involved in Kyrgyzstan (interview 1, Kyrgyz President’s 
Administration, 31 July 2012). Kazakhstan, in his view, is a different story 
though as it represents a good investment market and a source of oil for 
Europe (interview 1, Kyrgyz President’s Administration, 31 July 2012). In this 
regard, there is a clear lack of the solid platform of for pragmatic, interests-
based cooperation. However, one should acknowledge the unique nature of 
the EU, where the agency is multi-fold. “The EU might promote norms and 
values, but its member states pursue their interests” (interview 1, Kyrgyz 
President’s Administration, 31 July 2012). 
 
Multiple EU actors and interests 
The issue of different interests the EU has in the region in general and in 
each country in particular is another EU factor, which affect EU democracy 
promotion. The sui generis nature of the EU has both positive and negative 
effects on its democracy promotion efforts. On one hand, the voices of 28 
nations, if channelled in one direction, do have much more weight than one 
country’s voice. On the other hand, the crucial and sensitive decisions are 
often made in capitals of EU member states, which might have different, 
even opposite interests and priorities with regard to the external action. This 
results in a disarray and lack of harmony of the European choir.  
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The EU’s institutional arrangement and politics might be difficult to grasp 
from outside and Central Asian stakeholders do not always understand why 
they hear different and sometimes contradicting narratives from various EU 
actors (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013, p.59). The EU institutions usually 
pursue the same broader objectives set the Treaty on the European Union 
and other policy documents. However, it is important to bear in mind that EU 
democracy promotion is carried out through diplomatic channel (EEAS) and 
through development assistance channel (DG DEVCO). At that the crucial 
decision making is done at the Council of the EU and the European 
Commission. As the intergovernmental organisation, the Council of the EU 
aggregates the positions of member states, who have varying interests in 
Central Asia (see section 4.2), and has to account for these interests in its 
actions. The Commission experiences slightly less involvement and 
pressure from the side of member states, but pursues mostly development-
related objectives, i.e. democracy is not the primary objective.  
The European Parliament is least dependent on the opinions of member 
states and most vocal is raising democracy and human rights concerns, but 
its powers and ability to influence the situation on the ground is limited. The 
European Parliament plays an interesting role in the EU-Central Asian 
relations. On one hand, it does not have many powers and opportunities to 
get involved in the implementation of the EU Strategy towards Central Asia. 
The European Parliament discusses the EU policy in the region at the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET 2015) and runs several bilateral 
parliamentary friendship groups to supplement the political dialogue with 
Central Asian countries. However, in practical terms, the European 
Parliament does not and cannot go beyond discussing, voicing its opinions 
and reporting on the EU activities and policies in Central Asia (see Chapter 4 
on the actors and stakeholders and their roles). The Parliament's opinion on 
foreign affairs is not legally binding, and heated debates or conflicts on the 
Central Asian affairs are rare, if not absent. In general, MEPs in their 
majority do not demonstrate much interest in the Central Asian region; only 
few MEPs occasionally share their opinions on the EU involvement in 
Central Asia.  
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On the other hand, when MEPs do express opinions they come across as 
critical and, in this regard, very different from the generally positive and 
optimistic rhetoric of the European Commission, the EEAS and their 
subdivisions. Several democracy and human rights “hardliners” at the 
European Parliament, such as Socialist MEP Paul Murphy and the Green 
Party MEP Nicole Kiil-Nielsen, manage to direct the overall tone and nature 
of some parliamentary discussions on Central Asia into more critical 
direction and highlight the existing shortcomings of the policy implementation 
and warn of potential consequences of compromising democracy promotion.  
The positions of EU member states are not an issue per se, but their 
multitude and different prioritisation when it comes to the EU policy in the 
region become an impediment to concerted action. EEAS officials 
emphasise that normative (promotion and support of democratic principles) 
and non-normative interests (trade, diversification of energy resources and 
security) are compatible and successful cooperation in these two areas is 
not necessarily mutually exclusive (interview 20, EEAS, 11 March 2013). 
Officials directly involved in human rights and political dialogues do not allow 
any compromise on this matter: “We are not selling human rights concerns 
for gas or oil (interview 21, EEAS, 11 March 2013). On the other hand, EU 
officials, who are not involved in political dialogue or human rights dialogue, 
note some potential effects of over-focussing on human rights and 
democracy issues: this might affect trade and economic cooperation. He 
acknowledges the institutional set-up of the EU and the political foundation 
of the EU requires pushing forward normative issues, but too much criticism 
will alienate Central Asian partners and this might complicate any further 
cooperation both in political and economic matters: “Over-focusing on 
human rights and democracy sometimes undermines trade and economic 
cooperation” (interview 24, DG Trade, 12 March 2013). A staffer at the 
European Parliament goes beyond cautious evaluation of the normative-
non-normative interplay and sincerely states “You criticise a country, but 
then you need discussing energy…” (interview 17, 10 March 2013).  
While European Commission and EEAS deny any adverse effects of 
commercial interests on democracy promotion and human rights monitoring, 
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MEP Paul Murphy unambiguously acknowledges that “economic interests of 
the European Union and European based companies will always take 
priority over human rights” (Murphy 2013). While Murphy’s views might be 
shaped by his Socialist background and the fact that the European 
Parliament enjoys more freedom of expression compared to other EU 
institutions, few officials in other European institutions confidentially 
expressed similar concerns: “EU-CA dialogue is more about trade and 
energy. Human rights and democracy is often a box to tick in their dialogue 
with us” (interview 21, EEAS, 11 March 2013). Under these circumstances, it 
is difficult for the EU to maintain a coherent and consistent policy and deliver 
unequivocal and clear messages to the Central Asian audience, which still 
struggles with the concept of the EU.  
 
Limited leverage  
The final root cause for limited success of EU democracy promotion is the 
lack of leverage over the Central Asian regimes. The EU’s most attractive 
leverage – EU accession, is not available for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
While for the EU actors it goes without saying that Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan 
are ineligible to join the EU, both Kazakh and Kyrgyz presidents did consider 
this option at least once in their career. President Nazarbayev was more 
realistic about Kazakhstan’s prospects and rightfully noted that Kazakhstan 
“can only dream of becoming an EU member state” (Der Standard 2004). 
Kyrgyz President Atambayev chose a straightforward approach and asked 
his EU leadership directly: “I said that we are always ready to sign an 
agreement with the EU, I was told that it has no common border with 
Kyrgyzstan” (Atambayev 2015). The lack of membership prospects limits 
both the EU’s determination to promote democracy in countries, which are 
unlikely to ever become a part of the Union, and deprives the EU of its most 
effective democracy promotion mechanism – democracy promotion through 
positive conditionality where EU accession is an attractive reward for 
compliance with the EU requirements on democracy, good governance, rule 
of law and human rights. As the discussion in the previous chapter 
demonstrated, the EU has other means of leverage, but most of them have 
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not been used to the full extent in Central Asia. Nevertheless, in the history 
of EU-Central Asian relations, there was a favourable moment of opportunity 
in the year when the Strategy was adopted. 
The EU willingness to engage with Central Asia in a substantial and 
meaningful way stemmed from a favourable window of opportunity in 2007. 
The EU, local and regional factors converged in a reasonably favourable 
constellation that gave rise to the aspirations of bringing change to Central 
Asia and bridging Europe with the former Soviet south.  
Firstly, the EU was at the peak of its foreign policy activities. The mid 2000-s 
were characterised with an intensified discourse on the importance of the EU 
as a global actor and calls to consolidate and strengthen the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. Against this background, the Strategy has 
become a part of a larger effort to go beyond the immediate European 
neighbourhood and test the EU’s capacity to get engaged with the countries, 
which do not have membership prospects. In addition to reaching out to 
previously unfamiliar regions, there was a tendency to “go East”, i.e. to 
develop the EU’s relations with Russia and the former Soviet Union. In this 
regard, the EU Central Asian Strategy has become a geopolitical spillover 
from a larger set of Eastern policies, which were adopted around this time. 
By 2007, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Black Sea synergy 
policy were in place and functioning, and Central Asia was a missing puzzle 
in the post-Soviet board. 
Secondly, the German presidency at the Council of the EU in 2007 was 
another important driver behind the adoption of the EU CA strategy. The 
development and adoption of the Central Asian strategy corresponded to the 
German foreign policy objectives at the time: development and promotion of 
Eastern policies and German interests in the region, including trade and 
economic cooperation in Kazakhstan and a military base in Termez, 
Uzbekistan. 
Thirdly, the larger global setting at the time of the Strategy’s adoption played 
its role as well. The Strategy was adopted a year before the global economic 
crisis hit the EU economy and gave rise to a range of pressing domestic 
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issues. In addition, a range of European countries were involved in the US-
led military campaign in Afghanistan and Central Asian countries were 
needed as part of the local logistical chain, Northern Distribution Network 
and a stable area in the proximity to extremely volatile Afghanistan (see 
Appendix D). In terms of regional setting, Central Asia at the time was a 
relatively open space for the EU to increase its presence and engagement 
with regional countries. China and Russia have only started shifting their 
focus to the region and have not yet intensified their activities to an extent to 
effectively prevent or undermine the EU agenda. Plus, the attention was 
more on anti-terrorism and overall security in Central Asia, so the EU’s 
Strategy, which was generously loaded with the security discourse did not 
cause too much resistance from the part of these two powerful actors. In 
addition, EU-Russian relations were not particularly friendly, but at least at 
this particular moment in 2007 there have not been any major clashes on 
important international issues.  
Finally, there were more or less favourable domestic conditions within 
Central Asia. By the mid-2000s, Kazakhstan has not only recovered after the 
wild 1990s, but also managed to significantly develop and market its energy 
resources extraction industry. Against the background of the EU’s increasing 
need to diversify its energy supply sources, Kazakhstan seemed like a 
plausible option (Denison 2009). Moreover, the industrial and housing 
construction boom in Kazakhstan required significant investment and some 
of the European companies ventured into exploring investment and 
cooperation opportunities (interview 39, German Embassy to Kazakhstan, 
15 May 2013). Such EU member states as Germany, Netherlands and Italy 
found their commercial companies getting involved in the economic 
development of Kazakhstan, and needed to protect and facilitate these 
commercial interests. On the other hand, there were important political 
developments within Central Asian countries. In 2005, the Tulip revolution 
overthrew a largely authoritarian regime in Kyrgyzstan. While the new 
regime did not prove itself to be any more democratic, but it did give a 
chance to the EU to intensify cooperation and political dialogue without 
undermining its normative considerations; for few years, Bakiev’s regime has 
enjoyed some credit of trust. Kazakhstan had been developing an 
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unprecedented document at the time: Path to Europe (MFA of Kazakhstan 
2008). Path to Europe declared the country’s intention to deepen and widen 
its cooperation with Europe and turn this Asian post-Soviet country into a 
European oasis. Kazakhstan’s pro-European aspirations peaked at that 
period as the country attempted distancing itself from poorer neighbours 
(Kazakhstan even left the Asian Football Confederation to join UEFA in 
2002; its Central Asian neighbours still play in Asian Football Cup). In 
Uzbekistan, the situation was different, but at least, the initial international 
outrage caused by the 2005 Andijan massacre had faded by 2007 giving 
external powers a chance to carry on dialogue with the authoritarian 
leadership. In Turkmenistan, the long-standing dictator Saparmurat Niyazov 
died in 2006. In general, the region was still largely authoritarian but the 
degree of authoritarianism was relatively lower for a brief period of time.  
This window of opportunity is gone now and the context conditions are less 
favourable for the EU to assert influence over the democratisation process 
on the ground. Firstly, the 2007 peak of foreign policy activity was 
overshadowed with the global financial crisis and subsequent economic 
crises within the EU (Greece and Spain). Against the background of 
domestic issues, democracy promotion is a remote and authoritarian region 
like Central Asia has probably lost a part of its urgency. Secondly, due to the 
Council presidency rotation, the President countries have changed and 
brought their own ideas on foreign policy priorities. There have been another 
brief opening for Central Asia during the recent Latvian Presidency, but this 
opening has been missed against the background of other pressing issue, 
such as Syrian crisis, the war in Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia, 
all of which also signified a different global setting, where democracy in 
Central Asia is less pressing. Finally, the domestic context changed as well.  
 
6.3 Local Factors 
Central Asia presents one of the toughest places for external democracy 
promotion. Being one of the most authoritarian regions in the world with 
some of the world’s longest ruling leaders (Nazarbayev ran Kazakhstan for 
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25 years; Gizitdinov 2015, no pagination), Central Asia offers a hardly 
welcoming environment for the principles of democracy and human rights. 
For this reason, the local context conditions are usually blamed for less than 
successful external endeavours to promote democracy. This section focuses 
on a number of historical, political and economic conditions in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, which impede EU democracy promotion.  
Historical factors 
The existing research on EU democracy promotion in Central Asia does not 
always place the democratisation processes in the region in a 
comprehensive historical context. Meanwhile, the historical context is 
important for understanding the difficulties of democracy promotion in the 
region. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had little or no experience in 
independent governance, institution-building, state-building, or democracy. 
In the pre-Soviet period, the Kyrgyz and Kazakh tribes had a socio-political 
structure, which differed significantly from the modern concept of nation-
state. The societal organisation revolved around kinship based structures 
with two-tier governance: local community leaders, who dealt with everyday 
politics, and an external power (e.g. Kokand Khanate or the Tsarist Russia), 
who played a limited role in governance having been primarily preoccupied 
with taxation and military recruitment. The Kazakh and Kyrgyz statehood in 
its modern understanding was introduced by the Soviet power, but to a 
limited extent. The countries were heavily influenced by the Soviet legacy 
with its lack of political pluralism and democratic freedoms, flourishing 
bureaucracy, and centralised governance.  
Unlike their western fellow countries in the Baltic region – the former Soviet 
Republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, Central Asian republics of 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan neither had geographic proximity to developed 
democracies in Europe, nor cultural tradition of democratic rule (Furman 
2008). In fact, both were never intended to be an independent state: “the 
Soviet system imploded and independent became de facto reality for the 
republic” (Collins 1999, pp.2-3). For Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, state- and 
nation- building were challenging tasks as “prior to the formation of the 
USSR, they had not existed in their present shape, name or form” (Farrant 
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2006, p.61). Lack of statehood experience and no experience in procedural 
democracy informed the democratisation process at both state and societal 
level. Both leaders and the public managed to grasp the form, the exterior of 
democracy, but not necessarily its spirit and values.  
There is an important distinction between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
regarding establishment and early years of their political regimes. In 
Kazakhstan, the super-presidential regime of President Nazarbayev has 
been established before the country gained independence. President 
Nazarbayev was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers (equivalent 
to Prime Minister) in 1984 and became the President of the Soviet 
Kazakhstan in 1990, i.e. he has already monopolised the power before the 
country has officially become independent. In other words, Kazakhstan has 
never had an opportunity to change its political development path and 
democratise. Kyrgyzstan had more democratic openings. The first president 
Akayev was initially seen as a democratic reformer. When he failed to live to 
these expectations, there was an opportunity for democracy to take stronger 
roots in 2005, in the aftermath of the Tulip revolution, when the then 
oppressive regime was demolished. Two more chances followed the 2010 
regime overthrow: during the 2010 events and in 2011, when the country 
had what was largely seen as the first democratic elections (Horesh and 
Bollier 2011, no pagination).  
In addition to the limited experience in state-building, institution-building and 
democratisation, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have a negative experience of 
externally driven reforms, which resulted in a certain level of public mistrust 
to external actors. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are the two Central Asian 
countries that have agreed to undergo the shock therapy in the 1990-s. The 
socio-economic costs of the 1990-s transitional reforms have resulted in the 
wide-spread public fear of drastic reforming, which extends to any more or 
less significant changes; solid distrust in government and the state; and 
deep-embedded suspicious attitude to the Western actors or Western ideas. 
Researchers noted that the shock therapy for former Soviet countries was 
not particularly beneficial for the latter: they turned into “the firing range upon 
- 189 - 
l 
which the western international financial organisations, staffed in the main by 
US and UK educated economists, sought to test out their big guns of 
monetarism, deregulation, privatisation and the retreat of the social state” 
(Polese and Morris 2013, p.1). The deterioration of economic situation and 
life quality was clear to anyone, who survived the so-called shock therapy. 
Statistical data might only partially demonstrate the gravity of the situation 
and its impact on the general public.  
Kyrgyz Republic saw real GDP decline by 45% between 1991 and 1995; 
Kazakhstan’s decline in GDP was less thanks for the country’s rich natural 
resources. Manufacturing output fell substantially during the 1990s; many 
industrial sites were shut leaving thousands without jobs. Individual 
agricultural entrepreneurship and Kumtor gold mine kept economy floating in 
Kyrgyzstan, and natural resources of Kazakhstan saved the latter’s economy 
from collapse (Pomfret 2006). In 1993–95, Kyrgyzstan had the highest 
poverty rate of any Eastern European or former Soviet economy (Pomfret 
2006, p.15). Decrease in the state social support and shrinking salaries of 
public sector employees (teachers, civil servants, medics) combined with 
high inflation rates shattered the economic situation in many households. 
The retreat of the social state significantly reduced support to vulnerable 
social groups (disabled, senior citizens, large families, and others). Budget 
cuts and close-down of large industrial facilities affected working-age 
population inducing instability in the labour market and rapid increase in 
unemployment (chapter by Cieslewska in Polese and Morris 2013, pp.121-
135; Pomfret 2006). Only by 1997 had Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan 
managed to stabilize their economies and tame inflation rates, while 
continuing to implement ambitious, yet controversial privatisation (Gleason 
2004, p.52). The rise of poverty was particularly challenging for people, who 
lived in the Soviet Union – one of the two superpowers for the most of the 
twentieth century. People were simply unaccustomed to and unprepared for 
poverty, and many struggled to adapt to the rapidly changing circumstances 
(Pomfret 2003, p.9). The consequences of shock therapy in Kazakhstan had 
a chance to be alleviated (and post-factum justified in the eyes of general 
public) with the economic rise resulting from the country’s energy riches. In 
Kyrgyzstan, there has never been a chance to fix the damage in the social 
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welfare of citizens: 33.7% of Kyrgyz citizens live below poverty line 
compared to 5.3% population below poverty line in Kazakhstan (CIA 2014). 
While the researchers focused on the socio-economic consequences of this 
period (e.g. Pomfret 2003), not much has been written on the non-material 
effects. It is difficult to measure the level of mistrust to the West that the 
1990s reforms produced, but the informal conversations with the local 
participants in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan indicate a long-lasting suspicion 
towards the West. Some of the interviewees compared the EU engagement 
with the region with the Cold War ideological rivalry (interview 37, a Kazakh 
MP, 15 May 2013). Others noted that nothing good comes from close 
cooperation with Europe because its assistance is intrinsically selfish and 
pragmatic (interview 2, Kyrgyz Ministry of Economy, 3 August 2012). These 
views were expressed in an informal setting, but they do indicate a degree of 
hostility towards the EU that was most likely shaped by the experiences of 
the 1990s in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  
 
Political factors 
In terms of local political context, I have identified three major impediments 
to democracy promotion. First is the ability of the ruling political elites to 
mimic democracy for the external observes. Second is the wide-spread 
perception of democracy as a threat to stability exemplified by already 
notorious Kyrgyz democracy. Finally, the regime stability in Kazakhstan and 
the regime instability in Kyrgyzstan play their role in complicating promotion 
of democratic principles.  
Mimicking democracy: European officials in both Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan noted a degree of enthusiasm (more in Kyrgyzstan than in 
Kazakhstan though) from the side of local actors they work with on daily 
basis (interviews 35 and 36, EU Delegation to Kazakhstan, 14 May 2013). 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz Governments alike were praised for their readiness to 
discuss and participate in projects (interviews 35, EU Delegation to 
Kazakhstan, 14 May 2013). However, it would be reasonable to question the 
genuine degree of enthusiasm and commitment on the ground. The local 
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context requires acknowledging two simultaneously existing realities: one 
exists on paper, de jure and in the rhetoric of political elites. Another reality 
is on the ground, it exists in the execution of paper, de facto and in the lives 
of ordinary citizens. Basically, the debate is imitation democracy, democratic 
façade, lip service paid to the external observers. 
While political conditionality and democracy assistance played an important 
in giving rise to democratic reforms in post-Soviet Central Asia, the need to 
fit into the international community provided an important incentive for 
Central Asian government to at least declare formal commitment to 
democracy and introduce some democratic institutions and practices. The 
costs of being openly authoritarian in the age of the triumph of liberalism 
(Fukuyama 2006) and democracy’s third wave (late 1980s-early 1990s; 
Huntington 1991) were higher than the prospects of creating a formal 
democratic architecture, which would please Western powers. Paradoxically 
enough, the costs of the democratic façade are still lower than two other 
options: full compliance with the democratic principles or open 
authoritarianism.  
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan chose to combine democracy and 
authoritarianism in different proportions without fully adopting either option. 
Both countries demonstrate at least partial compliance with the EU 
requirements in the field of democracy. A brilliant example of how the 
democratic façade works can be found in the most recent presidential 
campaign in Kazakhstan. Elections in Kazakhstan represent a vital element 
of the democratic façade because on one hand there is a clear and 
unambiguous commitment of the nation’s leader to hold regular elections: 
Election is the most important constitutional and patriotic act. Election should be held in strict compliance with the legislation, in an open and fair manner with the broad participation of local and international observers (President Nursultan Nazarbayev, as cited in Lebedev 2015, Eurasian Centre) 
The reality on the ground demonstrates that elections are nothing more than 
a function to enhance regime legitimacy as they have nothing to do with 
determining who will govern (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.7). In the last 
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presidential elections in 2011, President Nazarbayev won 95% votes. In 
2015, President Nazarbayev not only enforced his right to run for the next 
presidential term one more time, but also called an early election. President 
Nazarbayev, who has been leading the country as the President since 1991 
and in reality since 1989, has an exclusive right to run for presidency as 
many times as he would like. In compliance with the 2007 constitutional 
amendments, “One and the same person may not be elected the President 
of the Republic more than two times in a row”, but “this limitation does not 
apply to the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (par.5, art.42, 
Constitution 1995 as amended in 1999, 2007, 2010, and 2011). 
President Nazarbayev’s decision to run for presidency in 2015 received 
large popular support. In fact, he stated his initial reluctance to participate in 
the election: “I have been governing Kazakhstan for many years, I stand at 
the inception of the independence. Maybe it is time to change the 
decorations, as they say in theatre?” (as cited in Lebedev 2015). The public 
support and seeming non-violation of the Constitution are insufficient for the 
construction of democratic façade. In compliance with established custom, 
democratic elections should be competitive. And, this is where one can trace 
the cost of the democratic façade. In the ongoing discussion of the 2015 
presidential election, civil society organisations and experts actively 
exchange opinion in what has remained from the independent mass media. 
The debate mostly revolves around the number of candidates; no one 
questions Nazarbayev’s victory. Despite 30 persons expressing their 
willingness to participate in the election and submitting the required 
documents, only three candidates were registered: current President 
Nazarbayev, the leader of a pro-governmental Communist Party1, and the 
head of trade unions’ federation. As NGOs and opposition leader agree, the 
reasons behind having only two relatively unknown competitors are largely 
pragmatic: one competitor for Nazarbayev is improperly too few, and more 
than two is too expensive (as cited in Toguzbaev 2015).  
                                            
1 There are two communist parties in Kazakhstan: one is pro-governmental and sits in the Parliament; another one considers itself opposition 
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This practice of faking free and fair elections aims to ensure “mimicking 
democracy” to please the external audience without giving up the 
authoritarianism. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are hybrid regimes, i.e. they 
combine aspects of democracy and autocracy. Hybrid regimes are firmly 
entrenched – they are not a stage that these countries could pass through. 
They have become the final destination, a compromise between what the 
international community expected and what the domestic actors (political 
leadership and to a certain extent population) pursued.  
The power of example: As a part of normative suasion, the EU refers to the 
parliamentary and presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan as an example that a 
peaceful transition of power through elections is possible in the region (2012, 
p.5). The regional perspective on the Kyrgyz democracy is drastically 
different though. Kyrgyzstan is often referred to as a negative example in 
two senses. Firstly, the Kyrgyz example is how external involvement in 
domestic affairs can bring a country to the brink of collapse. Secondly, 
Kyrgyzstan is an example of how democracy brings instability and affects 
economic development.  
When discussing domestic politics in Kyrgyzstan, one should also take into 
consideration how Kyrgyzstan is viewed in the region. The tumultuous 
political life in Kyrgyzstan, coupled with instability, security threats, and poor 
economic performance in this small country, can hardly serve as a positive 
example of democracy In other words, Kyrgyzstan has become a bad 
example for local authoritarian regimes (interview 17, a European Parliament 
clerk, 10 March 2013). The references to the Kyrgyzstan’s permanent state 
of instability have become rather frequent element in the rhetoric of 
authoritarian leaders in Central Asia, who equal democracy to catastrophe 
when addressing domestic audience: 
When our neighbours in Kyrgyzstan tried to establish complete freedom of democracy, it led to such cataclysms that they still can’t recover. We see this in Ukraine, we see this in Georgia. Our people see it. We say the economy first, then politics. We need to move gradually (Nazarbayev 2010) 
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Actors in the region have interests of their own, and for regional ruling elites 
the primary interest is regime preservation. Some of authoritarian regimes in 
Central Asia are not happy with what is happening in Kyrgyzstan. So, tend to 
“demonise” Kyrgyzstan. Locally produced documentaries and reports about 
Kyrgyzstan are titled as “Cannibals of the Revolution”, “Ethnic Massacre and 
Genocide”, etc (interview 6, a Bishkek-based expert, 13 August 2012). 
Likewise, the tone of news and other programmes in neighbouring countries 
keep using narratives of danger and insecurity in Kyrgyzstan (Central Asia 
News 2012).  
 
Economic factors 
As a middle income country with growing economy, Kazakhstan is less 
dependent on technical assistance or budget support than the neighbouring 
Kyrgyzstan. Less dependence on external technical assistance makes 
conditionality-based approach less efficient. In other words, Kazakhstan can 
“afford” human rights violations and authoritarianism, while Kyrgyzstan is 
more dependent on external assistance, including budget support and 
technical assistance provided by the EU (interview 20, EEAS, 11 March 
2013).  
Informal economic practices might undermine the principle of rule of law. 
The Soviet rule strictly controlled informal trade of goods and services, and 
the latter existed at a very limited scale. Liberalisation of economy and 
economic hardships gave rise to informal economy. Quickly changing 
circumstances forced people to respond with alternative jobs in informal 
sector to avoid unemployment and poverty; for some it was an escape from 
poverty, for many it was virtually the only way to survive (chapter by 
Cieslewska in Polese and Morris 2013, p.131). Bazaars have become and 
still remain biggest employers in Kyrgyzstan and to lesser extent in 
Kazakhstan. As the profits were limited and the trust in state decreased, a 
part of economic activities went into shadow reducing the state revenue from 
taxation. As an outcome, an alternative economic system developed. As 
informal economic activities required other services, which are normally 
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carried out by the state, and informal practices extended to other activities. 
For example, basic security and rule of bazaar law have been ensured by 
organised criminal groups, who either forced or negotiated with traders to 
make them pay protection money. Weak state institutions failed to prevent 
the emergence of criminal groups, who took advantage of instability and 
chaos in the early independence years. As the time passed, former 
racketeers and criminals either legalised themselves as private security 
guards or formed more consolidated and powerful criminal groups 
(Cieslewska in Polese and Morris 2013; Kupatadze 2008). This gave rise to 
the political-economic-criminal nexus, where the lines between political 
elites, business community and criminal underworld got blurred, and illegal 
activities got intertwined with legal ones. Under such circumstances, 
enforcement of the rule of law principle has become somewhat challenging. 
 
6.4 Regional Factors  
Chinese or Russian domination is like living in the cage with a dragon and a 
bear. 
Dosym Satpaev as cited in Andrukhaeva 2014 
There is a fundamental issue for the EU in Central Asia: the region has 
powerful alternatives. A comprehensive analysis of an external democracy 
promotion case requires taking into consideration the fact that the 
democracy promotion agent and the target country are not the only players 
in the field. In case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, regional powers and 
broader authoritarian regional environment in Central Asia impose 
considerable constraints upon the EU’s capacity to induce democratic 
change and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan’s freedom to democratise. Russia, 
as a major regional power and a long-standing strategic partner of 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, asserts strong influence on the current political 
culture, economic activities, and foreign policy choices in the region. China is 
a major economic and trade partner for all Central Asian countries and a 
generous donor, whose unconditional and diverse assistance offers an 
attractive alternative to the EU’s conditional aid. China and Russia lead 
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regional organisations, inform regional politics, and through the power of 
their own example prove the viability of undemocratic regimes. Together 
they contribute to an emerging regional environment characterised with the 
“league of authoritarian gentlemen" (Cooley 2013, no pagination) and 
consistent record of human rights violations. Other countries in the region, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and, to lesser extent Tajikistan represent 
notorious authoritarian regimes, who regularly find themselves at the very 
bottom of international freedom and democracy ratings (BTI 2014, Freedom 
House 2015). In such a highly undemocratic environment like wider Eurasian 
region, any inclination towards liberal democracy is a dangerous deviation 
from the regional norms; it is dangerous in the sense that it sets an 
unwanted precedent of welcoming Western, read – alien principles and 
norms, which often contradict the regional principles and norms of doing 
politics. In this regard, Central Asia is probably one of the brightest examples 
of how the need to fit into regional political setting might undermine the need 
of international socialisation. 
While Europe remains a geographically and culturally distant power with 
unclear normative-realist agenda and limited leverage, Russia and China are 
unavoidable regional powers, whose political, economic and cultural 
influence over the region of Central Asia can hardly be overestimated. In 
order to investigate the role these regional powers might play in EU 
democracy promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan it is necessary to 
identify their interests and policies, and to analyse how these two regional 
powers impede EU democracy promotion in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It 
is also important to note that Kazakhstan, thanks to its recent economic rise 
and rich energy resources, has slightly more freedom in foreign policy 
choices than Kyrgyzstan, which suffers from continuous economic issues 
and heavily relies on external financial sources, including labour migrant 
remittances, donor aid, grants and loans. Before everything else, I suggest a 
brief introduction of the bilateral relations between Russia and China on one 
side and Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on the other side.  
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, China had very limited, if any, 
relations with the Soviet Central Asia and these relations were invariably 
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mediated through Moscow. As soon as the former Soviet republics gained 
their independence, China engaged in building good neighbourly relations 
with the bordering countries. Primary concerns during the early 1990s 
included delineation, demarcation and demilitarisation of shared borders and 
prevention of Uyghur separatism’s consolidation (Laruelle and Peyrouse 
2013, p.27). Uyghurs represent an ethnic minority in both countries: 0.9% 
population in Kyrgyzstan (National Statistics Committee 2015); and, 1.44% 
population in Kazakhstan (Kazakh Agency on Statistics 2014) 
After having addressed these pressing issues, Chinese leadership sought to 
establish a collective security framework (Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation) and to engage in mutually beneficial partnership relations with 
the Central Asian republics. Most notably, China succeeded in establishing 
strong economic and trade relations. Chinese involvement in the Kazakh 
and Kyrgyz economy boomed in the early 2000-s with the trade volumes 
increasing up to 300% in just one year (2002-2003) and has since been 
steadily growing (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2013, p.35). At the moment, China 
ranks first top trade partner in Kyrgyzstan (Ministry of Economy Report 
2013) and second in Kazakhstan (KAZNEX INVEST 2015). Kazakhstan, as 
the largest Central Asia economy, accounts up to two thirds of the total 
Chinese-Central Asia trade. Just like the majority of external partners, 
China’s primary economic interest in Kazakhstan lies in the field of natural 
resources and investment opportunities in the booming economy: the 
recently signed contracts are worth $30 billion of Chinese investment (Lillis 
2013). For Kyrgyzstan, China is the top importer of manufactured goods: 
Kyrgyzstan re-exports up to 75% of the Chinese goods to other CIS 
countries, and this makes a considerable contribution to the Kyrgyz 
economy in the forms of customs and other tax charges, and employment. In 
addition, China is also the top investor in Kyrgyzstan and a generous donor, 
who funds vital infrastructure projects and offers considerable development 
assistance (Joint Kyrgyz-Chinese Declaration 2014).  
Overall, Chinese policy in Central Asia is informed by its general foreign 
policy strategy of “peaceful rise” based upon the tenets of multipolarity, 
multilateralism, non-interference and pragmatism in foreign affairs (Womack 
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2008, pp.273-274; Breslin 2011). This normative setting combined with 
consistency, generosity and responsiveness of the Chinese policy in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan has resulted in an important shift of local 
perceptions of China. The traditional representation of China as an “enemy 
of Turkic people and as a historical opponent of Islam” (Laruelle and 
Peyrouse 2013, p, 39) is being gradually replaced with the image of a 
generous donor and a pragmatic and reliable partner, whose interests are 
clear and reciprocal to the domestic interests in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: 
stability and economic cooperation.  
 
Russia  
Nevertheless, despite Chinese achievements in the region, China comes as 
the second most influential power in Central Asia as Russia’s solid long-
standing position in Central Asia remains undisputed. Russia’s interest in 
Central Asia and broader former Soviet neighbourhood has probably 
reached its peak in the last 25 years. Immediately after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the Central Asian states were hardly any priority for the new 
Russian administration (Bondarevsky in Ferdinand 1994, pp.40-41). At the 
dawn of the new statehood in the early 1990s, the Russian leadership faced 
roughly same “challenges of independence” as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: 
establishing itself as an international actor with a new identity, nation-
building, and transition to market economy (Bondarevsky in Ferdinand 1994, 
pp.40-41). The situation has changed drastically when young and energetic 
Vladimir Putin replaced aging Boris Yeltsin first as the Prime Minister in 1999 
and later as the President in 2000. Putin’s rule has become characterised 
with more aggressive and affirmative foreign policy and attempts to restore 
Russia’s former domination on the former Soviet space (Zakaurtseva in 
Akihiro 2007; Allison 2004, p.277). During Putin’s first and second terms as 
the President, Russia’s capacity to assert influence and re-establish itself in 
the Central Asian region was constrained by its limited financial and 
economic means (Allison 2004, p.277). Nowadays, against the background 
of the wealth accumulated during the high oil prices period in the 2000s, 
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Russia has become capable of backing its policy in the region with 
significant financial means in the form of both “carrots” (grants, loans, 
investment) and “sticks” (military involvement). Thus, the current Russian 
policy towards Central Asia has arrived to the point when it has both strong 
political will to assert influence and means to enforce this will.  
The contemporary foreign policy discourse in Russia is characterised with 
increasing animosity against the West and the Western agenda in the former 
Soviet area. The NATO expansion to the East, the EU’s eastern 
enlargement and the subsequent creation of the European Neighbourhood 
Programme (ENP) have long been seen as signs of the Western threat to 
Russia and blatant demarches against its legitimate interests in the region 
(Russia Today 2008). The construction of Western threat has been 
systematic and consistent, and to a certain degree it has become a publicly 
supported semi-official discourse.  
In 2013, President Putin warned Western NGOs to avoid meddling in 
Russian affairs, and warned that FSB is prepared to thwart foreign attempts 
to derail the plans of integrating Russia and former Soviet countries 
(Isachenkov 2013). His threats were further confirmed by the FSB. At the 
2014 meeting of the CIS national security agencies in Minsk, the head of the 
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Bortnikov declared that the forces 
attempting to undermine the security and to overthrow legitimate 
governments in the CIS are often sponsored by the West. General Bortnikov 
informed that these “destructive” forces are unwelcomed and the FSB will 
act strictly to prevent the “destructive” forces from affecting situation in “our 
countries” (as cited in News of Armenia 2014), i.e. the FSB declares 
commitment to protect the current regimes not only in Russia but throughout 
the Commonwealth of Independent States.  
Russian President Putin’s speech at the 11th meeting of the Valdai 
International Discussion Club on 24 October 2014 deserves particular 
attention. Having stood by his promise to speak “directly and frankly”, 
President Putin described the Western powers as self-declared victors in the 
Cold War, who have attempt reshaping the world to suit their own needs and 
interests and committed “many follies” while doing so. Putin blamed the 
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West for supporting “a very dubious public ranging from open neo-fascists to 
Islamic radicals”. He conflated the allegations of Russia’s quest for the great 
power status, but demanded to take the Russian interests into consideration 
and to respect the Russian position. Putin described the Western democracy 
promotion in the former Soviet Union as creating a "controlled chaos", which 
he a likened to "letting the genie out of the bottle" (Putin 2014, no 
pagination). 
Foreign Minister Lavrov went further in explaining the Western threat and 
extended its alleged range of damage far beyond the Russian and the CIS 
declaring that the West poses a threat to the international order stability:  
The attempts to impose one’s own designs for internal reforms on other peoples, which don’t take into account national characteristics, to ‘export democracy’, impact destructively international relations and multiplies the number of flashpoints on the world map (Sergey Lavrov as cited in Russia Today 2014) 
More importantly, Russia demonstrates that it is ready to back the 
antagonistic rhetoric of its leadership with decisive action. The current 
Ukrainian crisis has proven that Russia regains its influence and control over 
near abroad and willingly uses brute force to do so. Despite economic 
sanctions, tense geopolitical situation, incurring direct and indirect costs of 
the Ukrainian operation (support of the rebels, humanitarian aid, refugees 
etc.), Russia persists enforcing what it sees as legitimate interests in the 
region. Ukraine’s association with the EU has been seen as a hasty 
backstage decision by President Putin (Putin 2014, no pagination). He 
explicitly stated that the EU’s meddling with Ukraine touched on the Russian 
interests and triggered a chain of reactions, which resulted in the current 
political crisis and violent conflict in Ukraine and the deterioration of the 
Russian-Western relations.  
Russia actively reminds nearby countries of consequences they might ensue 
in case they go off the Russian orbit – the war with Georgia in 2008 and the 
Crimean crisis of 2014 has become some very harsh reminders for Georgia 
and Ukraine. In addition, both crises has become clear messages to the 
Western actors and to its “backyard” countries in the CIS, including 
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Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – Russia’s southern backyard, that any close 
cooperation with the West or flirting with democracy comes at high costs for 
former Soviet republics. This demonstrative punishment was obviously noted 
throughout the CIS.  
The crisis in Ukraine highlighted a number of regional dynamics, which might 
affect EU democracy promotion in the region. Firstly, Ukrainian crisis 
demonstrated that Russia is unhappy with the growing European influence in 
its backyard. Moreover, Russia is ready for decisive and aggressive actions 
when it feels that its interests are disregarded or undermined. Moscow has 
now assumed the right to decide for itself what is right and what is wrong in 
the affairs of the world, and to reinterpret such concepts as genocide, 
humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect (Trenin 2011, p.34). 
Secondly, in the multilateral stand-off on Ukraine between Russia and the 
West, Europe looked weak: lack of solid unified response on sanctions could 
not compare to Russia’s decisive actions and solid position.  
Against the background of this demonstration of power (or lack of thereof), 
the Central Asian governments must be aware of the costs of non-
compliance with the Russian demands to take into consideration its interests 
and to avoid getting to close to the EU. The costs of non-compliance can be 
very high in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as Russia has a variety of 
leverages over these countries. Due to the Soviet legacy and geographic 
proximity, Kazakhstan hosts Russia’s largest military presence abroad. 
Based upon bilateral agreements, Russia currently leases 7 military facilities, 
including the vital for the Russian aerospace programme Baikonur space 
complex, a variety of multi-service proving grounds, and few other military 
infrastructure objects. While the Russian military personnel in Kazakhstan is 
not large, the territory Russian military facilities occupy are impressive: 11 
million hectares (RIA News 2014). In Kyrgyzstan, Russia has 3 military 
facilities and a joint aviation proving ground. The Russian military airbase in 
Kant constitutes a part of the Rapid Deployment Forces of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation, but the equipment and the personnel of the 
base are exclusively Russian (Russian Embassy to the Kyrgyz Republic 
2015). Russian military presence in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan might be 
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limited in scope, but given that this is the only foreign military presence on 
the territory of both countries and Russia is geographically very close, it 
should be taken into consideration as a factor contributing to the Russian 
leverage in the region. In this regard, presence is power. 
In addition to the military presence, Russia has another important asset: 
large Russian diasporas in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Given that Russia’s 
official reason for getting involved in the Ukrainian crisis was partly explained 
with the discrimination of Russian speakers in Ukraine, the presence of the 
large ethnic Russian minority in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is an important 
factor for the governments of both countries. Thus, ethnic Russians account 
to 21.47% of the total population in Kazakhstan and 6.4% in Kyrgyzstan. 
Graph 8: Ethnic Russians in the former Soviet republics 
 
In addition to high costs of non-compliance with the Russian interests, 
Central Asian states take into consideration another important factor – the 
availability of alternative sources of development assistance. As Axyonova 
states “Availability of such alternative options to the target states brings the 
potential success of the EU’s conditionality policies close to zero” (Axyonova 
2011, p.140). The availability of generous Chinese assistance that comes 
with easy conditions (usually not recognizing Taiwan and not helping the 
Uyghur separatists in Xing Jiang) is an attractive option for Central Asian 
states. Against this alternative, the EU assistance comes across as “really 
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small” and “unsubstantial” in the eyes of local politicians (interview 27, 
Kyrgyz MP, 22 April 2013). A Kyrgyz MP compared EU assistance to 
Chinese assistance, which in his eyes is both generous and better spent: 
“China provides much more and invests in infrastructure - building roads, 
bridges etc. and energy sector. The Chinese assistance is incomparable to 
the European, but the Chinese do not make their assistance headline of 
every newspaper” (interview 27, Kyrgyz MP, 22 April 2013). On the other 
hand, he noted that the EU can provide substantial assistance if it is willing 
to do so. In this regard, he referred to the EU assistance to Georgia, which 
amounted to 800 million USD (ibid). While his number proved to be wrong, 
his comparison with the EU assistance to Georgia is actually valid. In 2007-
2013, the EU assistance to Georgia amounted to 452 million euros 
(European Commission 2014a), which is a generous allocation against the 
background of the 750 million euros for all five Central Asian republics 
allocated for the same period.  
 
China 
China offers both development assistance and investment to Central Asian 
republics. At that, the Chinese conditionality is minimal and hardly ever 
politically sensitive. Most of the conditions only require repaying loans and 
using funds on the agreed projects. The lack of political conditionality is 
probably the most attractive feature for Central Asian governments, who 
struggle with meeting Western requirements on democratic governance and 
respect to human rights. Western assistance is often accompanied with 
requirements to reduce corruption, increase transparency and ensure 
accountability in target countries. Meanwhile, local political elites and state 
bureaucracy prefer increasing countries’ economic potential, and avoid 
limiting their own ability to benefit from their positions. Political conditions 
often require political reforms, which might either limit their power or provide 
other domestic actors with plausible opportunity to compete for the access to 
state resources and powers. As a result, local elites are reluctant to proceed 
with substantial political reforming required as a part of Western assistance, 
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but welcome anything else that could improve economic performance of 
their countries (Gleason 2004, p.41).  
The Chinese assistance indirectly affects the conditionality mechanism 
employed by the EU to encourage local governments adopt and implement 
democratic principles of good governance, rule of law, human rights 
protection, and transparency. Beneficiaries in Central Asia receive from 
China substantial amounts of resources required for social and economic 
development. This gives the local governments an opportunity to lessen their 
dependence on or completely avoid Western assistance with its political 
conditionality, which accompanies virtually every cent of Western donor 
assistance. Having an alternative to the Western assistance, local rulers feel 
less constrained in their authoritarian policies. 
This generous and versatile support does not come free and it is not free 
from self-interest, but to a large extent, the Russian, Chinese and Central 
Asian interests converge on many important points, including the provision 
of security and development in the region. The EU is interested in the same, 
but it lacks the capacity and commitment to ensure effective implementation. 
In addition, democratic ways of doing things are not always the most 
effective ones. Through authoritarian means, some things can be done 
quicker and with less bureaucracy.  
In addition, China has become an important alternative to the Western liberal 
ideas of development and governance. China is an example of other ways of 
doing things: different understanding of the global order, different 
development discourse, and different governance (Breslin 2011, p.1324). 
Illiberal state capitalism, which is widely practiced in China and to lesser 
extent in Russia, is particularly attractive for Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s 
energy riches as well as other more or less important sectors are controlled 
by the state-owned corporations: KazMunaiGaz and the National Railway 
Company to name few.  
Thanks to the significant financial input in the region, China is seen as more 
generous actor in the region. China deliberately builds its image of an honest 
international power without hidden agendas: “China never uses foreign aid 
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as a means to interfere in recipient countries' internal affairs or seek political 
privileges for itself” (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
2014). Western (European and the US) powers appear as ungenerous 
actors with obscure geopolitical and political objectives. As Chair of the 
Kyrgyz Parliamentary Committee on International Affairs notes the Chinese 
assistance “is incomparable to the European, but the Chinese do not make 
their assistance headline of every newspaper”. Even at the policy making 
level, Western democracy promotion is often perceived either as a façade 
covering selfish interests or as an unnecessary whim included to the 
regional and bilateral cooperation agenda because Western powers have to 
stick to normative agenda in their foreign policy. 
As the Chinese White Paper on foreign aid indicates, “China's foreign aid 
falls into the category of South-South cooperation and is mutual help 
between developing countries” (The State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China 2014). Such horizontal positioning of a donor, who humbly 
acknowledges that it is equal to the aid recipient in terms of development 
level and willing to offer mutual help, sounds more appealing than the 
Western conditional aid, from the developed countries to developing 
countries, based upon “best practices” and “international”, i.e. US and 
European, standards and expertise. Meanwhile, despite European and US 
efforts to avoid mentoring tone, the nature of its aid conditions and overall 
rhetoric, often cause less than responsive reactions from local governments 
in Central Asia. While Kyrgyzstan, one of the poorest countries in the region, 
cannot afford criticising its donors, the petro-wealth of Kazakhstan allows it 
to be more vocal in its reluctance to accept the Western mentoring tone. In 
response to British Prime Minister David Cameron’s attempts to raise the 
issue of human rights violations in Kazakhstan, Kazakh President 
Nazarbayev clearly expressed his opinion: “Nobody has a right to instruct us 
how to live” (as cited in The Economist 2013). 
Despite the EU efforts to frame its cooperation offers in the terms that 
emphasise the partnership component and avoid vertical relationship 
patterns, it is possible to trace a certain degree of annoyance with the EU 
rhetoric in the area of democracy, human rights and rule of law. Kazakhstan 
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and Kyrgyzstan, as well as other countries in the region, are expected to 
comply with normative requirements in hope to improve relationships with 
the EU. However, the logic behind this mechanism is ambiguous: it creates 
an impression that the EU is a much-desired international actor, whose 
lifestyle and best practices are so universally attractive that other countries 
have to agree with a set of conditions to get access to them. It is assumed 
that others seek partnership with the EU and this partnership is granted in 
case if the suitors meet the criteria. The EU rhetoric does not state this 
explicitly, but this is what the Central Asian actors read between the lines. 
Such reading of the EU approach to external action is not inherent solely to 
Central Asia. As Averre observes Moscow interprets the EU’s approach as 
“seeking to exert political influence over less powerful countries on its 
periphery via rigidly imposed norms” (2005, p.181).  
Meanwhile, Russia positions itself as a traditional, reliable partner, who 
understands and accepts the autocratic Central Asian leaders (Allison 2004, 
p.279). Russia demands to be “equal partners, not consumers of EU 
blessings” and offers a similar position to Central Asian governments 
(Chizhov as cited in Averre 2007, p.174). In addition, being BRIC members 
and participants of other multilateral organisations, China and Russia offer 
socialisation with “the Rest” without demanding an open confrontation with 
“the West”. This is perfect for Kyrgyzstan and Kazkhstan, whose foreign 
policy are multi-vector.  
The crisis in Ukraine and the Central Asian reactions to the crisis highlighted 
few regional dynamics, which might affect EU democracy promotion in the 
region. Firstly, Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that Russia is unhappy with the 
growing European influence in its backyard. Moreover, Russia is ready for 
decisive and aggressive actions when it feels that its interests are 
disregarded or undermined. Moscow has now assumed the right to decide 
for itself what is right and what is wrong in the affairs of the world, and to 
reinterpret such concepts as genocide, humanitarian intervention and 
responsibility to protect (Trenin 2011, p.34). Secondly, in the multilateral 
stand-off on Ukraine between Russia and the West, Europe looked weak: 
lack of solid unified response on sanctions could not compare to Russia’s 
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armed forces, jets and tanks on the Ukrainian territory and occupation of 
Crimea. This weakness could not pass unnoticed by the regional actors: the 
costs and benefits of close cooperation with the EU were clear for Central 
Asian governments, and this might further deter the regional leadership and 
the public from getting too close to Europe and adopting liberal democracy 
as promoted by the Western powers.  
There is quite solid understanding of the power play that on the ground. A 
leading international politics expert Nargis Kasenova, KIMEP, has aptly 
summarised the local views on the EU-Russian power play in Central Asia: 
“Europe is not interested in a stand-off with Russia, especially in Kazakhstan 
or because of Kazakhstan” (Muminov 2014).  
Russia casts shadow not only on the responsiveness of local Central Asian 
governments to external Western democracy promotion projects, but also 
might inform the EU’s reluctance to push harder and oppose 
authoritarianism in the region. Bolder statements from Russia are partly 
have become possible thanks to the rising oil and gas prices and growing 
European dependence on Russian energy resources (Wesley 2007), Russia 
now has sufficient means for more assertive foreign and regional policy. As 
a result of increased economic capacities, Russia has achieved a lot in the 
recent years: the enormous oil wealth triggered economic development and 
amassed considerable currency reserves. The economic boom backed the 
assertive foreign policy: Russia regularly challenges the global hegemon – 
the US both in its periphery (former Soviet Union) and internationally; applies 
divide and rule tactic to the EU; leads and promotes alternative to the West 
regional and international organisations – BRIC, CSTO, and SCO are just a 
few example  
With its rich energy resources and its transportation network, managed by 
the state-owned monopoly Transneft, Russia is a major oil and gas supplier 
to several European countries (Bahgat in Wesley 2007, pp.119-121). 
Despite certain pessimism about Russian supply of energy resources, 
Russia’s proven reserves of natural gas are higher than those of any other 
state, amounting to 27 % of the global total, and its oil accounts for between 
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6 to 13% of global reserves (Naughten in Wesley 2007, pp.133-134). Given 
the growing insecurity of Middle Eastern supply, Russian is likely to remain a 
crucial supplier of oil and gas to Europe. In this case, knowing about 
Russia’s reluctance to accept foreign influence in its neighbourhood, 
European countries might be less willing to anyhow confront Russian 
regional policy in what Europe calls “neighbours of our neighbours”. 
 
Regional Authoritarian Environment  
It used to be that it was mainly the liberal democracies  
who banded together in defence of their values. No longer. 
Alexander Cooley, the League of Authoritarian Gentlemen,  
Foreign Policy, 30/01/13 
Central Asian countries and the wider Central Eurasian neighbourhood 
demonstrate surprisingly strong unity in consolidating the regional 
authoritarian environment. Promotion of autocratic norms might take both 
unintentional and deliberate forms and involve domestic and regional actors. 
Russia and China contribute to fostering regional authoritarian environment 
both directly and indirectly through a variety of mechanisms. Possibly one of 
the most efficient mechanisms is autocracy promotion through regional 
organisations, which serve as transmitters of norms, soft, and hard power 
(Jackson 2010, pp.112-114). Russia and China, together and independently 
from each other, play a significant, if not decisive role, in establishment and 
strengthening of regional political and security organisations, Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States structures (Swanstron 2004). A 
recent Russian-Kazakh initiative of establishing the Eurasian Union, another 
integration bloc on the CIS territory, speaks for the more proactive Russian 
position in the region. Although, Russian President Putin emphasized that 
the new Union would expand its cooperation with the EU and China, it is 
clear that the Union is “rather about Russia solidifying and institutionalizing 
its resurgence in its former Soviet periphery” (Eurasianet 2011). Russia, and 
to a certain extent China, “are both able and willing to hinder regional 
organisations that they do not control and thus stop them from becoming too 
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powerful” (Swanstron 2004, p.49). For Central Asian leaders, membership in 
these organisations is viewed as positive because it is not-burdened with 
democracy and human rights issues, and provides an alternative to evade 
Western pressure (Jackson 2010, p.114).  
One can have a closer look at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO) to draw on just one example of regional institutional mechanisms of 
autocracy promotion. The SCO, in its declarations and activities, highlights 
what is “appropriate and legitimate within the region” (Ambrosio 2008, 
p.1322), and the latter often does not match with what the general Western 
and European discourses of good governance and rule of law. This 
difference is considerable: for the West, humanitarian intervention might 
seem as a reasonable response to certain cases, but a recent SCO 
declaration unambiguously opposes armed intervention or forced "regime 
change" and invites to “respect the independent choice of the countries and 
peoples in the region” (Declaration of the Heads of State of the Member 
States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Building a Region of 
Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity 2012). Similar divergence in 
prioritisation of values is characteristic for other issues as well: state 
sovereignty and non-interference in other countries' internal affairs are 
cornerstone principles for SCO member states and are central to the SCO 
documents and declarations. The Declaration on the SCO creation (2001) 
and the SCO Charter (2002) are abundant with references to sovereignty 
and non-interference, but never express any commitment of member states 
to democracy. 
The SCO sets, codifies, and legitimises the regional rules of the game, 
where the importance of security (read regime security), stability (read 
regime stability), and sovereignty is paramount, and human rights and 
freedoms are of secondary, if not tertiary importance. Regular summits often 
revolve around the three ‘evils’, which undermine security, stability and 
sovereignty: terrorism, separatism and extremism. While all six SCO 
member states have varying forms of these evils, they use “counter-evil” 
rhetoric to crack down on domestic human rights and freedoms in a similar 
way. The SCO is an attractive multilateral instrument for local authoritarian 
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regimes to maintain their grip on power. SCO statements reiterate the 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, which is often used as an 
argument against Western criticisms on human rights violations or poor 
governance record. The SCO accepts no other actor, but the legitimate state 
leadership, where “legitimate” implies the authoritarian ruler in power with no 
regard to the way this power was gained and maintained. Moreover, SCO 
contributes to legitimisation of parliaments, presidents and governments in 
the region by sending its formal missions (just like OSCE), which steadily fail 
to see any electoral violations (RIA News 2012a and 2012b; Trend News 
Agency 2010). Regional multi-lateral organisations, including the SCO, 
regularly exchange favourable electoral observations thus helping local 
government-loyal mass media to report that international observers find 
elections fair and democratic. Elections in Kazakhstan, that are usually 
characterised as failing to “meet key democratic principles” (OSCE/ODIHR 
2012), are well-accepted by regional actors. Turkic Parliamentary Assembly 
noted that 2012 parliamentary election was transparent, democratic and fair 
(Trend News Agency 2012); CIS observation mission praised the election as 
“free and genuine” (International Elections Observation Missions 2011). 
Russia provides political support and extra legitimisation to the Central Asian 
regimes and their leaders: Russian institutions and politicians regularly 
congratulate the Central Asian presidents after their elections, encourage 
their policies and never criticise their governance style (Jackson 2010, 
p.110). 
In addition to these rather unfeasible dynamics of autocracy promotion, 
institutional mechanisms assert direct impact on the human rights and 
democracy situation in the countries of the regional. An NGO in Bishkek 
reported how the Chinese security services requested the Kyrgyz security 
services to interrupt Bir Duino human rights film festival through SCO 
channels. This NGO invited famous Chinese human rights activist of Uyghur 
origin Ms Rebiya Kadeer to attend the festival. Once the Chinese security 
services learned about this, they used informal channels to get in touch with 
the Kyrgyz security services and requested not avoid Kadeer’s participation 
in the festival and screening of “10 conditions of love”, a documentary about 
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Kadeer and her struggle for Uyghur rights in China (Lukashov 2010, no 
pagination). Kyrgyz National Security Service did interrupt the festival. 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
Promoting democracy in an authoritarian country with little democratic 
experience is a challenge, and it is important to acknowledge that. It is even 
more important to identify and highlight issues, which might impede the 
democracy promotion. As the paper demonstrates there are few factors 
inhibiting European democracy promotion. European factors impeding 
democracy promotion include the multi-faceted nature of the EU as an 
international actor, lack of leverage, and resulting weak position of the EU, 
reluctance to use some available instruments and mechanisms of 
democracy promotion, and prioritisation of various interests, which might 
affect normative interests. Local factors impeding democracy mostly revolve 
around consequences of the Central Asian historical and political 
development. By the present, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have formed 
distinct types of political regimes. While Kyrgyzstan demonstrates better 
democracy scores than Kazakhstan, its political and economic performance 
are significantly impeded by continuous instability. Kazakhstan represents a 
strong authoritarian presidential rule based on the personality of President 
Nazarbayev, oppressive regime, and sound economic performance. 
Given the shared Soviet past, current regional interconnections, and access 
to information in Central Asia, the regional environment is an important 
contextual factor. Unfortunately for external democracy promotion agents, 
Central Asia is not a great playground for democracy promotion exercise. 
The initial domestic conditions are not democracy-friendly: the majority of the 
regional states have not seen any change of power for decades, and are 
solid “not free” authoritarian dictatorships with the exception of the “partly-
free” Kyrgyzstan (Freedom House 2015). Democratic spill-over effect is 
challenging given that the regional powers with strong economic, political 
and cultural connections to the region, China and Russia, are as far from 
being democratic as they could possibly be.  
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Within broader regional framework, Russia and China are two undisputed 
regional powers, whose opinions and interests cannot be significantly 
disregarded or disrespected. Russia and China do not only push Europe out 
of the region politically, but also reduce the economic involvement of the EU 
in the region. Given this very much feasible dependence, the local 
governments are not likely to diverge drastically from the forms and modes 
of political and economic partnership China and Russia has to offer to the 
region. This might potentially affect any further close cooperation with 
Europe, especially in political matters. As the recent Ukrainian crisis 
demonstrated building closer ties with Europe and declaring commitment to 
liberal democracy might involve the political and socio-economic costs that 
are too high for the former Soviet republics.   
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to 
political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction 
between the desirable and the possible - between what is desirable 
everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete 
circumstances of time and place. 
Morgenthau and Thompson 1985, p.7 
There are places and situations where the EU could be effective, and there 
are places and situations where this is less possible. 
A Central Asia desk officer, EEAS (interview 20, 11 March 2013) 
In the eyes of democracy promotion agents, liberal democratic principles are 
desirable everywhere and at all times for a variety of reasons ranging from 
the belief that democracy ensures peace to an assumption that democracy 
facilitates economic development and reduces transnational security threats. 
However, the possibility to promote democracy in certain places can be 
limited by the democracy promotion agent’s approach, the target countries’ 
local context, and other factors.  
This thesis has evaluated EU democracy promotion efforts in Central Asia 
through a comparative case study of EU democracy promotion policy 
implementation in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It sought to establish 
whether or not EU democracy promotion has been successful in these two 
target countries and to identify factors which have impeded successful 
democracy promotion. This chapter serves to highlight the key findings by 
directly answering the research questions in the next two substantial 
sections. In addition, it emphasises the academic contribution of this thesis 
and identifies potential avenues for future research on the basis of this 
thesis. 
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7.2 To what Extent has EU Democracy Promotion been Successful in 
Central Asia? 
The intensification of EU-Central Asian relations in the 2000s and the 
adoption of the EU Strategy towards Central Asia in 2007 raised some hope 
and aspiration that the EU would become an important agent of democratic 
change in the largely authoritarian region. The Strategy promised an 
important reinforcement of EU policy in the region and presented a 
significant declaration of the scope and goals of the EU engagement with the 
region. The Strategy defined the EU’s strengthened approach to the region 
and set up seven priority cooperation areas, including human rights, rule of 
law, good governance and democratisation as a priority area. In contrast to 
previous documents guiding the EU-Central Asian relations, the 2007 
Strategy emphasised the horizontal, partnership-based nature of the 
renewed cooperation with the region.  
In reality, the EU policy towards Central Asia was characterised by a large 
gap between the highly normative rhetoric and predominantly self-interested 
behaviour in the region. Democracy promotion was one of the top priority 
areas according to the EU Strategy towards Central Asia, but its 
implementation was characterised with lack of effort and inconsistency. 
The evaluation of EU democracy promotion policy’s design, implementation 
and results in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in this thesis demonstrated that 
EU democracy promotion has not been successful. In order to evaluate 
the success of EU democracy promotion I used an analytical framework 
which focused on democracy promotion mechanisms and instruments. This 
decision was made to avoid three obstacles every researcher in democracy 
promotion studies encounters. First obstacle is the difficulty to measure 
democratic progress. Being a blurred concept, democracy can be interpreted 
in a variety of ways. Its substance can be scaled down to very basic 
procedural-institutional features or scaled up to the broad notion of 
democracy that incorporates deep socio-cultural features. Second, an 
evaluation of democracy promotion often encounters the problem of 
attribution. Due to the variety and diversity of domestic and external actors 
and factors that affect democratisation process in the target country, it is 
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extremely difficult to identify what changes or lack of changes can be 
attributed to the activities of a specific democracy promotion agent. Third, 
democracy promotion strategy and tactics can vary from country to country 
and it is important to develop a tailored approach to each case under 
examination. For these reasons, the most convenient and productive option 
was to concentrate on whether specific EU democracy promotion 
mechanisms available in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were implemented to 
their full extent and achieved what they were supposed to achieve in 
compliance with the general EU strategy towards Central Asia.  
The EU has three main democracy promotion mechanisms, which are used 
to various extent in different target countries. First, strategic calculation is a 
conditionality-based mechanism that operates on the premises that target 
governments are rational actors, who engage in a cost-benefit analysis in 
order to decide whether or not to accept the democracy promotion agent’s 
proposals to allow for democracy conducive changes. In order to be 
successful, a strategic calculation mechanism is required to offer significant 
rewards for compliance with the democracy promotion agent’s will or to 
involve considerable punishment for the failure to comply. Second, 
normative suasion employs the power of “better argument” and is based on 
gradual and persistent process of persuasion aimed to change the 
perceptions and convictions of the ruling elites in target countries. Third, 
democracy empowerment targets non-state and local actors and creates 
socio-cultural conditions required for successful democratisation through 
educating non-state actors and raising awareness of democracy related 
issues. Strategic calculation can be successful in short-term, but normative 
suasion and democratic empowerment are believed to be more efficient in 
long term perspective. They are expected to ensure genuine internalisation 
of democratic principles and norms as opposed to temporary acceptance 
under the strategic calculation framework and, as such, are more 
sustainable and allow for a greater degree of local ownership in the 
democratisation process.  
In exploring the implementation of each democracy promotion mechanism, a 
lack of consistency and overall reluctance to use available instruments were 
noted. Each democracy promotion mechanism has a set of specific 
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instruments that are related to the EU’s specific leverage and capacity to 
induce change. In case of Central Asia, the EU employs only some of the 
instruments to a limited extent and this significantly affects the achieved 
results. Firstly, from among all conditionality-based (strategic calculation) 
instruments, the EU membership is considered the most powerful, but its 
application is severely limited with the capacity of the EU to accept new 
member states. Privileged relations with the EU, such as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, are considered second most attractive reward, but 
again, its implementation is limited to the 16 immediate neighbours of the 
EU. This leaves the EU with two positive conditionality instruments, trade 
opportunities and development aid, and two negative conditionality 
instruments, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement’s human rights 
clause and sanctions for violation of human rights and democratic principles. 
The EU has been consistently reluctant to use any negative conditionality 
instruments despite the fact that there were several cases when the 
sanctions or suspension of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was 
justified. These cases included the violent handling of oil workers’ strike in 
Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan, numerous human rights abuses committed by 
President Bakiev’s regime in 2007-2010 in Kyrgyzstan, and the systematic 
encroachment of the state on a range of political rights and civil freedoms in 
both countries. The remaining positive conditionality instruments, 
development aid and trade opportunities, were only used to a limited extent.  
It was possible to identify an important difference in using these instruments 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan, as the top trade partner in 
Central Asia, was more interested in developing trade opportunities with the 
EU. Kyrgyzstan, as a poor donor-dependent country, had more interest in 
receiving donor aid, including the much needed sectoral budget support. 
These rewards were reasonably appealing for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
but the EU had limited the conditionality attached to these rewards. The 
target governments often needed to only demonstrate a commitment to 
comply with the normative requirements. In the absence of clear and 
significant conditions, the conditionality based instruments were not used to 
their full extent and, in the case of EU democracy promotion in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan, these opportunities have been largely missed.  
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Secondly, similar issues were discovered in the application of the normative 
suasion instruments - human rights dialogue platform, political dialogue 
platform, and common foreign and security policy instruments (resolutions, 
joint declarations and other collective EU statements aimed to raise the 
issues of democracy and human rights in Central Asia). The CFSP 
instruments were hardly ever used and had little bearing on the behaviour of 
the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as they were often limited in 
scope. Political dialogue and human rights dialogues could have been 
powerful instruments of normative suasion, but they have turned into a game 
of asking and promising. The EU asked for certain commitments and the 
target governments promised to commit themselves to the cause of 
democracy and human rights. In reality though, the process did not go 
beyond formal declarations and commitments. In addition, normative 
suasion instruments have had unintended negative effects on the overall 
democratisation process in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In Kazakhstan, the 
intensification of bilateral and multilateral contacts with the EU and its 
member states was used to legitimise and consolidate the ruling regime of 
President Nazarbayev. The willingness of the democratic Europe to 
cooperate with Kazakhstan more than any other country in the region was 
interpreted and presented to the domestic audience as a sign of the 
international respect to the regime. In other words, the increased EU-Kazakh 
cooperation was instrumentalised to highlight the international recognition, 
legitimacy and success of the ruling regime and its activities. This has 
become an indirect contribution to the consolidation of the authoritarian 
power in Kazakhstan.  
In addition, the dialogue platforms transformed with the course of time. They 
started as an instrument of normative persuasion and socialisation of local 
elites, but got entangled in the process of reverse socialisation. Hard 
security threats narratives have gradually overtaken the discourses of 
democracy and human rights. The local governments were successful in 
convincing their European counterparts that democracy and human rights 
are not as important and urgent as the issues of security and stability. 
Gradually, this conviction spread to the extent that security had become the 
primary focus of these dialogues, and democracy and human rights 
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transformed into a “box to tick” during the dialogue rounds. Reverse 
socialisation can be understandable given the seriousness of transnational 
security threats in the larger Central Asian region, but it has detrimental 
effects on the intrinsic purpose of democracy promotion. The incorporation 
of shared security concerns into bilateral and multilateral cooperation might 
be beneficial in order to raise and address security-related issues. The 
securitisation of EU-Central Asian dialogue stretches the focus this 
cooperation and shifts priorities to non-normative issues. As an outcome, 
democracy and human rights receive less political attention and less 
opportunities to be promoted at the state level.  
Thirdly, while strategic calculation and normative suasion were directed to 
change the perceptions and behaviour of the state actors, democratic 
empowerment aimed to increase the societal capacity to produce, endure 
and sustain democratic changes. Democratic empowerment potentially 
could have had long-lasting effects on democratisation processes in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan if it has not been associated with several 
controversies and difficulties. A significant part of the EU efforts in this area 
involved capacity building of the civil society sector in both Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. However, the reality on the ground, combined with the donors’ 
approach to the local civil society, resulted in the increasing domination of 
GONGOs (government organised non-governmental organisations) in 
Kazakhstan and BONGOs (business oriented non-governmental 
organisations) in Kyrgyzstan.  
In Kazakhstan, the state adapted to the perceived threat of democratisation 
through external means by sponsoring its own civil society, one which does 
not undermine and criticise the ruling regime’s legitimacy and actions. This is 
hardly a liberal democratic type of civil society, which could induce genuine 
democratic change. Nevertheless, in the absence of alternatives, the EU 
worked with and supported these half-democratic half-authoritarian 
alliances. In Kyrgyzstan, the civil society sector is dependent on the external 
funding to the extent that it has turned into a special kind of 
entrepreneurship. In pursuit of foreign grants that are vital for their survival, 
local NGOs eagerly follow the donors’ agendas and expectations with less 
regard to the actual local needs and realities. This practice has already 
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resulted in divisions within the Kyrgyz civil sector. On the top of the sector 
there are large and experienced NGOs that receive most of the funding and 
know how to please the donors. The overwhelming majority of other NGOs 
have limited access to grants and less opportunities to develop their 
activities as they cannot possibly meet the technical and administrative 
requirements of the donors, among which the EU stands out with one of the 
most complex and bureaucratised application procedures. As an outcome, 
democratic empowerment is available only for a small part of the civil society 
sector in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and this part does not necessarily 
reflect the actual needs and expectations on the ground.  
To summarise the answer to the primary research question, it should be 
noted that from among the range of democracy promotion instruments 
available to use in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, only some were used to a 
limited extent. These instruments included offering trade opportunities to 
Kazakhstan and development aid to Kyrgyzstan, dialogue platforms, and, 
capacity building. However, these instruments largely lacked conditionality 
attached to them, and were distorted by the target governments to serve 
their own needs. As an outcome, none of them worked as intended. 
Strategic calculation lacked substantial conditionality. Normative suasion 
reversed its direction and diverted the cooperation discourses to security. 
Democratic empowerment compartmentalised the civil society sector and 
consolidated a bubble of privileged NGOs. The EU is not to blame for the 
state of affairs in the civil society sector in the region of course, but it is 
important to bear in mind that its approach sustains this state of affairs.  
The EU’s policy in Central Asia in general can be described as an act of 
balancing where the EU strives to demonstrate its commitment to normative 
principles while keeping the Central Asian governments engaged. This 
balancing does not always work as intended and such engagement has its 
costs: continuous abuse of human rights and consolidation of undemocratic 
political regimes in the Central Asian republics. 
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7.3 Why has EU Democracy Promotion not been Successful in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan? 
The existing literature on EU democracy promotion often places the blame 
for less than successful implementation progress either on the unfavourable 
conditions in the target countries (Warkotsch 2011) or on the flaws of the 
democracy promotion agent (Axyonova 2014). While this is surely a 
legitimate explanation, the local context and the flawed approaches of 
democracy promoters constitute a part of the reason why EU democracy 
promotion not been particularly successful in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
This thesis identified three sets of factors, which affected the implementation 
of EU democracy promotion policy in Central Asia. One set of factors relates 
to the difficulties on the EU side. The second set focuses on the local 
context and conditions for democratisation. A third set acknowledges the 
role of regional powers and environment in countering democracy promotion 
efforts in the region.  
On the EU side, there are multiple gaps between the EU normative 
commitments and individual EU member states’ interests and priorities. The 
reluctance of some EU member states to get engaged more in external 
democracy promotion Central Asia stems from their non-normative interests. 
EU member states, whose troops participated in the ISAF campaign in 
Afghanistan were predominantly interested in keeping the ISAF air bases 
and air corridor in Central Asia. EU member states with a significant level of 
dependence on external energy imports prioritised the region’s rich energy 
resources above normative objectives. This partial reluctance affected the 
efficiency and productivity of the EU institutions’ efforts because member 
states are important actors and sometimes they have more leverage than 
the EU.  
Normative and non-normative interests might not be mutually exclusive, but 
due to the limited resources and political will, the urgent Realpolitik interests 
took precedence over abstract norms and values. When the subject matter 
is political or sensitive, achieving unity of the consolidated EU position, 
opinion, view, etc. is extra challenging as inconsistencies and contradictions 
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exist not only in the rhetoric and action of EU institutions, but also at the 
level of individual European politicians. In this regard, the thesis adds to the 
literature on the values vs. norms dichotomy in EU democracy promotion 
abroad. As the Central Asian case studies demonstrate, normative 
objectives are in place, but they are often overtaken by the Realpolitik 
interests of key EU stakeholders.  
It is important to acknowledge that there are significant obstacles on the 
ground. Central Asia is one of the most authoritarian regions in the world, 
and Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies have not had any experience of 
independent statehood or liberal democracy until 25 years ago. As a result, 
there are objective historic impediments rooted in the local legacies and 
socio-political idiosyncrasies, which affect external democracy promotion. 
These local factors contribute to the distortion of democracy promotion 
process and shape ambiguous results of democratisation. Central Asia does 
not represent a fertile ground for democratisation due to the limited local 
experience in institutional state-building and democratic governance, a solid 
record of authoritarian rule, and increasing state rentierism. Some efforts 
such as political and economic reforms, formal separation of powers, and 
nominal commitment to human rights and freedoms have been made by 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to meet the expectations of the international 
community represented by international organisations, state and 
international non-state actors. The extent of these efforts and the genuine 
commitment to democratic principles on the ground remains limited as both 
the state and civil society have mastered the art of mimicking democracy 
façade. 
Finally, regional factors affect external democracy promotion in direct and 
indirect ways. Powerful regional actors such as Russia and China often 
inform the trajectories of domestic and foreign policies in the broader region. 
They contribute to the endurance of the authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
regimes in Central Asia through offering alternatives. They offer an 
alternative set of authoritarian values, where the key norm and objective is 
regime stability, regime security and survival. Under these normative trends, 
democracy and human rights, as well as other elements of liberal 
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understanding of democracy get secondary if not tertiary importance in the 
eyes of governments and societies. Second, Russia and China offer an 
alternative source of investment, development aid and other material gains 
to Central Asian governments. This offer does not affect EU democracy 
promotion directly, but it does make EU conditionality based instruments 
less efficient by diversifying available options for the target governments in 
the region. Thus, Kazakhstan has more trade opportunities and Kyrgyzstan 
more development aid and grants with less strings attached. The Russian 
and Chinese aid and trade do come with certain conditions, but these 
conditions are easier to meet as they are less politically sensitive, i.e. do not 
require political changes or increased transparency or accountability. With 
China and Russian increasing their strategic engagement with Central Asia, 
the EU stands even less chance to be successful in promoting liberal 
democratic principles. China and Russia offer alternatives to the EU offers: 
alternative source of development assistance, alternative set of norms and 
principles, and alternative socialisation with the conditions that are easier to 
meet for the authoritarian Central Asian leaders.  
It is difficult to weigh these sets of factors against each other as their 
contribution to impeding EU democracy promotion is dynamic and depends 
on current local, regional and international trends. The EU factors are crucial 
as they set the direction of democracy promotion. The local contextual 
factors might shift when the ruling elites change, but in the short-term 
perspective the non-democratic factors on the ground are likely to stay 
intact. Regional factors gain more importance due to the recent international 
developments. Russia’s assertive and sometimes aggressive policy towards 
the EU sends a message across the region. The recent crisis in Ukraine is a 
threatening signal to the Central Asian governments as well. It messages 
that a closer engagement with the EU might cause an overreaction from the 
Russian side. In addition, Chinese economic expansion in the region makes 
the EU offers of trade opportunities less attractive thanks to the scale of the 
Chinese economic might and the conditions, which are convenient to follow 
for the Central Asian elites.  
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7.4 Avenues for Future Research 
Despite the uneven implementation progress of the EU Strategy towards 
Central Asia and significant flaws in the EU democracy promotion policy in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the EU efforts to incorporate democratic 
principles into the cooperation agenda in the region made an important 
contribution to shifting perceptions in the region. Thanks to the EU and other 
international actors raising the issues of democracy, rule of law, good 
governance and human rights, the Central Asian political elites accepted 
these issues as an inevitable part of external relations. This acceptance 
might be shallow at the moment, but its implications are important. Shallow 
democratisation and formal acceptance on both democracy promotion 
agent’s and target countries’ sides does not contribute much to building a 
genuine democracy at the moment, but it does normalise the discourses of 
democracy in local societies and makes the concept of democracy less alien 
in the eyes of the general public.  
The lack of immediate meaningful results should not put off the external 
actors involved in democracy promotion as the key to success is continuity 
and consistency. External democracy promotion is an inter-active multi-
dimensional dynamic process, where a variety of intra-state, state, and 
external factors affect the policy formation, implementation and outcomes. 
These factors change and there might be more windows of opportunity to 
pursue normative objectives in Central Asia. What is crucial here for both 
policy makers and academics is to stay informed and alert in order to be 
ready for the next window of opportunity. This thesis covered many issues 
and raised some questions, which could serve as the ground for further 
research in the field of democracy promotion studies. In particular, further 
research could use the analytical framework to study EU democracy 
promotion in other three Central Asian republics, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. The EU has slightly different sets of normative and non-
normative interests in each of these countries, and an analysis of how these 
interests affect and shape democracy promotion policies in these target 
countries would be interesting. 
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7.5 Academic Contribution  
The thesis has made several original contributions to the existing research 
on EU democracy promotion. First, it adds to the existing research on 
democracy promotion mechanisms and provides a comprehensive analytical 
framework for evaluation of democracy promotion, inclusive of factors which 
may facilitate or impede democracy promotion in Central Asia. This thesis 
aggregates the existing analytical frameworks and attempted to incorporate 
a participatory approach to provide a versatile analysis of EU democracy 
promotion. It did not focus only on one set of factors or another, but took into 
consideration a broad range of factors, which might affect EU democracy 
promotion.  
Second, this thesis demonstrates the validity of a holistic approach to 
analysing factors impeding democracy promotion. The existing research on 
EU democracy promotion in Central Asia often focuses only on a set of 
factors, usually either on the EU or on the local context, prioritising it over 
others. This research acknowledges that a variety of diverse factors affect 
external democracy promotion and their impact can vary as international, 
regional and domestic conditions change.  
Third, two original case studies were presented and analysed with taking 
into consideration relevant contextual conditions, which might affect the 
design, implementation and outcomes of EU democracy promotion. Case 
study approach offers a highly contextual solution to examining external 
democracy promotion. It allows for a depth of analysis and adds to the 
existing body of literature, which usually either focuses on individual 
democracy promotion projects or provide a shallow overview of EU activities 
in Central Asia. The choice of two case study countries allowed to ensure 
both depth of analysis and breadth of findings. In addition, an analysis of two 
case study countries provided an opportunity for the comparative dimension 
and a platform to see how different the EU’s approach can be. Examining 
two countries, where the EU has very different levels of interest, helped 
contribute to the debate on the interplay of values and norms in the EU 
motivation to get engaged in democracy promotion abroad. The thesis 
focused on the stable and rich authoritarian Kazakhstan and poorer 
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Kyrgyzstan prone to political instability but also to democratic openings. The 
case studies represented the country with more strategic importance for the 
EU (Kazakhstan) and the country with less strategic importance for the EU 
(Kyrgyzstan) in order to see how non normative interests interfere with 
normative interests. 
Democratic norms lie at the core of the EU identity as an international actor 
and a democracy promotion agent. Narratives of democracy, human rights, 
rule of law and good governance are embedded in what the EU represents 
to the extent that it is unthinkable to conduct any EU activities without 
references to these liberal democratic norms. International relations is no 
exclusion to this rule: democratic rhetoric has become an integral element of 
the EU’s cooperation with third countries. However, this does not make the 
EU a pure normative power. The normative dimension of EU external action 
and development aid can dominate in the areas and at times, where it is 
possible, i.e. where it does not affect other, non-normative interests. 
Otherwise the EU acts as a pragmatic international actor.  
Despite the long history of pooling sovereignty and developing supranational 
governance, the EU member states remain the primary international actors 
in the matters of strategic importance such as security, trade and foreign 
policy. Due to its unique nature, states are not the only actors involved in 
external action. The EU presents a complex, multi-layered entity with 
numerous centres of power and many voices. The sui generis nature of the 
EU has both positive and negative effects on its democracy promotion 
efforts. On one hand, the voices of 28 nations, if channelled in one direction, 
potentially could make a significant difference. On the other hand, the crucial 
and sensitive decisions are often made in the capitals of EU member states, 
which have different, even opposite interests and priorities with regard to the 
external action. This results in a disarray and half-hearted efforts when it 
comes to external democracy promotion - a challenging task that requires a 
great deal of political will and commitment from the part of democracy 
promoter.  
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2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline.  
 
3 I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result from the research.  
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Appendix B List of Interviews 
Interview 1 
31st July 2012, Bishkek 
Kyrgyz President’s Administration, Foreign Policy Department 
 
Interview 2 
3rd August 2012, Bishkek 
Kyrgyz Ministry of Economy 
 
Interview 3 
3rd August 2012, Bishkek 
Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance 
 
Interview 4 
10th August 2012, Bishkek 
The Delegation of the EU to the Kyrgyz Republic, Officer 1 
 
Interview 5 
10th August 2012, Bishkek 
The Delegation of the EU to the Kyrgyz Republic, Officer 2 
 
Interview 6 
13th August 2012, Bishkek 
POLIS-Central Asia Analytical Centre Expert 
 
Interview 7 
15th August 2012, Bishkek 
Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society NGO, an EU grant recipient  
 
Interview 8 
17th August 2012, Bishkek 
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An EU-funded project in Kyrgyzstan 1, Project Manager 
 
 
Interview 9 
17th August 2012, Bishkek 
Member of the Kyrgyz Council on Selection of Judges  
 
Interview 10 
17th August 2012, Bishkek 
Citizens against Corruption NGO, three Programme Officers 
 
Interview 11 
18th August 2012, Bishkek 
Kyrgyz Prime Minister’ Office, National Coordinator for Cooperation with the 
EU 
 
Interview 12 
21st August 2012, interviewed via Skype 
National Defence University, Washington, Researcher in Security and State-
Building in Central Asia 
 
Interview 13 
12th September 2012, Bishkek 
St. Andrew’s University, Researcher in Organised Crime in the post-Soviet 
Space 
 
Interview 14 
12th September 2012, Bishkek 
Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Division of Multilateral Cooperation  
 
Interview 15 
13th February 2013, interviewed via email 
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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Interview 16 
10th March 2013, Brussels 
EUCAM expert 1 
 
Interview 17 
10th March 2013, Brussels 
European People’s Party, Office of the Head Service, Central Asia and 
Mongolia Delegation 
 
Interview 18 
10th March 2013, Brussels 
EEAS, Central Asia Unit, Country Desk Officer 1 
 
Interview 19 
10th March 2013, Brussels 
EEAS, Central Asia Unit, Country Desk Officer 2  
 
Interview 20 
11th March 2013, Brussels 
EEAS, Central Asia Unit, Country Desk Officer 3 
 
Interview 21 
11th March 2013, Brussels 
EEAS, Human Rights Unit, Programme Officer 
 
Interview 22 
12th March 2013, Brussels 
Staffer at the Permanent Representation of Lithuania to the European Union 
 
Interview 23 
12th March 2013, Brussels 
EEAS, Central Asia Unit, Thematic Programme Manager  
 
Interview 24 
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12th March 2013, Brussels 
European Commission, DG Trade 
 
Interview 25 
12th March 2013, Brussels 
European Commission, DG DEVCO, Geographical Coordination Central 
Asia, Middle East/Gulf, Asia Regional Programmes, Country Desk Officer 1 
 
Interview 26 
12th March 2013, Brussels 
European Commission, DG DEVCO, Geographical Coordination Central 
Asia, Middle East/Gulf, Asia Regional Programmes, Country Desk Officer 2 
 
Interview 27 
22nd April 2013, Bishkek 
Kyrgyz Parliament, MP, Member of the Parliamentary Committee on 
International Affairs 
 
Interview 28 
22nd April 2013, Bishkek 
Externally funded (non-EU) good governance project in Kyrgyzstan, Expert 
in Rule of Law 
 
Interview 29 
23rd April 2013, Bishkek 
The Delegation of the EU to the Kyrgyz Republic, Officer 3  
 
Interview 30 
24th April 2013, Bishkek 
An EU-funded project in Kyrgyzstan 2, Senior Expert 
 
Interview 31 
30th April 2013, Bishkek 
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Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (GIZ) 
Representation in the Kyrgyz Republic, Expert 
 
Interview 32 
30th April 2013, Bishkek 
UNDP Governance Programme, Officer 
 
Interview 33 
8th May 2013, Bishkek 
Department for International Development (DFID) in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Officer 
 
Interview 34 
14th May 2013, Astana 
The Delegation of the EU to Kazakhstan, Officer 1 
 
Interview 35 
14th May 2013, Astana 
The Delegation of the EU to Kazakhstan, Officer 2  
 
Interview 36 
14th May 2013, Astana 
The Delegation of the EU to Kazakhstan, Officer 3 
 
Interview 37 
15th May 2013, Astana 
Parliament of Kazakhstan, MP and Head of a Parliamentary Faction 
 
Interview 38 
15th May 2013, Astana 
Parliament of Kazakhstan, MP  
 
Interview 39 
15th May 2013, Astana 
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German Embassy to Kazakhstan 
 
Interview 40 
17th May 2013, Astana 
The Delegation of the EU to Kazakhstan, Officer 4 
 
Interview 41 
17th May 2013, Astana 
Opposition political party 1, leader 
 
Interview 42 
17th May 2013, Astana 
Opposition political party 2, deputy leader 
 
Interview 43 
11th July 2013, interviewed via Skype 
Member of the European Parliament 
 
Interview 44 
22nd December 2014, interviewed via email 
An EU-funded regional, programme manager. 
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Appendix C Map of Central Asia 
Source: United Nations 2011. Map no.3763, revision no.7. Cartographic 
Section. Available at http://ow.ly/SeXwC (Accessed: 31 December 2015) 
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Appendix D ISAF Troop Contributing Nations 
Source: NATO 2013. Available at http://ow.ly/Sf0tR (Accessed: 31 
December 2015) 
 
